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1
Methods Used to Evaluate
Employment and Training Programs
in the Past
Evaluation of employment and training programs has been a central
focus of workforce policy decisions in the United States for nearly 25
years, yet remains controversial. Despite major advances in evaluation
methods, it is not clear that the nation has the tools it needs to obtain
unbiased measures of the benefits of any particular training interven
tion. Without such measures for past policies, wise choices cannot be
made among policy options for the future.
It is generally agreed that experimental evaluations, with random
assignment to program and control groups, are more likely to provide
unbiased estimates of program impacts than are alternative methods. It
is also widely recognized that such evaluations cannot be implemented
in all situations. 1 Therefore, over the last several decades, labor econo
mists have developed increasingly sophisticated nonexperimental
econometric methods to estimate the effects of employment and train
ing programs using (nonrandom) "comparison groups" drawn from
external (i.e., nonprogram) sources to represent what would have hap
pened to participants in the absence of the program.
Despite these efforts, there is still no generally accepted nonexperi
mental method for estimating the impacts of such programs on the
earnings and other outcomes of participants. Different methods yield
markedly different estimates, even when applied to identical samples
and data.2 The critical objective of these methods has yet to be
achieved: adjustment of outcomes to remove any preexisting differ
ences between participants and the nonexperimental comparison group
that would otherwise be mistaken as program impacts.
This monograph critically reviews the many nonexperimental
impact estimation approaches introduced over the years that are based
on external comparison groups. It then proposes an "internal" compar
ison group that we believe holds considerable promise: applicants for
the same programs who for various reasons do not participate. No
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recent studies have used the population of nonparticipating applicants
as a benchmark for measuring program effects, and none has ever
tested the effectiveness of that approach using experimental data.
Compared to primitive uses of the applicant-based approach during
the formative years of employment program evaluation (the 1960s and
early 1970s), we extend the methodology here by:
Giving it a stronger theoretical rationale, which makes clear how
certain conceptual limitations of external comparison groups are
corrected through the use of internal, applicant-based comparison
groups;
Incorporating more information on preexisting differences between
excluded applicants and participants than has been available in the
past, including measures that capture the criteria program staff
used to determine which applicants participate; and
Testing the applicant-based measures against estimates of program
impact taken from a randomized field experiment.
We begin in this chapter by reviewing the history of employment
and training program evaluation, with a focus on the methodological
lessons to be learned from that history. 3 We then present a theoretical
rationale for the applicant-based approach in chapter 2. Chapter 3
describes the data we will use to test the approach and develops nonexperimental impact estimates from those data using applicants as com
parison group members. We test the new estimates against the original
experimental findings in chapter 4 to determine which, if any, provide
promising alternatives to the experiment. Chapter 5 summarizes our
conclusions and their implications for future employment and training
evaluations.

The Importance of Employment and Training Programs

The U.S. government has invested in worker training and employ
ment programs at least since the late 1950s.4 By fiscal year 1991, 14
federal departments and agencies ran 125 such programs at a cost of
$16.3 billion per year, consuming just over 1 percent of all federal
expenditures. 5 Additional state programs are numerous, though not
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nearly so large (many are funded in part by federal dollars), while local
governments, private foundations, and employer groups also contribute
to the nation's workforce training effort.6
In total, these programs serve many millions of American workers
each year in an attempt to increase worker productivity and incomes. A
great deal may be at stake in such investments. Increasingly, the skill
level and employment success of the nation's workforce are viewed as
the key to America's standard of living and competitive position in the
world economy.7 Thus, the importance of evaluating the nation's many
workforce programs to distinguish effective from ineffective invest
ments can hardly be overemphasized.

Early Evaluations of MDTA
Serious evaluation of government employment and training pro
grams began with the Manpower Development and Training Act
(MDTA) programs of the 1960s. The U.S. Congress enacted the
MDTA in 1962 to expand federal retraining services for workers who
lost jobs due to technological change8 and, for the first time, to attempt
to improve the long-run earnings capacity of low-skill workers in gen
eral. Operationally, MDTA focused not just on classroom skill training
as had earlier programs, but on on-the-job training and basic education
as well.
Beginning with Borus (1964), several researchers attempted to mea
sure the impact of MDTA on participants' employment and earnings. 9
In hindsight, reviewers of these early studies found them to be uneven
and generally unsatisfying in terms of quality and statistical validity. 10
Some of these studies measured impacts as the change in partici
pant outcomes over time from the preprogram to the postprogram
period. 11 Under this approach, any program that evidenced a substan
tial upward trend in employment and earnings tended to be viewed as a
success, at least if the earnings gain exceeded that for all workers over
the same period. 12 Unfortunately, this approach ignored the possibility
that people enter employment programs at low points in their labor
market histories (e.g., following job loss) and therefore stand to
improve their fortunes more than the average even without special gov-
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ernment assistance. 13 If this is true, pre/post measures of program
impacts have a built-in bias toward favorable conclusions.
Later findings of sharply downward trends in earnings just prior to
program entry the so-called "preprogram dip" noted by Ashenfelter
(1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985), among others, seemed to con
firm the importance of this problem. So did still later experimental
evaluations of job training programs, where a random subset of those
who would otherwise have entered training were precluded from doing
so. Follow-up data for these experimental control groups showed
sharply rising earnings paths in the period after program application
even in the absence of any intervention. 14
The possibility of "dip and recovery" led evaluators to develop an
alternative benchmark with which to judge program effects. If the ini
tial position of program participants provided an unreliable standard,
then perhaps a benchmark could be derived from the experience of
similar workers who did not receive training assistance. Other early
studies of MDTA adopted that tack, usually adjusting for any remain
ing baseline differences between the participant and comparison
groups using statistical matching or multivariate regression tech
niques. 15 For a time, comparison group strategies of this sort were
accepted as an appropriate basis for judging past policies and, implic
itly, for making future policy.

Confronting the Selection Bias Problem
Later evaluations of MDTA added new sophistication to the com
parison group strategy. 16 Here, evaluators focused squarely on the
problem of "self-selection" that individuals who self-select into
employment and training programs are systematically different from
other apparently similar workers who do not seek assistance. In view
of this possibility, it becomes necessary to control not only for differ
ences in general demographic characteristics (e.g., age and education)
between program participants and comparison group members at base
line, but also for the particular factors that motivate program entry at a
point in time. Here, complex econometric techniques enter the employ
ment and training program evaluation literature for the first time.
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In his overview of the econometric evaluation of training programs,
Moffitt (1987) cites Ashenfelter (1978) and Bloch (1979) as the first to
confront the selection bias problem head on. 17 Attention focused on
possible corrections for selection bias through the use of preprogram
earnings to predict a valid postprogram earnings benchmark. Goldberger (1972) and Cain (1975) noted the potential for this approach to
remove selection bias under the strong assumption that systematic
selection into the program was based only on observable variables,
such as preprogram earnings. Ashenfelter (1978) was the first to apply
the approach to real data in his analysis of MDTA. A number of refine
ments and commentaries on the approach followed, including Kiefer
(1979), Cooley, McGuire, and Prescott (1979), Director (1979), and
Bloom (1984a).

The CETA Evaluations.
These models provided the foundation for the next generation of
training program evaluation, which focused not on MDTA but on pro
grams funded under its successor, the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act of 1973 (CETA). Extending the MDTA approach,
CETA offered public service employment and (for particularly disadvantaged workers) unpaid work experience in addition to classroom
and on-the-job training. Barnow (1987) summarizes the many analyses
of CETA impacts commissioned by the U.S. Department of Labor in
the 1970s and early 1980s. 18
Without exception, the CETA studies focused on the comparison of
earnings for CETA participants and similar individuals in the popula
tion at large. 19 They also used preprogram earnings differences to
equalize the two populations at baseline in all cases. As Barnow (1987)
notes, these studies "vary considerably in their findings and conclu
sions on the impact of CETA" (p. 175) and "the results are sensitive to
the specific methods adopted" (p. 157). In particular, Barnow con
cludes that an important source of variation in the estimates was the
way different evaluators used preprogram earnings to predict postpro
gram earnings:
Earnings in the year immediately prior to participation in a train
ing program tend to decline from the trend in the years preceding
it. The treatment of the 'preprogram dip' in the analysis can play a
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substantial role in the estimates of program impact. If the dip is a
transitory phenomenon, then it could influence selection into the
program without having a long-term impact on earnings. ... On
the other hand, if the dip indicates a permanent decline in human
capital (or the value placed by society on the human capital), then
earnings in the period immediately prior to program participation
is likely to be a key variable in explaining later earnings (pp. 184185).

This observation raises a serious problem for the design of evalua
tions using external comparison groups. If the preprogram dip is purely
transitory, one need only match the participant and comparison groups
on earnings prior to the dip (and follow both groups long enough to
measure postprogram earnings beyond the dip) to obtain a comparison
group that is well-matched to participants on permanent income. 20 But
if the loss of earnings that triggered program entry signifies a perma
nent break in the earnings trend for participants, earnings prior to that
break contain very little information about postprogram earnings, and
therefore cannot be used to identify an appropriate external compari
son group (or, what is the same thing, to adjust for differences in postprogram earnings that are not due to the program).
This uncertainty casts serious doubt on any method that relies
heavily on preprogram earnings to predict postprogram earnings. If the
preprogram dip is both unprecedented (for the individual) and perma
nent, this strategy cannot work by definition. If instead it represents a
mix of transitory and permanent changes for any group of program
participants, one can never be sure of the mix, much less how to predict
future earnings for the subset of participants experiencing permanent
shifts.21 Finally, even the best scenario a situation where all pre-program earnings changes are transitory does not solve the problem,
since the analyst has no means of recognizing that situation when it
occurs.22
On the basis of his review of the CETA studies, Barnow concluded
that:
[Randomized field experiments] appear to be the only method
available at this time to overcome the limitations of nonexperimental evaluations (p. 190).
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Experiments create "internal" comparison groups of control group
members who, because they are a random subset of would-be partici
pants, will on average follow the same permanent and transitory earn
ings paths that participants would have absent the program. Hence,
subject only to sampling error, the control group provides an appropri
ate benchmark, or counterfactual, for measuring program effects. As
noted below, Barnow's conclusion that controlled experiments are the
preferred method for evaluating training programs eventually came to
be shared by most of the evaluation community.

Two-Stage Methods.
Another external comparison group strategy for addressing the
selection bias problem was proposed concurrent with the CETA stud
ies: the use of two-stage selection models to jointly explain participa
tion in employment and training programs and its effects on earnings.
The most widely cited two-stage technique for addressing selection
bias in the labor market is that introduced by Heckman (1974, 1976,
1979).
Under this approach, specific statistical assumptions about the rela
tionship between the decision to participate in a training program and
the participant's future earnings provide a way to equalize the starting
point for the program and comparison groups when measuring pro
gram impacts. These assumptions require that the factors that influence
both program entry and later earnings, such as educational level and
motivation, are either controlled for in the analysis through measured
variables or jointly influence these two outcomes according to the wellbehaved statistical patterns of the bivariate normal distribution. 23 If
these assumptions hold true, the resulting estimates of program effect
are unbiased. In fact, the model has been found to be sensitive to the
assumption of bivariate normality in studies by several econometricians.24
The two-stage model for selection bias adjustments has not been
widely used for employment and training evaluations, although it has
in many other econometric applications. 25 Only one of the CETA stud
ies (Westat 1984) attempted the methodology, but the estimates of pro
gram impact were reported to be too sensitive to the variables included
in (or excluded from) the model to be useful.Manski (1989) summa-
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rizes the current state of the econometrician's unease with the method
when he refers to the two-stage selection model's "fragility," in which
"seemingly small misspecifications may generate large biases in esti
mates" of the program's effects (p. 356).
To summarize, then, the problem of selection bias while perhaps
much better understood appeared just as intractable following the
CETA studies as before. Direct empirical support for this conclusion
appeared almost immediately thereafter.

Testing Nonexperimental Estimates Against
Experimental Findings
As the CETA findings emerged, several researchers began to exam
ine the problem of selection bias in the various comparison group strat
egies employed by the CETA researchers using data from controlled
field experiments. The use of experimental methods for social policy
evaluation began in the late 1960s and early 1970s in other policy con
texts, specifically with regard to the effects of a national negative
income tax.26 Under the experimental approach, the group of individu
als that would normally be subjected to a policy or program is split at
random prior to the intervention and only a portion "treated" with the
policy or program. The remaining group which differs from the par
ticipants only by random sampling error then serves as a control
group" for measuring the effects of the intervention, in much the same
way that controlled experiments are used to test new drugs in a labora
tory or clinical setting. In large samples, chance differences in preexist
ing characteristics between the treatment and control groups tend to
disappear (and, in any case, can be taken into account in standard sta
tistical tests), effectively removing the self-selection problem that is at
the heart of any nonexperimental impact analysis.
The first training program to use random assignment to select partic
ipants was the National Supported Work Demonstration, which pro
vided intensive training and work assistance to severely disadvantaged
workers such as long-term welfare recipients, disadvantaged youth,
and ex-offenders.27 In the mid-1980s, LaLonde (1986) and Fraker and
Maynard (1987) reanalyzed the original Supported Work data with
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nonexperimental methods, as though the experimental control group
was not available, and compared the resulting estimates with the exper
imental findings. They used the same technique that had been applied
to the CETA data, drawing external comparison groups from national
data bases by selecting a sample of individuals who were similar to the
participants on the basis of certain observed characteristics. They pro
duced estimates of earnings impacts that varied as much from one
another as the original CETA estimates.
More important, LaLonde and Fraker-Maynard for the first time
demonstrated that few of the nonexperimental estimates came close to
the experimental estimate, which was presumed to be free of selection
bias. Moreover, estimates derived from more sophisticated and more
theoretically compelling techniques performed only a little better than
more primitive approaches and still left a wide margin for error. 28 Most
observers saw this as a graphic illustration of the potential for selection
bias to invalidate even the most sophisticated nonexperimental tech
niques.29 An immediate consequence was a widespread and rapidly
growing preference among policy makers, both in Congress and
among executive agencies, for experimental over nonexperimental
training program evaluations. 30

Responses to the Unfavorable Test Results
Realizing that controlled field experiments could not, or would not,
be used in all applications, some evaluators responded to the LaLonde
and Fraker-Maynard results not so much as an indictment of external
comparison group techniques but as a challenge to improve them. We
review those responses below. 31
Model Specification Tests.
The most direct response came from Heckman and Hotz (1989),
who argued that many of the estimation techniques considered by
LaLonde and Fraker-Maynard could and should have been rejected
prior to the comparison to the experimental benchmark on the basis of
their conceptual implausibility and/or their demonstrable inconsistency
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with the nonexperimental data. 32 Making these exclusions, Heckman
and Hotz contended that the remaining plausible estimates are much
more similar to one another, and in their policy implications to the
experimental estimate than the original group. Others, however, have
not found these tests to be helpful; see for example, Friedlander and
Robins (1992).
A conceptual problem at issue in this method is the absence of
explicit criteria for choosing among econometric methods and their
various estimates when there is no experimental estimate against which
to compare them. Heckman and Hotz's response to this problem was to
develop a series of model specification tests, based on methods first
introduced in Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986). They argued that evaluators should accept or reject each nonexperimental estimation tech
nique based on how well its assumptions accord with the available
data. Given enough preprogram data, many nonexperimental tech
niques can be tested in the absence of a controlled experiment (which,
of course, is the only situation in which such tests are needed). These
include approaches that assume earnings are steady over time (testable
with two or more preprogram observations) or that earnings vary at
random around some steady-state trend line (testable with three or
more preprogram observations).
In the best case, model specification tests would reduce the range of
nonexperimental estimates to a tight band around the experimental
benchmark. If the "tightness" of this band or at least some measure
of consistency among the remaining estimates as to policy implications
(e.g., whether a program has a positive or negative effect) can be
established from nonexperimental data, one should have greater faith
that the group of estimates as a whole comes close to the (unobserved)
experimental benchmark. One's faith in the approach should grow fur
ther still with each instance in which it replicates the results of a true
experiment, of which Heckman-Hotz was the first attempt.
Better Comparison Groups and Baseline Data.
A second, related response to the limits of existing nonexperimental
estimators was pioneered by the National JTPA Study sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Labor in the late 1980s. This $23 million study of
the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) for the first time combined
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both experimental and nonexperimental elements in its design.
Approximately $5 million was used to study the selection of program
participants and to assess the validity of nonexperimental techniques.
To provide a basis for nonexperimental comparison groups, the project
identified and interviewed 2,300 individuals in the study areas who
were eligible for JTPA services but did not participate. The eligible
population was viewed^as an external comparison group in which the
preexisting factors separating participants from nonparticipants could
be identified and included in the model to eliminate selection bias from
the estimated program impact.33
While results are not yet available from this undertaking, its design
has many desirable features. This external comparison group was
selected on the basis of its similarity to the group assigned to JTPA in
terms of location and current economic circumstances that determine
JTPA eligibility. Interviews with these individuals focused on detailed
employment and earnings histories over the five years prior to eligibil
ity determination and 18 months after. Data were also collected on
respondents' understanding of and inclination to pursue eligibility for a
variety of employment assistance programs, including JTPA. The pur
pose of this data collection strategy was to discover the reasons that
some eligible individuals applied to and entered JTPA at a point in
time, while others applied and did not enter and still others (the exter
nal comparison group) did not even apply to the program. Visits to the
study sites by the principal researchers were designed to heighten this
understanding by looking at the program intake process itself.
In many respects, this research project represents the limit of what
can be accomplished through reliance on comparison groups generated
external to the program under study. It maximizes the comparison
group match to participants, the information available to control for
any remaining differences, and the econometric expertise needed to
make those adjustments. Thus, once completed, the study should pro
vide a useful test of the potential validity of external comparisons.
Nonparametric Bounds on Effects
In the interim, an entirely new approach has been introduced by
Charles Manski. First applied to the measurement of the effects of fam
ily structure on high school graduation (see Manski et al. 1992), this
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strategy uses nonparametric methods to place bounds on the selection
bias in estimating program effects. In contrast with the current econo
metric methods of modeling the selection process, which require rather
restrictive assumptions about functional form and other parametric
assumptions, Manski's "nonparametric" method is virtually assump
tion-free.
The technique is best illustrated when the outcome is binary, such as
graduating from high school or obtaining a job. In this case, the impact
of the program must be within a fixed range that is determined by the
outcomes of participants and nonparticipants and the relative shares of
the population in each group. To use the method for continuous out
comes, such as earnings, more restrictive assumptions are required.
Whether the bounds derived by this method will be tight enough to
give useful guidance to policy decisions is an open question, as Manski
acknowledges.34
The real payoff to the approach may come only as carefully selected
assumptions are added to the model to narrow the initial bounds to
some meaningful level. 35 In any case, the method has the virtue of
imposing a "from the ground up" assessment of the implicit assump
tions imbedded in all previous (and future) nonexperimental estima
tors, making clear the tradeoff between the strength of the assumption
and the progress it provides in narrowing the bounds of uncertainty.
Comparison Site Designs
A fourth strategy, more popular with policy makers than with
researchers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is to design evaluations
around random assignment of local areas such as counties or other
units of local government to program or comparison status. 36 In these
"comparison site" designs, comparison groups are taken from the pop
ulation of potential participants (e.g., AFDC recipients) in alternative
geographic areas, either by purposively matching comparison sites to
predetermined program sites or by picking matched pairs of counties
and then deciding at random which one will host the program.
Some types of effects can only be analyzed with comparison site
designs. If, for example, the interest is in estimating the impact of a
"saturation" treatment or effects at the community level, the program
must include all individuals within the community; it cannot be imple-
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mented for a just sample of individuals who are randomly assigned to
treatment. Comparison site designs can also capture effects that occur
prior to the point at which random assignment could feasibly be imple
mented, such as changes in the rate at which individuals apply to a pro
gram.
In principle, when pairs of sites are randomly assigned to treatment
or control status, this approach removes the selection bias problem just
as effectively as random assignment of individuals, without the added
complication of deciding individual fates one at a time. 37 As with ran
dom assignment of individuals, treatment sites do not differ systemati
cally from comparison sites on the nonprogram factors that affect
outcomes. But they may still differ substantially on those factors by
chance alone, given the small number of sites involved in most such
studies.38 However, if most of the variation in the outcome of interest
(e.g., earnings) is at the individual level, so that average outcome levels
tend to be similar across localities, a relatively small number of ran
domly assigned sites could provide highly reliable impact estimates.
Comparison site designs have the disadvantage that they cannot be
used to evaluate existing programs without discontinuing local opera
tions in the comparison sites. Moreover, problems can arise even when
the approach is applied to demonstrations of new programs in selected
counties. If the program is voluntary, the preferred comparison of par
ticipants in program sites with "participant-like" individuals in nonpro
gram sites becomes impossible, since one has no way of identifying
who would have participated in the nonprogram sites had the program
been offered. The most obvious alternative comparisons of partici
pants with the entire eligible population in the nonprogram sites reintroduces the self-selection problem common to earlier comparison
group approaches. The best that can be done in this situation is to com
pare those who meet the program's eligibility rules between the two
sets of sites, adjusting for the fact that most eligibles do not partici
pate.39 Unless the participation rate among eligibles in the program
sites is quite high, however, the resulting impact estimates will be rela
tively imprecise.
Overall, comparison site designs remain an option of necessity more
than of choice when evaluating mandatory employment and training
demonstrations. And they certainly are not a solution to the more gen-

14 Methods Used to Evaluate Employment and Training Programs in the Past

eral problem of self-selection when evaluating existing voluntary pro
grams such as JTPA.
Instrumental Variable Approaches
A long-standing approach to dealing with the endogeneity of selec
tion into certain states, such as participation in training programs, is to
apply various econometric techniques used in simultaneous-equation
estimation. These methods have only recently been applied to the eval
uation of training programs. In this context, the first equation models
program participation, and the second equation models participant out
comes. The equation modeling participation must include one or more
determinants (variables) that do not, on their own, influence the out
comes. In the nonexperimental evaluation of the Job Corps, for exam
ple, distance from the nearest Job Corps center was found to be a good
predictor of participation, but not of earnings.40 If such factors can be
found, they can provide reliable information on the effects of participa
tion per se, free from the influence of selection.
In practice, econometricians have frequently found it difficult to
identify a factor that might influence participation that does not other
wise influence earnings. Caution in choosing such "instruments" is
well justified, since making an erroneous exclusion restriction from the
earnings equation can easily lead to substantial bias in the impact esti
mate.41
Angrist and Imbens (1991) and Imbens and Angrist (1992) recast
the search for an exclusion restriction in a two-stage model as a need
for an "instrumental variable" that can be used to estimate program
impacts in a single stage. If a factor can be identified that affects partic
ipation but not earnings (except through participation), it can be used
as an "instrument" in place of the usual indicator for participation in an
earnings impact equation. Angrist and Imbens discuss possible instru
ments in several applications, though not that of evaluating the earn
ings effects of employment and training programs.
In general, the use of instrumental variable methods of nonexperi
mental analysis has to be carefully justified in a particular context. The
conditions necessary for accepting assignment to a treatment group as
a valid instrument for participation are widely accepted; those involv
ing other instruments are not. Sometimes, nonrandom variation in
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access to programs occurs naturally due to geographic or other factors,
but these same factors may affect future earnings in ways not otherwise
controlled for in the model. Thus, while valid instruments for program
participation (other than random assignment) may exist, they must be
discovered and justified in each specific evaluation application. Ran
dom assignment, on the other hand, always provides a strong starting
point for deriving valid instruments.

Lessons from the Literature

On the basis of this review, we draw four major lessons from the
thirty-year history of employment and training program evaluation:
1. Assumptions about the selection process that distinguishes pro
gram participants from nonparticipants (and from their own prior
experience) are inevitable in any meaningful analysis of program
impact.
2. The best and most credible impact estimates are those whose
assumptions are clearest, most limited, and most plausible a priori,
and most testable ex post.
3. It will be difficult to use data on the characteristics of participants
and nonparticipants to replace knowledge of the selection process
as the best starting point for measuring program impacts.
4. In voluntary programs, it is particularly critical to take account of
the time path of participants' earnings around the point of program
entry. Participants tend to enter a program at a low point in their
earnings history the "preprogram dip" and, absent intervention,
may or may not emerge with their earnings restored to previous
levels.
None of these points is a new insight. Manski makes point 1 the
inevitability of assumptions most sharply by starting without
assumptions and showing what must be added to obtain meaningful
results. The same point is driven home by the long history of evaluators
introducing new techniques that avoid the assumptions of earlier
approaches and ending up simply shifting the debate to the validity of
their own set of assumptions.
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The importance of limiting and testing assumptions wherever possi
ble point 2 is also fundamental to much of the work reviewed here.
Angrist and Imbens (1991, pp. 1-2) make this point most succinctly:
"Disagreements over evaluation methodology notwithstanding,
research . . . allowing for fewer assumptions in observational analyses
is likely to remain important." The development of model specification
tests (by Heckman and others) has improved but not assured the suc
cess of methods relying on external comparison groups and tests of
assumptions.
Point 3 has also appeared in various forms in the literature for at
least twenty years, beginning with Goldberger's (1972) observation
that knowing the selection rule and having data on its determinants is
sufficient for unbiased estimation. The same point is fundamental to
mainline evaluation handbooks in the education field (e.g, Campbell
and Stanley 1966; Cook and Campbell 1979), which urge evaluators to
impose well-understood and carefully monitored selection rules when
designing impact evaluations.
Finally, while point 4 has been well known for many years, its
implications have perhaps been less than fully appreciated. In particu
lar, early evaluations based on external comparison groups essentially
ignored this point in attempting to use individuals who are (on average)
in steady state in their earnings histories as benchmarks for individuals
with transitorily low earnings, while typically controlling for only
fixed factors such as race, sex, and education. The more sophisticated
attempts to adjust for preprogram earnings differences are also fraught
with difficulties. In particular, the loss of earnings that typically trig
gers program entry among participants may signify a permanent break
in earnings trends, so that preprogram earnings contain essentially no
information about subsequent "without program" earnings levels. In
this case, even comparison groups that are well matched on permanent
preprogram earnings (e.g., by matching on earnings before the pre-program dip) will yield biased estimates of program impact.
These conclusions suggest that external comparison groups may not
provide the best benchmark for measuring training program impacts.
As an alternative, evaluators might consider internal comparison
groups of nonparticipating program applicants, whose division from
participants is based on simple and well-understood selection rules and
whose comparability to participants especially with respect to the

Methods Used to Evaluate Employment and Training Programs in the Past

17

time path of earnings can be established with a minimum of assump
tions and data. While such a strategy will not necessarily avoid all of
the problems that have surfaced in the literature over the years, we
believe it is worth trying. We begin one trial of the approach in the next
chapter.
NOTES
1. The use of experiments is sometimes limited by the operational and ethical problems that
arise when randomly excluding individuals from program services. See, for example, Burtless and
Orr (1986) or Manski and Garfinkel (1991) for a discussion of this issue.
2. See, for example, LaLonde (1986), Fraker and Maynard (1987), and Barnow (1987).
3. Moffitt (1991) provides a similar review of the literature through 1989, drawing substan
tially different conclusions from those presented here.
4. O'Neill (1973) provides a succinct overview of early programs, then called "manpower"
programs, many of which were supported under the Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962.
5. These figures include spending on postsecondary education as well as job training and
placement programs for adults and non-college-bound youth. See U.S. General Accounting Office
(1992) for details.
6. Miller and Buckley (1993) estimate that U.S. employers invest 1 to 2 percent of their pay
roll expenditures in worker training, a figure in the tens of billions of dollars.
7. See Reich (1983), Johnston et al. (1987), and U.S. Congress (1990) for three of the many
recent "call to arms" statements on this theme.
8. The Area Redevelopment Act of the late 1950s provided skill training and placement assis
tance to displaced workers prior to MDTA.
9. We define "impact" as the change in outcomes due to the program i.e., that portion of the
outcomes that would not have occurred absent the program. Operationally, this can be thought of
as the difference between the outcome given the program (usually observed) and the outcome that
would have occurred for the same person had he or she not participated in the program (which
cannot be observed directly). Other evaluations of MDTA focused exclusively on program admin
istration and the observed postprogram outcomes of participants, rather than on impacts.
10. For example, O'Neill (1973) concludes that the early studies "vary tremendously in terms
of quality of data and statistical methodology" (p. 10). Other reviews, not all as critical as O'Neill,
include Somers (1968), Hardin (1969), Borus and Buntz (1972), Goldstein (1972), and Perry et al.
(1975).
11. See, for example, Goldfarb (1969), U.S. Department of Labor (1970), or Smith (1970).
12. Smith (1970) stood out among the early evaluators by comparing trainee wage gains to
those of workers in the economy in general before interpreting upward trends as program effects.
13. This phenomenon, which is known in statistics as "regression to the mean", had been
noted by a number of researchers; see, for example, Cain and Hollister (1969). Ashenfelter (1978)
and Kiefer (1979) provide excellent discussions of the problem and methods for dealing with it.
Note that the point does not necessarily apply to employment and training programs in which par
ticipation is mandatory, such as those that have been the focus of much of the recent literature on
evaluation of programs for AFDC recipients (see, for example, Gueron and Pauly 1991). When
participation is imposed from the outside, as in mandatory work-welfare programs such as the
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AFDC JOBS program or the food stamp employment and training program, one would not neces
sarily expect participants to begin at unusually low points in their labor market histories.
14. See, for example, Bell and Orr (1994) and Bloom et al. (1993).
15. See, for example, Borus (1964), Main (1968), Stromsdorfer (1968), Hardin and Borus
(1971), Prescott and Cooley (1972), and Farber (1972).
16. See Ashenfelter (1978), Kiefer (1979), and Bloom (1984a).
17. Others had previously addressed the effect of self-selection on non-training-related labor
market outcomes using sophisticated econometric techniques. See, for example, Ashenfelter and
Johnson (1972), Greenberg and Kosters (1973), and Heckman (1974).
18. These analyses included Westat (1981), Bloom and McLaughlin (1982), Bassi (1983,
1984), Westat (1984), Bassi et al. (1984), Dickenson, Johnson, and West (1984, 1986), and Geraci
(1984). Additional analyses of CETA not included in the Barnow review appear in Bryant and
Rupp (1987), Rupp et al. (1987), and Card and Sullivan (1988).
19. Data for this comparison were taken from a nationally representative sample of CETA
enrollees interviewed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, members of the U.S. population at large
interviewed as part of the Bureau's March Current Population Survey, and several years of
matched social security earnings records for both samples. Collectively, this data base was known
as the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey.
20. In practice, of course, it may be difficult to identify the "pre-dip" period and to obtain data
on earnings during that interval, either because of data constraints or because sample members do
not have extensive employment histories (e.g., youths and women entering or reentering the labor
force). It is also true that as the preprogram and postprogram earnings observations are separated
further in time, preprogram earnings becomes a less powerful predictor of postprogram earnings
in general.
21. Ashenfelter and Card (1985) also recognized this problem and attempted to address it, but
in the end concluded that only an experimental design could be relied upon to yield unbiased esti
mates in the face of this uncertainty.
22. Observation of the subsequent earnings of trainees cannot resolve this problem, since later
earnings reflect both the natural "rebound" (or lack of rebound) from the preprogram dip and the
effects of the training program intervention.
23. Maddala (1983, pp. 260-71) provides a useful discussion of these assumptions and other
aspects of the two-stage model for correcting for selection bias.
24. See Goldberger (1983). Horowitz and Neumann (1987) and Newey, Powell, and Walker
(1990) explore the implications of relaxing the bivariate normal distributional assumption in other
applications. To our knowledge, this extension has not been undertaken in the context of training
program impact analysis.
25. See Benus and Byrnes (1993) for a recent exception.
26. See Greenberg and Shroder (1991) for an overview of these and a large number of other
social experiments.
27. See Hollister et al. (1984).
28. Couch (1992) repeated a portion of this analysis with longer-term follow-up data and
obtained much the same result. See also LaLonde and Maynard (1987) for a summary and discus
sion of the earlier analyses.
29. See, for example, Stromsdofer et al. (1985), who recommended an experimental evalua
tion of the next generation of federal employment and training programs those authorized by the
Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 largely on this basis. Others to make the case for experi
ments over nonexperimental methods included Ashenfelter and Card (1985), Burtless and Orr
(1986), and Barnow (1987). For dissenting opinions, see Heckman, Hotz, and Dabos (1987),
Heckman (1991), Manski and Garfinkel (1991), and Heckman and Smith (1993).
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30. Gueron and Pauly (1991) summarize more than a dozen evaluations of employment and
training programs for welfare recipients initiated as controlled experiments in the 1980s. Greenberg and Shroder (1991) provide an even more complete catalog ranging over many years, policy
interventions, and target populations (e.g., displaced workers, youth ex-offenders). The preference
for experimental research continues unabated into the 1990s, as evidenced by recent decisions at
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Social Security Administration, and the
U.S. Department of Labor to fund major experimental evaluations of training programs for wel
fare recipients, persons receiving disability benefits, and disadvantaged and dislocated workers.
See Wiseman (1993) and Bell et al. (1993) for details of the first two initiatives; the Department of
Labor studies are just underway and will focus on the national Job Corps program and job search
demonstrations in three states.
31. Two further new directions in the recent employment and training evaluation literature do
not bear directly on the relative merits of different impact estimation techniques. These concern
the synthesis of findings from multiple program evaluations using "meta analysis" techniques (see
Greenberg and Wiseman 1992) and the examination of different aspects of multidimensional
treatments (see Greenberg, Meyer, and Wiseman 1992).
32. Model specification tests were also advocated by Ashenfelter and Card (1985).
33. Chapters VI and VII of Bloom et al. (1988) provide the original motivation and design for
this approach. A more recent version appears in Hotz (1991).
34. Angrist and Imbens (1991) explore a possible bounding strategy for continuous outcome
measures, though not one free of assumptions.
35. Manski et al. (1992) illustrate this process.
36. Several of the work-welfare initiatives of the last six years have employed this approach.
(See Fishman and Weinberg 1991 for a summary.) Among the most visible is the evaluation of the
Washington State Family Independence Program (Long and Wissoker 1992).
37. See Harris (1985), Ginsburg (1985), Orr (1985), and Garfinkel, Manski, and Michalopoulos (1991) for a more extensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of comparison site
designs in relation to other options.
38. Friedlander and Robins (1992) explore the potential for error through random selection of
program and comparison sites using data from the WIN demonstrations of the 1970s. Working
with data from multicounty work-welfare experiments, they combine treatment group observa
tions from one set of randomly selected "program" counties with control group data from another
set of randomly selected "comparison" counties. The results show that impact estimates are quite
sensitive to the particular counties selected, even after controlling for certain preexisting differ
ences between counties and individuals.
39. Bloom (1984b) provides a formula for this adjustment. Angrist and Imbens (1991) specifi
cally advocate this approach to the design of experiments.
40. See Mallar et al. (1982).
41. Learner (1978, 1982) demonstrated this result with regard to identifying restrictions on
two-stage models generally.

2
The Case for Applicant-Based
Comparison Groups
Our review of the history of employment and training program eval
uations in chapter 1 identified several weaknesses in the most common
approach to measuring program effects using external comparison
groups. In this chapter we explore the use of alternate "internal" com
parison groups composed of nonparticipating applicants as a means of
addressing the key weakness of selection bias.
We begin by identifying the qualities we would require of a nonexperimental impact estimation technique in order to make it a reason
able alternative to randomized field experiments. We then discuss the
different subgroups of nonparticipants that might serve as internal
comparison groups and how each of these groups differs from partici
pants. A subsequent section reviews prior uses of applicant-based com
parison groups and what became of that strategy in recent years. A final
section explores ways to overcome several of the limitations of previ
ous applications as we seek to reintroduce the method to the literature.

Desired Qualities in a Nonexperimental Estimation Technique
Three qualities are essential for any nonexperimental method to
replace experiments as an accepted means of measuring the effects of
employment and training programs. Such a nonexperimental method
must be:
Operationally feasible and affordable across a variety of contexts;
Free of any important amount of selection bias;
Widely accepted among policy makers as free of selection bias.
As we saw in chapter 1, the literature on nonexperimental estima
tion has appropriately emphasized the second of these three criteria by
focusing on the risk of selection bias. But this is not, of course, the
only factor to be considered.
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Much of the debate over experiments concerns their operational fea
sibility and cost. This category has several components: data collection
and analysis costs, logistical difficulties when implementing random
assignment in the field, and political and ethical concerns about ran
dom exclusions from program services. We will not attempt to summa
rize the debate surrounding these issues. 1 Instead, we will note its
principal lesson: that operational constraints lie at the root of many of
the perceived difficulties with experimental analyses. 2 This being the
case, it is in the realm of feasibility and cost that nonexperimental
methods must improve on experiments if they are to be considered;
they will not be able to do so with regard to selection bias.
Often overlooked in the debate is the need for credibility among pol
icy makers who will use research results. It is not enough that an esti
mation technique be considered free of selection bias in the minds of
researchers; it must also be viewed as bias-free by policy makers if its
results are to be trusted and used. The presumption of accuracy on the
part of policy makers, based on a method's "face validity," constitutes
one of the key strengths of experimental research. For example, it was
this "power to persuade" that propelled the findings of the work-wel
fare experiments of the 1980s to a pivotal role in the passage of
national welfare reform in the Family Support Act 1988. As several
commentators have noted, as important as it was for the work-welfare
findings to be unbiased, it was even more essential that they be viewed
as unbiased and, therefore, beyond dispute. 3 An example in the oppo
site direction is the set of Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act (CETA) studies reviewed in chapter 1, none of which produced
estimates viewed as credible by policy or research experts and which,
as a result, had little consistent influence on policy.
The credibility requirement may in fact pose the greatest challenge
to the success of any nonexperimental impact estimation technique. To
achieve widespread recognition as a valid approach, a nonexperimental
estimator must do what none of the CETA estimators did:
Offer a compelling reason to believe, a priori, that by its very con
struction it has the potential to overcome the selection bias prob
lem; and
Demonstrate its validity through favorable comparisons to esti
mates that are free from selection bias.
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In the words of one of the leading exponents of nonexperimental
research on education and training programs: "We are looking for a
behaviorally motivated and empirically validated nonexperimental
impact estimation technique."4 We will return to this requirement, and
the others noted above, as we assess the overall potential of the appli
cant-based estimation approach in the rest of the monograph.

Potential Nonparticipant Comparison Groups
To understand why the use of nonparticipating applicants as com
parison group members may meet these criteria, we begin by reviewing
the typical employment and training program intake process that gen
erates the nonparticipating applicant population. Exhibit 2.1 summa
rizes that process and the steps by which some individuals become
nonparticipating applicants and others participants or nonapplicants.5
Of all these groups, only participants receive the classroom training,
job search assistance, and other services that define the program, the
effects of which the evaluator seeks to measure.
Throughout the program intake process, the pool of potential partic
ipants divides over and over again until only the participants remain. At
various points of division, groups of nonparticipating applicants are
created, which can serve as "internal" comparison groups for measur
ing program effects. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these
various groups below.
Nonapplicants
As shown in the exhibit, the first division is between citizens eligible
to participate in a given program and those who are not. Typically in
government-sponsored employment and training programs, the cate
gorical requirements of eligibility focus on household income levels
(e.g., only low-income individuals qualify) and/or current employment
status (e.g., only those out of work qualify). Qualifications may also
extend to reasons for nonemployment (e.g., plant closing), income
transfer program status (e.g., AFDC or food stamp receipt), and/or edu
cational or competency levels.
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Exhibit 2.1 Flow Diagram of Entry into Employment and Training
Programs
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As shown at the second level of the exhibit, both the eligible and
ineligible populations divide into applicants and nonapplicants. The
vast majority of both groups never apply, with applications from the
pool of ineligibles being particularly unusual. Individuals may fail to
apply to a program for a variety of reasons other than the realization
that they are not eligible. A principal reason for nonapplication among
eligibles is that the individual feels no need for the services that the
program provides. In employment and training programs, individuals
typically apply only when they are unemployed. Since eligibility for
training programs is usually based on broader criteria, such as family
income, a large proportion of the eligible population may not be unem
ployed at any given time.6
Even when matched on formal eligibility criteria and current labor
market status, nonapplicants may differ sharply from participants in
their interest in self-improvement and motivation to work both fac
tors that could substantially affect subsequent earnings. Yet despite
these likely differences between nonapplicants and participants, eligi
ble nonapplicants are routinely used as external comparison groups
against which program effects are measured. At times, even the infor
mation needed to identify eligible individuals as opposed to nonparticipants in general is unavailable when forming comparison groups.
As a result, evaluators have often had to rely on external comparison
groups of nonapplicants shown near the top of exhibit 2.1 to com
pare with participants at the very bottom of the exhibit. That these two
groups match up well on the factors that determine future earnings
(other than program participation) seems unlikely, even if one controls
for observed differences in age, education, and previous income.
There are two situations, however, in which eligibles might make an
acceptable comparison group. In the first instance, all eligibles may be
equal in their motivation and future earnings potential at the point of
eligibility, but differ in terms of the timing of that eligibility. Those
who become eligible at a time when the program is perceived to have
training "slots" available to new applicants apply, while the majority
those who become eligible when availability is believed to be highly
limited do not. Here, it is only the timing of eligibility that distin
guishes the two groups, which in steady state may not generate system
atic differences in underlying earnings potential.7 The simpler version
of this "rationing" of applications occurs when geographic location
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limits access to program services for individuals who are otherwise
identical to program participants. The use of nonapplicant eligibles as
comparison groups could be justified in both instances.

Withdrawals and No-Shows
Some of the same motivational differences will often distinguish
participants from other populations defined during intake. Those who
withdraw from the program's intake process while their application is
being processed the "withdrawals" shown at the third level of the
exhibit also differ from eventual participants on these factors. So too
do accepted applicants who fail to show up for services once admitted
into the program the "no-shows" shown at the fifth level of the
exhibit. Even so, the withdrawals at least match the circumstances and
motivations of participants up to the point of applying for the program.
No-shows parallel participants even further into the process, separating
only after acceptance into the program.
Of the two groups, no-shows should be better matched to partici
pants on motivational factors, in that they waited longer i.e., until
after they were approved for program entry before withdrawing. Noshows also differ from withdrawals in that, like participants, they have
passed the screens used by program staff to select program partici
pants.

Screen-Outs
Between these two stages of self-selection comes the crucial step of
program selection and exclusion. Most government-funded employ
ment and training programs lack the resources to serve all of the eligi
ble individuals who would like to participate. Thus, some form of
program selection is essential to ration program services. The exact
form of that selection may vary, but the result is always the same: a
group of "screen-outs," individuals at least as motivated to obtain pro
gram services as the no-shows and possibly as motivated as the par
ticipants but who are not allowed to participate. These individuals
differ from participants on program-related factors, but not necessarily
on the types of personal factors that lead to self-selection among with
drawals and no-shows.
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In summary, then, the groups of nonparticipants that might be con
sidered for use as comparison groups, and the principal ways in which
they may differ from the participants, include:
Nonapplicants drawn from the general population, the group used
to form external comparison groups. While these individuals may
differ from participants in the personal characteristics that influ
ence selection, it is possible to control for many of these in the
analysis. Several important characteristics are particularly difficult
to control for, however, and may be systematically different for
program participants and nonapplicants.
Withdrawals, who voluntarily withdraw from the intake process
after application but before acceptance or rejection by program
staff. Because they applied to the program, withdrawals are pre
sumably more like participants than are nonapplicants in the per
sonal characteristics and labor market status that determine selfselection. But they may still differ from participants on some of
the factors that determine interest in the program, and on the pro
gram selection factors applied by intake staff.
Screen-outs, who clearly differ from participants in terms of the
characteristics that lead program staff to reject their applications.
While these individuals resemble participants in their initial deci
sion to seek services, they include some individuals who like
withdrawals would not have participated were they selected.
No-shows, who differ from participants primarily in terms of fac
tors (e.g., motivation, finding a job on one's own) that lead some
accepted applicants to enter the program once accepted, while
others do not.
We refer to the last three of these groups collectively as "nonparticipating applicants."

The History of Applicant-Based Comparison Groups
Interest in nonparticipating applicants as comparison group mem
bers is not new, particularly in the field of education research. Begin-
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ning with Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), a vast literature has
emerged on how best to use comparison groups of students excluded
from educational programs through program selection the group we
call screen-outs in our discussion. The focus of this literature is on the
"regression discontinuity" approach to analyzing screen-out data,
introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and then indepen
dently reinvented over thirty years by several other researchers. 8
Under the most common version of this approach, potential program
participants are rated on criteria of suitability for admission to the pro
gram and only those with the highest ratings are admitted. The rest
particularly those whose ratings fall just below the cutoff for program
admission serve as comparison group members in measuring the
impact of the program on those just above the cutoff. If the ratings are
the only systematic determinant of program admission, it becomes fea
sible to use the ratings as a variable that controls for selection and, in
theory, produce an unbiased estimate of the program effect. (Several
necessary conditions to obtain this desired result are discussed below.)
This particular use of "screen-outs" as comparison group members
is distinguished by the notion also common to randomized social
experiments that admission decisions can be designed and controlled
by the evaluator to ensure reliable impact estimation. To our knowl
edge, controlled selection processes of this sort (other than random
assignment) have never been used to evaluate employment and training
programs, although they are common in educational research.
Less premeditated uses of nonparticipating applicants as compari
son group members were fairly common among the early evaluations
of MDTA reviewed in chapter 1, however. Applicants who dropped out
of the intake process before receiving services both withdrawals and
no-shows were used as comparison group members by Borus (1964),
Cain (1968), Stromsdorfer (1968), Borus, Brennan, and Rosen (1970),
Hardin and Borus (1971), and Prescott and Cooley (1972), several of
which were noted as playing a role in the broader history of nonexperimental methods. In addition, Gibbard and Somers (1968), Solie
(1968), and Robin (1969) used applicants who were rejected by pro
gram staff screen-outs as their comparison groups. 9
These analysts were generally aware of the potential selection bias
problems posed by using nonparticipating applicants as comparison
group members, but defended their choice on the grounds that "some-
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times they are the only groups available for comparisons" (Borus and
Buntz, 1972, p. 238). In surveying their work, Hardin (1969, p. 107)
writes:
[Defending the kinds of control groups used in Hardin and Borus.
... I derive comfort from the erratic judgment by the local
employment service screening the applicants, failure of notices
of enrollment to reach the applicants, temporary illness prevent
ing enrollment in the course, and haphazard ineligibility for
training allowances.

Hardin thus appeals to randomness in the selection procedure as the
basis for trusting comparison groups of nonparticipating applicants. A
general weakness of these earlier studies is that the analysts often did
not attempt to control for selection bias by modeling the nonrandom
factors that lead to participation among applicants.
The early applicant-based studies and their methodologies have
largely escaped notice in recent years. They were not viewed as terribly
rigorous or reliable at the time of their release, and the approach they
represented fell out of favor in the 1970s. Three factors may have led to
their demise:
Some of the early analyses were, because of data limitations or
simple oversight, fairly unsophisticated in motivating and apply
ing the applicant-based approach. 10
It is not clear that its early practitioners appreciated or advanced the
strong theoretical arguments that can be made for the approach.
To our knowledge, we are the first to propose the applicant-based
approach as potentially preferable to other nonexperimental meth
ods over a wide range of employment and training contexts.
Finally, and partly as a result of the first two points, a National
Academy of Science report (1974) took a fairly visible stance
favoring the use of external comparison groups when evaluating
manpower programs, especially those serving prime age male
workers such as MDTA. This conclusion reflected both skepticism
regarding the value of internal comparison groups in relation to
their costs (new follow-up data would have to be collected for
applicant comparison groups, but already existed for external
comparison groups) and the belief that the selection problem was
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not as severe for programs serving prime-age males as for those
serving more disadvantaged populations, such as Job Corps.
At the same time, two concurrent developments focused attention on
nonapplicant comparison groups drawn from national data bases:
The increasing availability of large, nationally representative sur
vey data bases containing detailed measures of the earnings of
low-income individuals. These included the Current Population
Survey, the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey, and the
Survey of Income and Program Participation. These data were
both more accessible and cheaper than special surveys of nonparticipating applicants.
The development of elegant and apparently powerful econometric
techniques for correcting or avoiding selection bias in a variety of
labor market applications. As discussed in chapter 1, these tech
niques began their ascendancy with the seminal work of Heckman
(1974, 1976) and, for employment and training program evalua
tion, Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985).
Together, these two developments offered promise for valid program
evaluation based largely on existing (and ever improving) general pur
pose data sets and econometric techniques. As noted above, the under
developed method of using applicant-based comparison groups was
left by the wayside.
The emphasis in nonexperimental employment and training pro
gram evaluation has since turned completely away from the use of
applicant comparison groups. Beginning with Ashenfelter (1978) and
Kiefer (1979), it shifted to modeling the overall selection process
depicted in exhibit 2.1 distinguishing eligibles as a group from par
ticipants and the implications of that distinction for future earnings.
Before closing our discussion of applicant-based comparison
groups, it is worth noting that they have been used sporadically over
the last fifteen years in other fields besides educational research." Of
particular relevance is a volume by Collignon et al. (1989) providing
an extremely thorough discussion of alternative applicant-based com
parison groups for measuring the effects of state vocational rehabilita
tion programs! Both the theoretical and empirical appeal of alternative
comparison groups are explored, although the authors do not have the
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benefit of an experimental control group with which to test the various
options (as we do here). Largely on theoretical grounds, then, they con
clude that in the vocational rehabilitation context some applicantbased comparison groups should provide a useful lower bound on true
program impacts when used as a benchmark (e.g., applicants screened
out as not sufficiently disabled to merit rehabilitation services), while
others should provide a complementary upper bound (e.g., those
screened out as too disabled to rehabilitated). The tightness of these
bounds is not considered, however, nor is the question of whether sim
ilar groups of screen-outs can be found for this purpose in evaluating
standard employment and training programs.

Reviving and Strengthening the Applicant-Based Approach
The principal purpose of this monograph is to reintroduce nonparticipating applicants as a comparison group for evaluating voluntary
employment and training programs. 12 In this section, we present our
conceptual argument for why comparison groups composed of nonparticipating applicants may be able to overcome the problem of selection
bias. In the process, we establish that the applicant-based approach has
the capacity to meet the other two criteria for successful nonexperimental methods introduced earlier in the chapter: operational feasibil
ity and an a priori plausibility for obtaining unbiased estimates. We
provide modest but promising evidence on the final criterion, empirical
reliability, in chapters 3 and 4.
Possible Advantages of the Approach
We begin by revisiting the program intake diagram in exhibit 2.1.
We argued earlier that later attriters from the intake process with
drawals, screen-outs, and no-shows may correspond much more
closely to participants, on both observed and unobserved characteris
tics, than the more commonly used comparison group of eligible nonapplicants. One expects that, simply by applying to the program,
nonparticipating applicants have revealed themselves to be more simi
lar to the participants than are nonapplicants in such critical dimen-
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sions as labor market status, the transitory component of earnings, and
motivation to seek training.
The reverse could also be true i.e., nonapplicants could make a
better comparison group than either withdrawals or no-shows. 13 Sup
pose that nonapplicants are a mix of those who expect to find good jobs
on their own and those who do not. Suppose also that individuals who
apply for assistance further sort themselves between those who enter
the program and those who drop out of the intake process. Suppose that
individuals who succeed in finding employment on their own become
withdrawals and no-shows, while less successful applicants become
participants. Nonapplicants some employed, some not fall between
these two groups, making them a better comparison group for partici
pants than withdrawals or drop-outs.
While not implausible, the above situation seems to us less likely
than one in which participants match more closely to nonparticipating
applicants than to any other group on the transitory elements of earn
ings and motivation that determine immediate postprogram earnings.
This is not a foregone conclusion, however, making it essential that our
theoretical arguments in favor of nonparticipating applicant compari
son groups be subjected to tests of their empirical validity in later
chapters.
Of particular importance to the a priori argument on behalf of appli
cant-based comparison groups is the fact that nonparticipating appli
cants are likely to be well matched to the participants on the time path
of earnings just prior to application. Like participants, most nonpartici
pating applicants will have experienced an earnings loss that prompted
them to apply to the program. In contrast, eligible nonapplicants with
similar earnings may have chronically low incomes (and a disinterest
in employment and training services) and thus will be in steady state
rather than in the midst of a transition when selected for inclusion in a
comparison group.
If the preprogram dip in earnings for participants signifies a perma
nent break, the same type of break should be evident to some extent in
the subsequent earnings of nonparticipating applicants. There is no rea
son to expect either of these patterns to be especially strong for eligible
nonapplicants, if our hypothesis of sustained low income for those
individuals is correct. In this case, applicant-based comparison groups
will better mimic the earnings of participants than would nonappli-
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cants. If this is the case, reliance on applicant-based comparison
groups will avoid the problems of trying to adjust comparison group
earnings for individuals in steady state to match the without-program
earnings of participants in steady state. 14
Even if nonparticipating applicants match well to participants on the
transitory aspects of earnings, they may still differ from participants in
two other, potentially important, respects: 15
Withdrawals and no-shows selected themselves out of the intake
process before acceptance and/or entry into training. This may
mean that they are less motivated, capable, or willing to work than
participants. Or it may mean that, unlike participants, they found
an attractive job opportunity before they could begin training.
Screen-outs were selected out of the intake process by program
staff. If the screening criteria used by program staff are related to
future earnings, the subsequent earnings of screen-outs may not
be a good proxy for what participants would have earned in the
absence of training.

Controlling for Self-Selection
To deal with the first of these problems self-selection among pro
gram applicants the initial step is to control for observable baseline
characteristics such as age, sex, and ethnicity. While common in stud
ies using external comparison groups, controls of this sort were not
always present in the early applicant-based evaluations of Manpower
Development and Training Act. Even with these variables included in
the model, however, an unknown degree of selection bias may still
occur due to selection on unobservable characteristics such as motiva
tion and inherent ability. Traditionally, evaluators using external com
parison groups have attempted to correct for these differences by
adjusting for differences in preprogram earnings (see, for example,
Ashenfelter 1978), or by explicitly modeling the selection process as
part of a two-stage estimation process (see Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger 1980). 16
As the discussion in chapter 1 makes clear, these methods are not
always successful in eliminating systematic differences between the
participants and the comparison group. In the absence of a randomly
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assigned control group as a benchmark, however, one can never know
how successful they have been in any particular application. Our strat
egy for minimizing the selection bias problem is to choose a compari
son group that is as similar to the participants as possible in terms of its
circumstances and motivation at the time of application to the program.
We believe that nonparticipating applicants provide such a comparison
group. Nevertheless, because of the differences between nonparticipat
ing applicants and participants noted above, there is no guarantee that
they will perform as well as a randomly assigned control group or
even that they will constitute a better comparison group than nonapplicants, although their similarities to participants argue strongly in their
favor.
Controlling for Program Selection
The second problem program staff selection of suitable partici
pants is, at least in principle, more tractable from an analytic stand
point. 17 Screen-outs differ from participants on factors that are
necessarily external to the individuals involved. Whether acting on
conscious or unconscious considerations, intake workers if they are
systematic at all necessarily work from external signals when decid
ing whom to admit and whom to exclude from their programs, signals
that are, at least in principle, also discernible by evaluators. 18
Some of these signals should be captured by standard background
variables like age, level of education, and prior work experience. Pre
sumably, these predictors of later labor market outcomes and ability to
benefit from training substantially influence which individuals intake
staff see as most suitable for or most in need of program services. 19
Thus, these variables alone will help to remove preexisting differences
in earnings potential between screen-outs and participants that might
otherwise be confounded with program impacts.
To deal with any remaining differences between screen-outs and
participants, we propose an approach that was introduced to the educa
tional literature concurrent with the beginning of employment and
training evaluation. In their seminal article on regression discontinuity
analysis cited above, Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) set out a
model that is explicitly designed to deal with the fact that screen-outs
differ systematically from participants on those characteristics that lead
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program staff to reject certain candidates. They point out that if these
characteristics can be captured and added to the model, an unbiased
estimate of the impact of the program can be obtained, at least for
those near the "cutoff point" between participants and those screened
out of the program. (They conceptualize the selection factors as a sin
gle index variable; we adopt this formulation for convenience of expo
sition, although it is not essential to the model.) We now examine this
model in detail.

The Regression Discontinuity Model for Screen-Out-Based
Impact Analysis

Exhibit 2.2 shows how the regression discontinuity approach to
impact estimation works and how it got its name. At its core, the
technique represents a promising way of estimating what the earnings
of program participants would have been absent the program, given
earnings data on nonparticipants in this case, screen-outs.
Projecting the Without-Program Earnings of Participants
Exhibit 2.2 depicts graphically the relationship between intake staff
ratings of the suitability of applicants for admission to the program and
applicant earnings. The postprogram earnings of participants and
screen-outs appear on the vertical axis of the graph; the index used to
rate applicants and make screening decisions is shown on the horizon
tal axis.20 In the simplest case, program staff establish a cutoff index
value, I*, for entry into the program. The cutoff value divides the appli
cant population intQ screen-outs (those with scores to the left of I*) and
participants (those with scores to the right of I*).
The solid line in the exhibit shows how much earnings will rise with
the ratings absent entry into the program. The earnings of the screenouts in the postprogram period determine the slope of this line to the
left of I*. This segment can be estimated with observed data. Above I*,
however, there are no "without-program" cases to observe, since all
applicants with index values greater than I* have been accepted into
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Exhibit 2.2 Diagram of Regression Discontinuity Analysis
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the program. The diagram assumes that the linear relationship shown
below I* continues above I*.
The postprogram earnings of participants may be higher than this
benchmark level, because of the impact of the program. This enhanced
level of earnings is denoted by the broken line to the right of I*, which
appears above the solid line. The space between these two lines the
broken line representing participant outcomes with program services
and the solid line representing participant outcomes without services
is the impact of the program.
Now consider how one might estimate the relationships shown in
the exhibit. The solid line to the left of I* and the broken line to the
right of I* can be estimated from observed data on screen-outs and par
ticipants, respectively. A linear specification gives the pattern shown
here, although nonlinear specifications could be considered. In the lin
ear case, postprogram earnings of screen-outs and participants are
regressed on a constant, the index I, a dummy variable for participa
tion, and the dummy for participation interacted with I.21 The first two
terms from this equation determine the height and slope of the screenout segment of the earnings line (the solid line to the left of I*), while
the last two terms shift those parameters to create the participant por
tion (the dashed segment to the right of I*). The vertical "jump"
between these two line segments at I* the discontinuity in the regres
sion line provides an estimate of the effect of participation on the
marginal participant (the individual with index value I*).
To obtain measures of the impact of the program on other partici
pants those with index values greater than I* one must extrapolate
the relationship between the index and the "without-program" earnings
of screen-outs to index values above I*. We observe this relationship
below I* (i.e., for screen-outs) but must simulate it above I*. This is
done in the exhibit by extending the solid without-program earnings
line to the right of I*, on the assumption that the linear relationship
between earnings and index values observed for screen-outs would
have applied to participants had they too been kept out of the program.
Other nonlinear extrapolation methods are possible, though all neces
sarily involve extension of without-program patterns among screenouts to index values for participants.
Given the centrality of the index variable in this exercise, it is impor
tant to recognize that the index need not be a perfect correlate for
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future earnings. Rather, it is a measure of the applicant's suitability for
admission to the program (as judged by intake staff), which may or
may not correlate with applicant's future earnings. If it does not, and
the index is the sole basis for program admission, we have no selection
bias problem. More likely, some correlation (either positive or nega
tive) is present, and the index becomes a tool for measuring program
impacts.
While it may seem like a tall order to define a single index that cap
tures all the considerations that went into the decisions of program
staff to accept or reject specific applicants, it is in principle quite feasi
ble. As noted by Campbell and Stanley (1966), a simple ranking of the
N applicants from 1 (most acceptable) to N (least acceptable) by pro
gram intake staff would capture all of the relevant considerations and
make additional objective measures such as education and prior work
experience superfluous. Similarly (though perhaps less obviously), if
program staff were to rate each candidate's suitability for training on a
scale of 1 to 100, such ratings should also capture all of the informa
tion used in selection decisions, since staff would presumably never
assign a higher rating to an applicant they rejected than to one they
accepted.22

Potential Limitations of the Approach
There are some potential limitations to the regression discontinuity
approach, however. 23 First, as noted above, it requires assumptions
about the relationship between the selection index and the potential
without-program earnings of participants (individuals above I* on the
selection index). Depending on the accuracy of these assumptions
(e.g., whether the true relationship really is linear as assumed in exhibit
2.2), the technique may give valid impact estimates only at the bound
ary between acceptance and rejection to the program (i.e., at I*). More
generally, one's confidence in the impact estimates it produces will
depend on how close to the cutoff the participant observations are.
Estimates become increasingly dependent on the assumptions used to
project without-program earnings trend of screen-outs to individuals
above the cutoff line as one moves farther above that level. There is no
guarantee that the relationship observed below I* whether projected
linearly as in the exhibit or nonlinearly as suggested by possible non-
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linear patterns in the data to the left of I* (not shown) would continue
above the cutoff point.
Assuming that there are no discrete jumps in without-program earn
ings as index values change,24 all smooth projections beyond I* will
give fairly similar, uniformly reliable impact estimates for those just
above the cutoff. Different approaches may give quite different
answers further to the right, as the various means of projection diverge.
The regression discontinuity approach is critically dependent, then,
on two assumptions: (1) that the selection index variable fully controls
for the systematic determinants of participation in the program, and (2)
that the relationship between the selection index and without-program
earnings can be reliably estimated from the earnings of screen-outs.
The approach is also dependent on obtaining complete, consistent
data on applicant rankings.25 As noted above, ratings of applicants on a
common numeric scale will serve just as well as rankings for this type
of analysis, and may be the only feasible option in programs whose
intake period extends over many weeks or months (precluding the joint
ranking of all applicants for the purpose of making admission deci
sions). But dependence on either type of index carries certain costs.
First, one must arrange to collect rating data on all applicants, or for as
many as possible up to a reasonable sample size. (See below for a dis
cussion of the operational feasibility of the method). Also, unless
instructed to do so, intake workers cannot all be expected to use the
same cutoff point on a ratings scale to determine who enters the pro
gram.26 Or, in what amounts to the same thing, different workers may
adopt different admission standards and then score candidates so that,
in each instance, those who just meet a rater's personal standard
receive the preordained cutoff score of I*. Nor is the cutoff point
adopted necessarily the same at all points in time, depending on tem
poral ups and downs in the supply of (and demand for) training ser
vices.
Ironically, arbitrary variations in admission standards will
strengthen, rather than weaken, the regression discontinuity analysis.
Exceptions to the cutoff rule provide observations on screen-outs both
to the left and right of the I* cut-off point in exhibit 2.2. If sufficiently
numerous, these observations can be used to test how well the disconti
nuity analysis projects without-program outcomes into the participant
portion of the scale or, better still, may serve as the basis for actually
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estimating that portion of the line from observed data. In the extreme,
if the cutoff point varied randomly from one applicant to the next,
admission to the program would be random and screen-outs would be
equivalent to a randomly assigned control group. 27 In practice, these
data points are likely to provide a less complete set of without-program
observations above I* than would an experimental control group and
will not necessarily represent that portion of the population on a statis
tically valid basis. 28 Nevertheless, they unquestionably improve the
information available to the evaluator regarding the key with-program/
without-program contrast between otherwise comparable individuals.
The mere occurrence of screen-out observations above I* is not suf
ficient to guarantee better information with which to measure impacts,
however. The overlap of participants and screen-outs along the ratings
scale must be due to true differences in the standards applied for pro
gram admission, having accurately recorded the ratings. It cannot be
the result of variations in how ratings are recorded for individuals per
ceived as equally qualified for admission yet rated differently. In that
case, the variation in ratings would tell us nothing about the selection
process itself, only about errors in the ratings data.
A more complex problem arises when two intake workers use not
just a different cut-off standard on a common rating scale, but two
entirely different scales based on different sets of rating factors. For
example, one worker might try to admit those applicants who look like
they can do best in the labor market with the program's help, while
another worker admits those who would do worst without help and
who therefore need help more. As a result, the first worker would rate
highly and admit applicants with relatively high without-program earn
ings (the case shown in exhibit 2.2), while the other worker does just
the opposite.
One response to this situation would be to analyze the intake process
separately for each intake worker. However, this would substantially
reduce the statistical precision of the analysis, even when combined
across workers. Alternatively, one could perform a combined analysis
to estimate the (weighted) average of various selection rules. This
would produce meaningful impact estimates for the overall program
only if the average trend in earnings across a variety of indexes esti
mated within the screen-out sample provides an unbiased projection
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of average without-program earnings of participants at higher levels of
the index scale.29
In light of all these possibilities, the most difficult problem facing
evaluators using the regression discontinuity approach may be knowing
how to interpret the ratings data at their disposal. Here, there is simply
no substitute for ensuring that the intake process is either successfully
controlled and monitored by the evaluator in all times and places, or
else adequately documented at a level of care and disaggregation not
normally considered by program evaluators.

Desired Qualities: How Does the Screen-Out-Based
Approach Fare?
At the outset of the chapter, we posited three desired qualities in
any nonexperimental approach to measuring the impact of employment
and training programs: operational feasibility and affordability, free
dom from selection bias, and general acceptance as unbiased based on
past performance and a priori plausibility. Here, we assess the poten
tial of the screen-out-based method of analysis with regard to these fac
tors.
The second and third qualities are related, inasmuch as true freedom
from selection bias and the role of past performance in generating the
method's acceptance can only be assessed once the approach has been
used and tested. These tasks we undertake for the first time in chapters
3 and 4. Here, we confine our attention to the a priori plausibility and
operational feasibility/affordability of the method, plus a closing com
ment on the replicability of the testing process initiated in subsequent
chapters.
A Priori Plausibility
To offer a viable alternative to experimental research, an applicantbased impact estimation strategy must not only avoid serious selection
bias, but do so by methods that are conceptually plausible across a
variety of employment and training contexts. In this chapter, we have
attempted to demonstrate both the theoretical appeal and the limita-
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tions of the various applicant-based strategies. In our judgment, com
parison groups composed of screened-out applicants, combined with
data on intake workers' assessments of suitability for training, have
stronger theoretical appeal than the external comparison groups tradi
tionally used in nonexperimental evaluations.
Our real goal here is not to argue for one nonexperimental method
above another when both are flawed, however, but to assess the overall
strength of the case for accepting screen-out-based impact estimates as
free of substantial selection bias in most applications. The one impact
estimation methodology where this case has been made successfully to
date is that of controlled random experiments. It is instructive,
therefore, to make a conceptual comparison between ratings-adjusted
screen-outs and the comparison group used in experiments: randomly
excluded but otherwise acceptable program applicants. The contrast to
screen-outs is immediately apparent: screen-outs are nonrandomly
excluded and unacceptable program applicants. This points to two
major points of contrast, one essentially a "red herring" but still
important in an assessment of the method's a priori plausibility, and
the other much more fundamental:
Unlike random assignment, the selection and exclusion of screenouts are not directly controlled by the evaluator; and
Program staff rationing of training slots among interested and eli
gible applicants contains both random and systematic elements,
rather than strictly random elements as in random assignment.
We first consider the reasons why evaluators might want to control
the intake process and, in light of those reasons, why the absence of
control should not pose a concern regarding the plausibility and face
validity of the method. It seems clear from our discussion of the regres
sion discontinuity approach that the advocates of evaluator-controlled
selection (see, for example, Campbell and Stanley 1966) have two pur
poses in mind: uniformity and "knowability" of the intake decision
rule. Both of these qualities obviously apply to a random assignment
intake process and to any other evaluator-controlled selection
approach. But, as Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) first observed,
they can also be attained by letting program operators follow their own
predilections when selecting participants as long as both the selection
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criteria used and the information to which those criteria were applied
are fully specified to the evaluator.
Thus, in principle, any screen-out-based evaluation can meet these
two requirements, if planned in advance of program intake. All that is
required is for the evaluator to work with program operators to elicit
their preferred selection approach and develop an overall rating scale
that reflects that approach for individual applicants. A regression dis
continuity analysis follows immediately, regardless of whose selection
rule is followed. This approach has the side benefit of allowing pro
grams to be run on their own terms, which should make screen-outbased evaluations much more salable to program operators than the
highly demanding selection requirements of randomized field experi
ments. Documenting, rather than dictating, the basis for program selec
tion may be the only option available when evaluating an ongoing
program; there, the exact mechanisms for selection are part of the pro
gram to be evaluated "as is" and cannot be dictated by the researcher as
in a demonstration project.
Even where it is not possible to assure well-documented screen-out
procedures and data inputs in advance, a reasonable approximation to
that result may be possible after the fact as long as intake workers' selfdefined ratings of applicants are collected from the outset. This is in
fact the situation we face in using data from the AFDC HomemakerHome Health Aide Demonstrations to test the screen-out approach in
later chapters. The effectiveness of this ex post approach, explored
more fully in chapters 3 and 4, may not yet fully illustrate the potential
of more deliberate attempts to employ screen-outs as comparison
group members when undertaken ex ante.30 We will return to the ques
tion of how this might be done in our concluding chapter.
The distinction between random and systematic selection is more
fundamental. In comparing random assignment to applicant-based
methodologies in this regard, it is again helpful to refer to the diagram
in exhibit 2.2. As noted earlier, the one difficulty (apart from possible
limitations of the ratings variable) that this approach entails is the need
to project rather than observe without-program outcomes of higherranked applicants. Random assignment solves this problem by exclud
ing a random share of applicants at all ratings levels from the program,
effectively tracing out all points along the solid without-program earn
ings line to the right of I* using observable data on controls. This most
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fundamental and potentially sizable advantage of experimental
analyses over regression discontinuity modeling cannot be overcome
by any program-defined selection rule, since program operators will
always have preferred applicants under any approach or rule for ration
ing training slots. Barring unintended departures from that rule (see
above), by definition all favored applicants will appear to the right of I*
and be observed only as program participants.
In the end, then, the a priori plausibility of the screen-out-based
approach rests on one's faith in how well it projects the without-program earnings line beyond the point on the ratings scale where one
ceases to observe without-program individuals. If one thinks the pro
jection has been accomplished within an acceptable margin of error,
one should believe that the systematic differences between screen-outs
and participants which distinguish this approach from a randomized
experiment have been removed. If not, one will have to judge the
method's a priori appeal not against the experimental norm but in rela
tion to the plausibility of other nonexperimental methods that try to
equalize participants and comparison group members by other means.
The accuracy of the projection of without-program earnings into the
range of the index where only participants are observed depends in
large part on the evaluator's ability to choose the correct functional
form for the regression equation. If the relationship between the index
and without-program earnings is close to linear, a standard linear
regression specification may provide a reasonable projection into this
range. If, however, this relationship is highly nonlinear in that range, a
linear projection could yield a very inaccurate measure of what partici
pants would have earned in the absence of the program. If nonlinear
relationships are evident below the cutoff level for intake (i.e., for
screen-outs), this can be projected instead, but again succeeds or fails
according to the reliability of this projection above the cutoff.
One more comment on the theoretical appeal of the screen-out
approach should be noted before turning to a discussion of the
method's operational feasibility. Even if we assume that regression dis
continuity analysis will adjust screen-outs to match non-screen-outs in
all relevant respects, a portion of the selection bias problem remains.
Some of the individuals admitted into the program through staff
screening may elect not to participate and instead become no-shows.
This final self-selection process pares down the participant group on a
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nonrandom basis, leaving a subset of participants who do not match
screen-outs as well as the original, complete set of accepted applicants
did.
If screen-out-based comparison groups have trouble matching up to
the participants who remain following the exodus of no-shows, the
same will also be true of experimental control group members. Like
screen-outs, control group members are removed from the intake flow
at the point of admission to the program and are fully comparable only
to the full set of accepted applicants (no-shows plus participants). We
discuss in the next chapter how this problem is addressed in the context
of experimental research; the same approach could be applied to a
screen-out comparison group if it was thought to be otherwise compa
rable to no-shows and participants as a group. Thus, this aspect of the
selection problem does not represent a shortfall of the screen-out-based
approach in comparison to the experimental standard.

Feasibility and Affordability
A final consideration concerns the feasibility and affordability of
applicant-based comparison groups in general, and screen-out strate
gies in particular. Here, the experience of the National JTPA Study31
and other social experiments is instructive. Routinely, and with little
hesitation on the part of program operators, evaluators add a form to
the program intake process on which applicants record their baseline
characteristics, and intake staff subsequently document their own deci
sions and actions with regard to the applicant. Nearly 30,000 of these
forms were collected in 96 local offices as part of the National JTPA
Study at a modest cost and with minimal missing data rates.
In this and most other program contexts, nearly all of the informa
tion required on the evaluation intake form would be collected anyway
for operational purposes. Thus, the evaluation imposes little added bur
den on the program; in fact, in some instances, it simplifies and
improves data collection to the point that program operators adopt the
evaluator's form as a permanent part of their intake process once the
evaluation ends. 32 And as long as it is routinely administered at the
point of application, such an intake form should identify a sufficient
pool of nonparticipating applicants and participants for research pur
poses in most contexts.33 As we shall see in the next chapter, the break-
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down of the former group into withdrawals, screen-outs, and no-shows
is easily accomplished by the inclusion of just a few items on the form
to be completed by program staff.
The other essential requirement for applicant-based impact analysis
is accurate follow-up data on both participants and nonparticipating
applicants. Historically, employment and training program evaluators
have relied on follow-up surveys to measure participant earnings fol
lowing program entry, and for experiments to obtain corresponding
measures for control group members. The latter requirement has been
viewed as one of the drawbacks of experimental designs, since special
control group surveys are unnecessary in nonexperimental analyses
based on external comparison groups drawn from existing national
data bases such as the Current Population Survey, the National Longi
tudinal Survey, or the Survey of Income and Program Participation. It
would also seem to apply to applicant-based analyses, where specialpurpose data collection is again unavoidable for the group that is to be
compared to participants.
Increasingly, however, evaluators are turning to much less expensive
administrative sources for earnings information, for all types of com
parison groups and for both the preprogram and postprogram periods.
The National JTPA Study, for example, compiled earnings data on
treatment and control group members from three sources: follow-up
surveys, state unemployment insurance wage records, and (in grouped
form to protect confidentiality) Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
employer reports. 34 The Bloom et al. (1993) study shows that both of
the latter administrative data sources provide earnings impact estimates
similar to those produced by the traditional survey method across
broad populations. Our work with IRS data for the homemaker demon
stration sample (see chapter 3) confirms this result in an entirely differ
ent sample and in relation to a different type of follow-up survey.
Given their low cost, broad coverage, and proven reliability, these
administrative records systems may be a particularly cost-effective
source of follow-up data for applicant-based impact evaluations for
many years to come. And, by removing the requirement of costly sur
vey data collection for participants as well as comparison group mem
bers, they make applicant-based evaluations even more affordable than
past evaluations that took only comparison group data from existing
(and therefore low cost) national data bases. Given the essentially zero
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cost of obtaining additional observations from administrative records
systems, using such data to track comparison group members once
they are being used to track participants should reduce total evaluation
costs to a level below that of just the special-purpose (participant) sur
vey requirements of past evaluations using external comparison
groups.35

Replicability
Replicability is also a key requirement for the applicant-based
approach, both in its testing and in subsequent applications. Like any
nonexperimental approach that aspires to broad acceptance, the appli
cant-based strategy will need to be tested in more than one setting
where experimental data are also available as a validation benchmark.
The tests of applicant-based comparison groups presented here consti
tute only a single observation on their performance; they will not pro
vide a definitive judgment as to whether such methods are an
acceptable substitute for experiments. Only by replicating this type of
analysis many times in many different contexts can such a judgment be
made.
Fortunately, the fact that data on applicants used here first emerged
as an accidental byproduct of an experiment suggests that this type of
analysis could readily be conducted in other settings. The large number
of experiments currently in the field or in the planning stage provide an
opportunity for a broad range of validation tests across a variety of
contexts over the next five or ten years.
We present the first such test in the next two chapters.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Burtless and Orr (1986) and Manski and Garfinkel (1991).
2. The operational difficulties facing experiments may do the most harm in confining them to
nonrepresentative samples of program participants. This restriction calls the findings of many
experiments into question even after selection bias has been removed through random assignment.
(Not all experiments suffer from this difficulty; the Food Stamp Employment and Training Pro
gram evaluation described in Puma et al. 1990 applied random assignment methods to a nationally
representative sample). Other common criticisms of experiments stem from the feasibility con
straint: unlike evaluations based on natural variations within national data bases, experiments are
said to lack flexibility when addressing a range of policy questions, and to distort outcomes in
relation to a permanent national program when limited to a few localities and/or years. While the
first of these criticisms may not be valid randomization creates a new population for study (the
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control group) without destroying any existing populations, thus increasing research flexibility
the second surely is and results directly from operational restrictions on the scope and duration of
experiments.
3. See the articles collected in Wiseman (1991).
4. James Heckman, January 5,1993, to the annual meeting of the American Economic Associ
ation in a panel entitled "Evaluating Employment and Training Programs Using Nonexperimental
Methods."
5. Maddala (1983, p. 266) also frames the problem of self-selection in program evaluation in
terms of such a diagram.
6. For example, Sandell and Rupp (1988) found that while 68 percent of participants in Job
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs are unemployed at application, only 12 percent of the
eligibles fell into this category. The remaining eligibles are either employed or not in the labor
force.
7. We are indebted to Stephen Kennedy for pointing out this possibility.
8. Campbell notes several of these rediscoveries in the forward to Trochim (1984). Examples
from the econometric literature include Goldberger (1972, 1980) and Cain (1975). The current
monograph also stems from the independent development of the technique by Orr and Bell specif
ically for the purpose of evaluating employment and training programs. The approach is discussed
in detail in Campbell and Stanley (1966) and Cook and Campbell (1979) and receives booklength treatment in Trochim (1984).
9. A more detailed review of these early studies is available from the authors on request,
including an assessment of how well the different applicant-based approaches were implemented.
For present purposes, the research merit of these studies is of less interest than the place they
occupied in the overall history of nonexperimental evaluations of employment and training pro
grams.
10. For example, the variables used to control for preexisting differences between participants
and nonparticipating applicants were fairly limited or nonexistent in several studies.
11. For example, screen-outs are used by Bloom and Singer (1979) as a comparison group for
evaluating the effects of alternative prisons and by Bound (1989) for evaluating the effects of dis
ability insurance (also discussed in Bound 1991 and Parsons 1991). Dean and Dolan (1991) use
no-shows to evaluate vocational rehabilitation services, while Berger and Black (1992) rely on a
special group of applicants not normally available to evaluators of employment and training pro
grams those on the waiting list for services to measure the effects of child care services.
12. Mandatory employment and training programs do not formally allow for nonparticipation
among those who fall within the program's mandate, either at the discretion of the individual
involved or based on decisions by program staff, although nonparticipation cannot be avoided in a
free society. We do not discuss how to deal with this type of nonparticipation. Note, however, that
programs of this sort, such as the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program for ablebodied AFDC recipients, may still apply the participation requirement selectively when program
openings must be rationed due to limited capacity. If so, much of what we discuss here in terms of
voluntary employment programs applies to those programs as well.
13. We are indebted to Stephen Kennedy for bringing this possibility to our attention.
14. It is possible, of course, to match an external comparison group on changes in earnings in
the period immediately prior to program entry, mimicking the preprogram dip. Several of the
CETA studies used comparison groups drawn from the Current Population Survey matched on
this basis (see Westat 1981, 1984). Because there is no assurance that the dip represents the same
mix of permanent and transitory changes in earnings for both groups, however, such matching
provides little assurance that the two groups are well matched on the transitory component of
earnings, and therefore on subsequent total earnings.
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15. Collignon et al. (1989) explore these same two factors when considering the comparability
of various groups of nonparticipating applicants and participants in state vocational rehabilitation
programs.
16. See chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of these methods.
17. Angrist and Imbens (1991) make the same point, but for different reasons, in their paper on
the use of instrumental variables to address the selection bias problem. They say at the outset that,
in contrast to previous econometric analyses of the selection bias problem offered by Heckman
(1990) and Chamberlain (1986):
An important distinction, and an underlying theme of [our] paper, is the difference
between identifying information derived from models of program participants'
behavior and from information about program eligibility rules. We argue that the
latter is more likely to provide a convincing empirical identification strategy (p. 4).
Unlike the argument presented here, the Angrist-Imbens approach hinges on the existence of a
group of individuals who have zero probability of participating a group they believe is more
likely to be created by program exclusions than by individual tastes for employment and training
services (pp. 13-16).
18. The only alternative that program exclusions are totally arbitrary (i.e., not based on any
external signals), as suggested by Hardin (1969) presents an even greater opportunity for unbi
ased impact estimation. Arbitrary exclusions would prevent participation from correlating with
future earnings at all, and would therefore preclude any degree of selection bias. Under this sce
nario, screen-outs would be the ideal comparison group, differing from participants strictly at ran
dom, as do experimentally designed control groups.
19. Several studies have identified some of the factors used to screen applicants to employ
ment and training programs, many of which tend to recur across a variety of program settings. The
most consistently influential variables are prior education and recent work experience (positively
related to selection) and age and current employment (negatively related to selection). See, for
example, Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond (1992) and Sandell and Rupp (1988), on selection
in Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs, and Rupp, Bryant, and Mantovani (1983) on
selection into the earlier CETA programs. An earlier study of special relevance is Bell and Orr
(1988), which examines screening factors in the demonstration projects analyzed in chapters 3
and 4.
20. We assume here that those with higher index values earn more in the follow-up period at
all points on the scale. This assumption is not essential, however; what is essential is that followup earnings vary in some fashion with the value of the index.
21. In practice, the regression could also include control variables for the measured character
istics of the sample, including prior earnings. We abstract from these factors here to focus on the
critical role of the index in the regression analysis.
22. While true for individual intake workers (assuming that their cognitive processes and
admission standards are consistent across applicants), this point does not necessarily hold for dif
ferent workers or over different program intake periods. We discuss the implications of these
exceptions below.
23. Potential problems with the method have been explored at length in the education litera
ture, most recently in Stanley (1991), Reichardt, Trochim, and Cappelleri (1992), and related arti
cles. Here, we make an independent assessment of the potential limitations of the method when
evaluating employment and training programs.
24. This assumption, too, could be violated, although the odds of a discrete jump occurring
right where it would most interfere with impact estimation at the cutoff point for program
admission, I* seem fairly remote.
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25. Also, in what may be an easy requirement to meet, some variation in ratings among
screen-cuts is essential in order to project follow-up earnings as a function of those ratings into
the participant portion of the range.
26. For example, Worker A might admit all candidates rated above 50, while Worker B admit
ted all candidates rated above 30. Thus, one worker would admit candidates rated 31-50, while the
other would reject them.
27. Admission to the program would also be random, and screen-outs equivalent to a true con
trol group, if the ratings themselves were completely capricious.
28. If some applicants above I* are admitted while others are not, it is likely that admissions in
this range of the index will correlate with both index values and outcomes; if so, these observa
tions may provide biased estimates of the relationship above the cutoff. The only exception would
be if violations of the cutoff rule occur on a haphazard, unintentional basis, providing essentially a
random (though very small) subsample of applicants above I* who do not participate. Exceptions
due to variations in admission standards among workers and over time are more problematic, but
still potentially quite valuable. For example, if the composition of applicants is fairly constant
over time and applicants are assigned to intake workers without regard to their (the applicants')
characteristics, screen-outs above I* should be a random sample of all the applicants in that range.
(I.e., they would represent the particular applicants who happened to encounter workers and/or
time periods for which the cut-off level was above I*.) While these screen-outs would not cover
the entire range of ratings (since all workers and times would probably exercise some level of
selectivity), they could still be used to estimate without-program earnings over the range in which
they did occur.
29. One could easily imagine a case where an unbiased projection of this sort would not result,
depending on the curvature of the without-program earnings lines for the various intake workers.
Under such circumstances, the analysis should be kept separate for the different workers and the
independent projections (for the respective participant samples) averaged at the end of the pro
cess. This is computationally equivalent to running separate impact estimates for each intake
worker and then averaging the estimates.
30. In particular, the analyses in chapter 3 might have been stronger had the demonstrations
adopted a more detailed rating scale or collected data on which intake worker rated each appli
cant.
31. See Bloom etal. (1993).
32. This was the case in several of the sites in the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide
Demonstrations and the National JTPA Study.
33. Obviously, applicant-based comparison groups cannot provide valid impact estimates
when very few applicants drop out or are screened out of the intake process. This seems rarely to
be the case in an age when government resources are severely constrained and most employment
and training programs oversubscribed. An insufficient number of nonparticipating applicants is
not the reason large nonparticipating applicant samples are unavailable for most of the National
JTPA Study sites; there, data limitations resulted from administering the form too late in the
intake process, a constraint that other evaluations can easily avoid if they are (as that one was not)
designed with applicant-based comparison groups in mind.
34. The social security earnings records used in several evaluations are derived from the same
source as IRS data employers' reports of individual workers' earnings. Unlike IRS data, how
ever, they have the limitation that only earnings below the Social Security tax limit are recorded in
this data source. This limitation is much less serious now than it was when the tax limit was much
lower.
35. The same is true of the costs of social experiments.

Estimating Program Effects
in the AFDC Homemaker-Home
Health Aide Demonstrations
This chapter describes an application of applicant-based nonexperimental impact estimation techniques to data from the AFDC Home
maker-Home Health Aide Demonstrations. It begins with a brief
description of the homemaker demonstrations and their data, followed
by an explanation of the methodology we employ and a detailed
account of our findings. 1
Our analysis of the homemaker data focuses on the roles of alterna
tive comparison groups and intake workers' ratings of applicant poten
tial in forming nonexperimental estimates of the program's impact. We
therefore do not explore all of the econometric modeling techniques
available in the literature (see chapter 1) that might be applied with
these two basic inputs. Instead, we use basic multiple regression meth
ods to highlight the role of these two key inputs.

The Homemaker Demonstrations and Their Data
The data employed in our analysis come from Abt Associates' eval
uation of the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide Demonstrations.
These demonstrations, conducted as random assignment experiments
during the 1980s, included seven state-run programs, each providing
selected recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) with four to six weeks of training and up to a year of subsi
dized employment as homemakers and home health aides. 2 Over a
thirty-month follow-up period, this intervention produced substantial,
sustained earnings gains and important welfare reductions in most
states.3
Like many government-sponsored employment and training pro
grams, the demonstrations served volunteer applicants, whose applica-
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tions were screened on a selective basis by program intake staff prior to
admittance. Screening was based on formal eligibility criteria and sub
jective assessments of the applicant's potential to benefit from or suc
ceed in the program. Formal eligibility criteria restricted the
demonstrations to individuals who had received AFDC for at least
three months and who had not worked as homemakers or home health
aides in the previous six months. Some states imposed further require
ments, such as the availability of private transportation or a minimum
educational or literacy level. All seven demonstrations tended to
"cream" applicants, admitting a larger share of those with better educa
tion and/or more employment experience. The same factors have been
found to correlate with higher subsequent earnings among control
group members, though not with larger program effects.4
The data from the evaluation are particularly well-suited for a criti
cal examination of alternative applicant-based comparison groups for
several reasons. First, they contain information on randomly assigned
treatment and control group members, which is essential for the cre
ation of an experimental benchmark estimate of program impacts. 5
Second, they include a measure of program selection ratings by
intake workers of the applicants' potential as homemakers and home
health aides on a scale of 1 (excellent) to 4 (poor). Also, unlike many
other evaluation data sets, long-term follow-up measures of both par
ticipant and nonparticipating applicant earnings are available from a
single, consistent source (see below).
The analysis sample breaks down into five subgroups defined by the
demonstration intake process:
• 909 withdrawals, who applied to the program but chose to leave
the intake process before being screened by intake staff;6
• 931 screen-outs, who applied but were rejected by intake staff
• 282 no-shows, who applied to and were accepted into the pro
gram, but decided not to participate;
1,573 participants;7
1,826 controls, who were accepted by program staff but were
then randomly selected for exclusion from the program. 8
All applicants filled out Background Information Sheets, which col
lected detailed information on a wide range of baseline characteristics,
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including demographics, employment experience, caregiving experi
ence, and public program participation. In addition, staff rated each
applicant on a four-point scale to indicate his or her perceived potential
as a homemaker or home health aide. Reasons for nonparticipation
were also recorded to distinguish screen-outs from withdrawals.
Demonstration intake ran from early 1982 through May 1985. The
current analysis focuses on the cohort of individuals who went through
intake between July 1984 and May 1985, the only cohort for which
complete data are available on all demonstration applicants.9
The demonstration data have been supplemented with long-term fol
low-up data on annual earnings for all five subsamples. These data
come from the U.S Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which collects
employers' reports of gross wages and salaries paid to individual work
ers throughout the United States. The earnings reported correspond
reasonably well to earnings measures based on survey self-reports
from the original evaluation. 10 To preserve anonymity, the IRS provided
these data in aggregate form (as group means and standard deviations)
for groups of 10 or more individuals. Earnings data are available on all
applicants in the July 1984-May 1985 cohort for the years 1984
through 1990. This provides four years of postprogram data (19871990) for participants, allowing us to consider the performance of
alternative nonexperimental estimators over a longer period of time
after the end of the program than in most evaluations of training pro
grams. 11
Exhibit 3.1 presents the sample sizes and descriptive characteristics
for the five analysis samples. As shown in the exhibit, there are 82
group observations for withdrawals, 83 screen-out groups, 24 no-show
groups, 144 participant groups, and 166 control groups. There are
never more than 19 nor less than 10 individuals in any single group.
Group sizes were sometimes set above 10 to increase within-group
homogeneity on baseline variables, important in assuring maximum
explanatory power from key group-level baseline variables, such as the
intake rating. 12 The average number of individuals in each group is
slightly above 10, ranging from 10.9 for participants to 11.8 for noshows. Thus, additional homogeneity is achieved at only a small cost
in terms of the number of overall group observations. Details of the
grouping procedure and the resulting degree of homogeneity are pre
sented in appendix A. As explained there, grouping does not affect the

Exhibit 3.1 Sample Sizes and Selected Characteristics of Applicant Groups
No-shows
Withdrawals3 Screen-outs
Sample size
282
931
909
Number of persons
24
83
82
Number of groups
11.8
11.2
11.1
Average group size
Group characteristicsb
29
31
30
Average age
18
39
31
% White
63
53
55
% Black
53
50
53
% Education < 12 years
6
12
13
% Married, spouse present
Average number of dependent
1.9
2.0
2.0
children
86
82
85
% Ever worked for pay
$3.37
$3.17
$3.00
Average previous hourly wagec
$710
$592
$823
Average 1984 annual earnings'1
16
11
4
% Arkansas
3
31
17
% Kentucky
15
15
31
% New Jersey
28
14
15
% New York
4
30
26
% Ohio

Participants

Controls

1,573
144
10.9

1,826
166
11.0

30
29
59
46
9

29
29
57
49
9

1.9
87
$3.33
$840
16
14
18
13
15

1.9
86
$3.33
$749
16
11
18'
14
14

% South Carolina
% Texas
Average intake rating6
% Intake rating = excellent or
good
% Intake rating = fair or poor
% Intake rating missing

4
3
3.0

4
4
3.1

10
24
2.4

8
16
2.3

9
18
2.3

53
47
65

44
56
36

84
16
18

86
14
12

86
14
12

a. Of the 82 withdrawal groups, 19 consist of individuals for whom reason for nonparticipation is missing. These individuals are assumed to have with
drawn from the intake process voluntarily without providing a reason to the demonstration staff.
b. Observations with missing or invalid values are excluded from the calculations except where otherwise noted. See appendix A for missing data rates
and additional details on the baseline characteristics of the sample.
c. Includes only individuals whose highest wage on previous job was less than or equal to $25 per hour. Those who had never worked for pay are coded
zero and included in the average. Those who worked for an unknown wage rate are assumed to have earned the average reported wage rate for their subpopulation (withdrawals, etc.), intake rating, and race,
d. Includes $0 values for those with no earnings reported in the IRS data,
e. Intake rating is scaled as: l=excellent; 2=good; 3=fair; 4=poor.
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precision of mean earnings estimates for subpopulations allocated to
mutually exclusive groups. Grouping does, however, affect the preci
sion of mean earnings estimates for subpopulations mixed together in
the same groups, as well as the precision of multivariate relationships
involving one or more such "mixed" subpopulation. (See note 13.)
As can be seen from the exhibit, the typical applicant was a thirtyyear-old black single parent with two children and less than twelve
years of education. Though not shown, virtually all applicants were
women, as was true of almost all adult recipients of AFDC in the mid1980s. Most applicants had previously worked for pay at or just below
the (then) minimum wage of $3.35 per hour. Annual earnings prior to
application were very low, around $700 in 1984 dollars. Nonparticipating applicants and participants differed little on these factors, except
that participants tended to have somewhat more education and except
when compared to withdrawals somewhat higher annual earnings.
The distribution of the four populations across states differed consider
ably, however, with withdrawals disproportionately concentrated in
New Jersey and Ohio, screen-outs in Kentucky and Ohio, and noshows in New York and Texas, compared with the participant group. A
final column of the exhibit shows the control group to be well matched
to the combination of (a few) no-shows and (many more) participants
that form the experimental treatment group.
Not surprisingly, given prior evidence of "creaming," almost all of
those admitted to the demonstrations no-shows, participants, and
controls were rated as having excellent or good potential as homemakers or home health aides, while less than half of screen-outs were
so rated. As a result, average rankings varied considerably between the
two groups: 2.3 for those admitted versus 3.1 for those screened out on
a scale of 1 (excellent) to 4 (poor). The overlap in ratings between
screened in and screened out applicants is particularly striking: 44 per
cent of screen-outs were rated good or better, while around 14 percent
of "screen-ins" were rated fair or worse. Clearly, intake decisions did
not move in lock-step with the reported ratings, a pattern with many
possible interpretations that we will explore later when interpreting our
findings.
The exhibit also shows one drawback of the data: a rather high pro
portion of withdrawals and screen-outs (65 and 36 percent, respec
tively) have no potential ratings recorded. Since the original design of
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the evaluation was experimental, obtaining subjective ratings for
screen-outs was not emphasized. The dearth of ratings for withdrawals
reflects the fact that these individuals tended to leave the intake process
prior to a full assessment by demonstration staff.

Impact Estimation Methodology
For each of the three nonexperimental comparison groups discussed
in chapter 2 withdrawals, screen-outs, and no-shows we calculate
three separate impact estimates. For a given comparison group, each
successive estimate accounts for progressively more information about
the selection process, as explained below. Once obtained, we compare
the range of estimates produced to see how much of the difference in
estimated impacts is attributable to the choice of the comparison group
and to the addition of information on the intake workers' ratings of
potential. Experimental estimates are provided as reference points for
this purpose, and each follow-up year is considered separately. How
ever, the formal comparisons of nonexperimental and experimental
estimates needed to gauge the overall success of these nonexperimental
approaches in eliminating selection bias are deferred until chapter 4.

Differences in Means
The simplest measure of program impact is the unadjusted differ
ence in mean annual earnings between participants and a particular
comparison group. This is calculated as:
= y — y
Jp Jc

where:
y

= average annual earnings outcome for participants,

v = average annual earnings outcome for comparison group.

Jc
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No other information is incorporated, so that if participants differ from
comparison group members on any selection factors, the estimates will
be biased.

Controlling for Standard Selection Factors
We use two techniques to control for readily measured differences in
the participant and comparison samples due to self- selection factors.
First, we expand the comparison of means into a multivariate regres
sion analysis that not only distinguishes participants and comparison
group members using a dummy variable, p, for participation, but also
incorporates information on the baseline characteristics of both groups
using variables of the sort shown in exhibit 3.1:
y = XB + 52p + £
where:
y = annual earnings,
X = a vector of baseline characteristics,
p = 1 for participants, Ofor comparison group members.

Baseline variables include age, race, education, marital status, num
ber of dependent children, whether the individual has ever worked for
pay, maximum wage previously earned, earnings in 1984 (the baseline
year), and state of residence. 13
Since the analysis must be conducted at the group level, background
variables are expressed either as mean values for the group or as per
centages of the group possessing a given characteristic. 14 Weighted
least-squares regression is used to adjust for variations in group size.
(See appendix B for details.)
Regression-adjusted estimates obtained in this way are comparable
to the regression-adjusted estimates used in studies involving external
comparison groups. The estimates produced by this model differ from
previous commonly used estimates solely in their reliance on appli
cant-based comparison groups. If applicants select or are selected into
the program on the basis of observed characteristics, 82 should approx
imate the actual program impact. 15 It will differ from the true impact
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only by chance or because of the existence of additional selection fac
tors not included in the model.
Additional Controls for Program Selection
To adjust for variables omitted from the model that were known to
the intake workers but are not among the variables that were explicitly
measured, we re-estimate the equation adding intake workers' ratings
of applicants as potential homemakers and home health aides. This
provides the second focus of our analysis, again within the multiple
regression model. The following equation is estimated for each com
parison group:

y = X£ + £0 + 53/? + e
where:
p = \forparticipants, 0 for comparison group members,
S = a vector of subjective rating variables.

This model controls for all measured selection factors, including
demographic characteristics and intake workers' ratings of applicant
potential. The intake rating variables indicate the percentage of each
group rated at each level on a scale of 1 (excellent) to 4 (poor), plus the
percentage with missing ratings data. 16 This represents the groupeddata version of the "regression discontinuity" model discussed in chap
ter 2. The particular parameterization chosen essentially dummy
variables at the individual level for each value on the rating scale
avoids the problem of having to assume a functional form for how rat
ings affect follow-up earnings. 17 Inclusion of a separate missing data
category assures that data on those without ratings will not confound
estimates for those with ratings. The program impact estimate, 53, that
emerges from this model attempts to isolate the effect of the program
from the effects of program selection on both observable and subjec
tive factors, and from the effects of self- selection on observable fac
tors.
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Adjusting for Self-Selection in the Experimental Sample
In order to interpret the impact estimates obtained from the above
procedures, we need a benchmark against which the various nonexperimental estimates may be compared. To this end, we exploit the origi
nal experimental design of the demonstrations wherein participants
were randomly assigned to treatment status or control status following
acceptance into the program. To obtain an experimental estimate in
each year, we reestimate our final equation using data on experimental
treatment group members (no-shows plus participants) and control
group members, where p now represents assignment to the treatment
group. This regression gives us an unbiased estimate of the average
program effect on the full treatment group.
We then convert that estimate into a measure of the average effect on
participants by dividing it (and its standard error) by the share of the
treatment group who actually participated. Algebraically, the effect on
participants, P, is obtained from the equation
T = r P+ (1-r) N,

where T is the treatment effect for those assigned to the treatment
group, N the treatment effect for no-shows, and r the proportion of the
treatment group that participated in the program. Assuming N - 0 (no
effect on no-shows) and solving for P, we get a formula for the pro
gram's effect on the average participant:
P = T/r

This procedure common in the evaluation literature is based on two
assumptions: the demonstration program had no effect on no-shows;
and the distribution of no-show "types" in the experimental sample
matches the distribution of nonparticipants among those admitted to an
actual program of the same design. 18
The first of these two assumptions is well known, discussed by
Bloom (1984b) and others and examined empirically by Heckman,
Smith, and Taber (1994). The second assumption is less well recog
nized; we are indebted to Arthur Goldberger for bringing it to our
attention. 19
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The assumption of equal patterns of nonparticipation in the "sam
ple" (the demonstration or experiment) and the "population" (the real
program) allows us to ignore potential effects on those who participate
in one instance and not in the other. It does not make any difference
whether demonstration no-shows would have participated or benefitted
from a real program, as long as the selection process that produces
them is the same in both instances. If the selection process differs
between the two settings, the "sample-based" demonstration analysis
will yield a biased estimate of the "population" parameter of interest,
P, unless the effect of the program is the same for individuals whose
participation differs between the two settings and those whose partici
pation is constant.20
Details of the Regressions
All regression equations are estimated as a cross section, separately for
each of six years, 1984 through 1990. The 1984 regressions omit the
baseline (1984) earnings measure from the specification and are pre
sented for comparison purposes only, since they do not represent mea
sures of demonstration impact. Appendix B contains the detailed
regression results for the fully specified model (including the ratings
variables).

Estimation Results
The experimental impact estimates for each year are given in exhibit
3.2. Impacts per treatment group member in the first column are taken
directly from the coefficient on treatment status in our final equation
( 3). As can be seen, the largest estimated effects are evident during the
in-program years 1985 and 1986. These periods included up to a year
of subsidized employment for each participant; thus large earnings
effects are to be expected. Impacts decline steadily beginning with the
first postprogram year (1987). By 1990, four years after the program,
treatment group members earned an average of $402 more than the
average control member. Most of the impact estimates are statistically
significant at or near the . 10 level, and most at the .01 level. They fall in
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Exhibit 3.2 Impact Estimates from the Experiment, with Participant
Mean Earnings (standard errors in parentheses)
Average effect on:
Treatment group
Participant
Year
members
Participants mean earnings
1984: Preprogram year $ 99
(74) $ 116 (86) $ 840 (706)
1985: In-program year 2,237
(119) 2,610 (139) 4 ,206 (1,288)
1986: Mostly
postprogram year
1,023
(135) 1,194 (158) 3 ,776 (1,526)
1987: Postprogram
year
551
(157)
643 (183) 3 ,936 (1,824)
1988: Postprogram
year
(191)
500
583 (223) 4 ,626 (2,056)
1989: Postprogram
year
394 (244) 5 ,174 (2,172)
338
(209)
1990: Postprogram
year
402
(226)
469 (264) 5,623 (2,363)

the middle of previously available long-term impact estimates for
experimentally evaluated AFDC employment programs.21
The third column of exhibit 3.2 applies a no-show adjustment to the
results in column 1 to arrive at estimates of the impacts per participant.
Adjusting for no-shows results in larger impact estimates, since the noshows did not receive training and therefore contributed nothing to the
average impact per treatment group member. Column 3 is-the relevant
experimental benchmark for comparison with nonexperimental estima
tors, which universally (in this study and others) measure impacts on
program participants only, not participants plus no-shows. The esti
mated impact of the program on the earnings of the participants during
the four purely postprogram years is a modest increase (8 to 16 per
cent), as shown in the last two columns of exhibit 3.2.
Withdrawal-Based Estimates
The estimates obtained using withdrawals as a comparison group
are presented in exhibit 3.3.22 The first column shows the unadjusted

Estimating Program Effects

63

difference in mean earnings between participants and withdrawals. As
expected, the difference is largest during the period of training and sub
sidized employment (1985), with the estimated impact falling off
sharply in the first postprogram year and declining slowly thereafter.
This mirrors the pattern seen earlier in the experimental estimates
(repeated in the last column of the exhibit for reference). The nonexperimental impact estimates are, however, uniformly larger than the
experimental estimates for all years after 1984. This implies that those
who withdrew early in the intake process experienced lower earnings
than the participants would have in the absence of the program.
Exhibit 3.3 Impact Estimates Based on Withdrawal Comparison Group
Based on
regression
Based on
with
regression Experimental
with
estimate of
Unadjusted conventional
difference independent subjective impact on
in means
variables3
ratingb
participants'
Year
1984: Mostly
$ 41
preprogram year
$ 125
$ 121
$ 116
1985: In-program
2,774
3,413
3,422
2,610
year
1986: Mostly
postprogram year
1,687
1,194
2,076
2,003
1987: Postprogram year
949
824
643
635
1988: Post951
907
583
program year
800
1989: Postprogram year
887
394
1,564
1,316
1990: Postprogram year
852
469
2,337
2,074
a. Independent variables: age, race, education, marital status, number of children, ever worked for
pay, highest wage attained, 1984 total earnings (except in 1984 regressions), and state of resi
dence.
b. Includes all independent variables in previous note plus intake workers' rating of potential,
c. Experimental treatment-control difference, controlling for independent variables in note a, and
subjective rating of potential and adjusted to apply to participants only.
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We come to this conclusion based on the following reasoning. The
control group's earnings, adjusted for no-shows, provide a selectionbias-free estimate of what participants would have earned in the
absence of the program. As a result, the entire difference between the
(no-show-adjusted) experimental impact estimate in column 4 and the
participant-withdrawal difference of means in column 1 results from
the difference between control group earnings and withdrawal earn
ings. A similar interpretation applies to the comparison of column 4 to
columns 2 and 3, where additional demographic and selection factors
have been used to adjust the earnings of withdrawals to more closely
resemble those of controls.
The second column of exhibit 3.3 gives withdrawal-based impact
estimates after controlling for conventional demographic and selection
factors, including age, race, education, marital status, number of chil
dren, work experience, state of residence, and (except in 1984) previ
ous earnings. This column displays the curious result that accounting
for observable characteristics produces generally higher impact esti
mates, rather than lower estimates as one might have expected given
that the original estimates were too high in most years. This suggests
that the measured variables inflicted a downward bias on the impact
estimates before they were neutralized, but were overwhelmed by an
even stronger upward bias attributable to unmeasured factors. Remov
ing only the first set of influences leads to an even larger upward bias in
the column 2 estimates.
The third column of exhibit 3.3 shows the results of estimating the
full equation described above, adding the subjective rating dummy
variables. We do not expect intake workers' ratings to make large dif
ferences in this instance, since they played no role in nonparticipation
decisions and, in any case, are missing for two-thirds of all withdraw
als. Even so, including the subjective ratings does move the impact
estimates toward the experimental estimates in all years except 1985,
though not by much. Estimates with the rating variables are $150 to
$260 closer to the experimental benchmark estimates in each of the
postprogram years beginning in 1987. The small extent of these
improvements may be due to the fact that potential ratings are available
for only about a third of the withdrawal sample. 23
For both the regression models, the deviation of the nonexperimental estimates from the experimental benchmarks widens late in the fol-
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low-up period. This deviation begins fairly large, narrows considerably
in the early post-program years, and then widens again. By 1990, the
gap is over $1,600 for the fully-adjusted estimator. Hence, in most
years, the withdrawals in this sample do not appear to provide an ade
quate comparison group even after adjustments for baseline differ
ences. (Chapter 4 considers this question more formally.) This finding
is not unexpected, since withdrawals exit the employment and training
program intake process for a wide variety of reasons that we could not
expect to fully measure. Hence, systematic differences between with
drawals and participants may remain even after controlling for avail
able selection factors.
Screen-Out-Based Estimates
Exhibit 3.4 presents the estimates obtained using screen-outs as the
comparison group. These estimates are not obtained by directly com
paring participants and screen-outs in the standard fashion, however, as
was previously done with participants and withdrawals. Here, we com
pare participants plus no-shows to screen-outs in order to obtain a mea
sure of impact on the average "screen-in" (participants plus no-shows)
and then apply the no-show correction to that estimate (and its standard
error). As with the experimental estimates, this latter step converts
impacts on the average "screen-in" into impacts on the average partici
pant on the assumptions that the demonstrations had no effect on noshows and that self-selection of no-shows in the demonstrations would
not change in a real program of the same design.
The reason for this departure from the standard methodology was
noted in chapter 2. Unlike the withdrawal comparison group just ana
lyzed, we expect to achieve the best match of screen-outs to a withprogram population by comparing them to participants and no-shows
combined. As explained in chapter 2, the objective of the screen-outbased approach is to control for the program selection that separates
screen-outs from "screen-ins," using intake workers' ratings at the
point of selection. After that point, adjustments for self-selection into
the participant group (versus the no-show group) can be handled just
as in an experiment through the no-show adjustment proposed by
Bloom (1984b).24 The same framework does not apply to the other
applicant-based comparison groups considered here, however. Since
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there is no presumption that withdrawals and/or no-shows are compa
rable with participants plus no-shows, we stay with the simpler com
parison of withdrawals or no-shows to participants.
Exhibit 3.4 Impact Estimates Based on Screen-Out Comparison Group9

Year
1984: Mostly
preprogram year
1985: In-program
year
1986: Mostly
postprogram year
1987: Postprogram year
1988: Postprogram year
1989: Postprogram year
1990: Postprogram year

Based on
regression
Based on
with
regression Experimental
Unadjusted conventional
with
estimate of
difference independent subjective impact on
in means
variables11
rating0
participants'1
$ 274

$ 192

$ 183

$ 116

3,107

3,448

3,401

2,610

1,927

1,862

1,802

1,194

1,388

1,111

1,030

643

1,326

1,036

1,014

583

1,138

850

696

394

1,026

931

768

469

a. All estimates are based on a comparison of participants plus no-shows to screen-cuts and then
adjusted to apply to participants only.
b. Independent variables: age, race, education, marital status, number of children, ever worked for
pay, highest wage attained, 1984 total earnings (except in 1984 regressions), and state of resi
dence.
c. Includes all independent variables in previous note plus intake workers' rating of potential,
d. Experimental treatment-control difference, controlling for independent variables in note a, and
subjective rating of potential and adjusted to apply to participants only.

With this refinement to the matching process, we expect the screenout-based approach to produce better results than our earlier analysis
of withdrawals. As can be seen in the first column of the exhibit, how
ever, this is not the case for the basic estimates prior to controlling for
baseline characteristics and intake ratings. The unadjusted difference-
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in-means estimates (which include the no-show correction) exceed the
corresponding estimates in exhibit 3.3 and, therefore, are further from
the experimental benchmarks than the withdrawal-based estimates.
That they substantially surpass the experimental benchmarks confirms
inferences made by Bell and Orr (1988) that demonstration intake staff
"creamed" applicants with the best earnings prospects, producing
screen-cuts whose subsequent earnings were well below what partici
pants would have earned absent demonstration services.
Except near the end of the follow-up period, discrepancies between
unadjusted screen-out estimates of program impacts and experimental
estimates are the largest of any comparison group considered and gen
erally exceed $500 per year. This of itself is not a problem, since the
real strength of screen-outs as a comparison group is not their initial
similarity to participants (which we do not expect) but their likeness on
self-selection factors once the determinants of program selection have
been taken into account. Consistent with this theory, column 2 shows
that unlike the experience with withdrawals including conventional
control variables moves the estimates toward the lower experimental
benchmarks in most years. It appears, then, that program selection on
the measured variables produces a screen-out population with lower
earnings than participants, all other things equal. Hence, controlling for
those variables through the regression reduces the earnings difference
between screen-outs and participants, resulting in impact estimates
closer to the experimental estimates in most years. Nonetheless, the
screen-out-based estimates in column 2 rarely come within $400 dol
lars of the experimental estimates in any postprogram year.
Theory further suggests that the impact estimates generated from
the screen-out comparison group should show the largest improvement
with the addition of the intake rating variables. Indeed, the addition of
these variables in column 3 of the exhibit closes the gap with the exper
imental estimates by nearly $100 in each postprogram year except
1988. In all years beginning with 1985, the rating variables improve
the estimates to some degree, with later years showing particularly
strong improvements. In percentage terms, the gap is reduced by 17
percent in 1987, 5 percent in 1988, 34 percent in 1989, and 35 percent
in 1990. Hence, despite the facts that the subjective rating variables in
our data are limited to fairly coarse four-way distinctions, that these
distinctions do not track entirely with admission decisions, and that
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somewhat over a third of the screen-outs have no rating recorded, the
ratings have some explanatory power in the predicted direction.
That they could not do more to remove the initial differences
between the screen-out-based and experimental estimates may be due
in part to the inexact relationship between the ratings variable and
actual selection decisions. As noted in discussing exhibit 3.1, a sub
stantial number of highly rated applicants were excluded from the
demonstrations and a number of poorly rated applicants admitted. This
necessarily reflects inconsistent admission standards (across intake
workers and/or over time), measurement error in the ratings variable,
or the use of factors beyond the ratings in making admission decisions.
As noted in chapter 2, the first of these factors increases the ability of
the regression discontinuity approach to successfully adjust for incom
ing differences between the participant and screen-out samples (by
providing more overlap between the two groups). In contrast, the other
two factors reduce the usefulness of the rating variable as a means of
refining screen-out-based estimates. Unfortunately, we do not know
what accounts for the observed variation in admissions by rating level
in these data.25
Another noteworthy aspect of the findings is the marked improve
ment in the screen-out estimates relative to the experimental bench
marks over time. In 1986, the first largely postprogram year, the
difference between the fully adjusted nonexperimental and experimen
tal estimates is nearly $500, while by 1990 the impact differential is
less than $300. We consider the possible reasons for this trend in chap
ter 4.
No-Show-Based Estimates
Nonexperimental impacts based on the no-show comparison group
are displayed in exhibit 3.5. Unadjusted difference-in-mean impacts
(estimated using the original methodology applied to withdrawals)
hover around $1,000 for each of the postprogram years, well above the
experimental estimates shown in the final column. Thus, like the other
two nonparticipating applicant groups, no-shows earned less than par
ticipants would have absent the demonstration throughout the followup period. These results are similar to those found earlier for withdraw
als, the other self-selected comparison group considered here.
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Exhibit 3.5 Impact Estimates Based on No-Show Comparison Group
Based on
regression
Based on
with
regression Experimental
Unadjusted conventional
with
estimate of
difference independent subjective impact on
Year
in means
variables8
ratingb participants'
1984: Mostly
preprogram year
$ 143
$ 61
$ 116
$ 26
1985: In-program
year
2,077
2,751
2,100
2,610
1986: Mostly
postprogram year
1,489
1,145
1,088
1,194
1987: Postprogram year
1,051
898
643
916
1988: Postprogram year
1,039
669
706
583
1989: Postprogram year
1,192
836
394
814
1990: Postprogram year
1,154
882
469
867
a. Independent variables: age, race, education, marital status, number of children, ever worked for
pay, highest wage attained, 1984 total earnings (except in 1984 regressions), and state of resi
dence.
b. Includes all independent variables in previous note plus intake workers' rating of potential,
c. Experimental treatment-control difference, controlling for independent variables in note a, and
subjective rating of potential and adjusted to apply to participants only.

Unlike the withdrawals, however, adjusting the no-show-based
impact estimates for objective baseline characteristics produces dis
tinct improvements in their performance. These adjustments actually
overcompensate for preexisting differences in 1984 through 1986,
leading to conventional regression-adjusted estimates in column 2 that
fall below the experimental benchmarks. In later years, the nonexperimental estimates again exceed the experimental benchmarks. The
explanations offered earlier in connection with similar but less extreme
changes in the withdrawal-based estimates may again account for these
patterns.
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Adding the intake rating variables to the analysis has very little
effect on the no-show-based estimates. Apparently, intake workers' rat
ings do not discriminate well among those who make it through the
demonstrations' intake screens. This should perhaps not be surprising,
since most of those admitted to the program (86 percent) were rated
either "excellent" or "good" on the crude four-point scale used here.
The estimates derived from the full regression model are quite close to
the experimental estimates in 1986, the first substantially postprogram
year, but lie $100 to $400 above the experimental benchmarks in the
remaining four follow-up years.

Summary

Exhibits 3.3 through 3.5 illustrate the application of applicant-based
nonexperimental impact estimation techniques to data on a voluntary
employment and training program for AFDC recipients. They show
that, in this particular application, controlling for standard demo
graphic selection variables and subjective intake ratings generally
moves applicant-based impact estimates in the direction of the experi
mental estimates for both the screen-out and no-show comparison
groups. The withdrawal-based estimates are not consistently improved
by these variables, however, although of the three comparison groups
considered withdrawals do produce simple difference-in-means impact
estimates that are closest to the experimental benchmark.
In the next chapter, we consider more formally how well each of
these estimators has performed relative to the selection-bias-free
experimental estimates.
NOTES
1. Further discussion of the empirical work is presented in Bell et al. (1993) and Cain et al.
(1993). The results presented in this chapter include certain corrections and refinements to the ear
lier results and should be considered final.
2. The seven states that ran demonstrations under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration, were Arkansas, Kentucky,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas. For a full description of the demonstra
tions, see Bell et al. (1987).
3. Bell and Orr (1994) summarize the results of the original experimental evaluation.
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4. See Bell and Orr (1988).
5. Random assignment was centrally controlled by Abt and rarely violated in the field. See
Bell, Enns, and Flanagan (1987) for details.
6. For purposes of analysis, this group also contains a small number of applicants who left the
intake process prior to admission with no reason reported. We assume that had intake staff known
the reasons these individuals did not enter the demonstrations, they would have reported them.
Hence, we take the absence of reported reasons to imply that the staff did not exclude the individ
uals involved and, therefore, that the applicants withdrew voluntarily (i.e., were withdrawals).
7. No-shows plus participants comprise the experimental treatment group of 1,855 individu
als, a number roughly equivalent to the size of the control group as a result of the 50-50 random
assignment ratio employed.
8. Controls remained eligible for other employment and training services in the community.
9. The decision to collect data on nonparticipants in order to study the demonstration intake
process was made after the demonstrations were well under way. As a result, complete data on
nonparticipants are available only for the third annual cohort of applicants.
10. Average earnings of the experimental sample (no-shows, participants, and controls) are
almost identical between the two sources in 1985, the year of greatest overlap. In the sample of
3,432 individuals for whom both types of data are available, earnings averaged $3,434 from the
survey and $3,361 from the IRS data. The correspondence is not so tight at the level of individual
observations, however, as is often the case for earnings measures from different sources. (See, for
example, Appendix E of Bloom et al. 1993.) As noted in the text, IRS data were provided as
means and standard deviations for groups of 10 or more individuals, to protect confidentiality. The
correlation coefficient between the IRS and survey measures at the group level is .63, with 54 per
cent of the groups differing by less than $1,000 between the two sources. Forty-six percent of the
groups differed by more than $1,000, and 17 percent by more than $2,000. Partly as a result of
these deviations, the experimental impact estimate for 1985 for the overlapping sample is $1,527
from the survey and $1,209 from the IRS data. Thus, while not as closely aligned as one might
hope, the two sources do give basically the same picture as regards demonstration impact. (This
modest divergence in impact estimates is also due partly to the extrapolation technique used to
project survey-based earnings to the end of 1985 for individuals interviewed before the end of the
year, a technique that biases downward control group but not treatment group mean earn
ings.)
11. Participants spent an average of twelve months in the program. With an average point of
entry of December 1984, 1984 can be considered the preprogram year and 1985 the in-program
year. Most, but not all, of 1986 represents postprogram experience.
12. This point may be explained with an example. If a baseline characteristic, such as an
"excellent" intake rating, was evenly distributed across groups so that all groups had the same per
centage, the variable would have no explanatory power in a regression of group-level observa
tions. Conversely, maximum variation and explanatory power at the group level is achieved by
making groups totally homogeneous with respect to a particular variable.
13. The specific variables used to represent each of these factors appear in the tables of regres
sion results in appendix B.
14. Additional details on the homogeneity of the groups appear in appendix A. Since all
groups are homogeneous with respect to intake status, the participation dummy in the equation is
a standard 0/1 variable.
15. Bell and Reesman (1987, table B.2) find that a collection of baseline characteristics,
including those considered here plus prior caregiving experience, non-AFDC welfare status, and
availability of private transportation, are highly significant as a group in predicting participation in
each of the seven state demonstrations. So, too, are many individual characteristics. Unfortu-
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nately, the proportion of variation in participation accounted for by these factors cannot be com
puted because the 0/1 participation equation is estimated using maximum likelihood methods
rather than ordinary least squares (which would have provided an R-squared coefficient measur
ing "explained" variation).
16. One of these five variables must be excluded from the model (which also includes an inter
cept) since they sum to 1 for each grouped observation. Values of 2 and 3 on the ratings scale cor
respond to "good" and "fair," respectively.
17. Note that this specification is possible only when there are both participants and compari
son group members at each rating level, a feature that differs from the original regression discon
tinuity approach in ways that become important as we interpret our findings below.
18. See Bloom (1984b) for an early discussion of the technique. Angrist and Imbens (1991)
and Imbens and Angrist (1992) reintroduce the same method as an instrumental variable
approach, using assignment to the treatment group as an instrument for participation. The proce
dure has been applied to several large-scale evaluations of voluntary employment and training
programs; see, for example, Bell and Orr (1994) and Bloom et al. (1993).
19. Unpublished comments presented at a session on "Does Job Training for the Disadvantaged Work? Findings from the National JTPA Study," Annual Meetings of the American Eco
nomic Association, Boston, Massachusetts, January 3, 1994.
20. Goldberger further suggested that the selection process be examined directly, noting that
participation patterns may depend, among other things, on the pool of persons eligible to apply for
the program, the sites included in the evaluation, and the incentives to participate presented by
each local program office.
21. Couch (1992) estimates that the National Supported Work Demonstration increased the
earnings of AFDC recipients a statistically significant $490-655 per year (in 1978 dollars) in the
fourth to eighth years following demonstration exit. Friedlander and Burtless (1992) report much
smaller long-term earnings gains from a Virginia work-welfare initiative $200-300 per year in
the late 1980s (in unadjusted dollars) for the fourth and fifth year of follow-up. Gueron and Pauly
(1991, table A.I) report that Supported Work cost substantially more per participant to implement
than did the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide Demonstrations, and the Virginia demonstra
tion substantially less.
22. For simplicity, we omit standard errors and significance tests from this and the following
two exhibits. We discuss approximation errors and how they should affect the interpretation of the
numbers in chapter 4. For now, our objective is simply to illustrate the behavior of the nonexperimental impact "point estimates" shown in the exhibits as we vary the comparison group and
regression control variables used.
23. Many withdrawals left the intake process prior to the point where intake workers evaluated
potential.
24. In practice, the use of the alternate methodology makes little difference to the size of the
estimates, except in 1985 where estimates from the standard approach (not shown) are $300-400
smaller than those shown here.
25. Nor can we examine that variation by intake worker because the intake worker who made
the selection decision was not identified on the forms.

Testing Alternative Estimates
for Selection Bias
Our purpose in reintroducing applicant-based impact measures to
the evaluation of employment and training programs is to find a nonexperimental measure that provides adequate protection from the selec
tion bias problems that have plagued other nonexperimental
techniques. The crucial question for the empirical portion of our analy
sis is therefore: Which, if any, of the applicant-based approaches are
sufficiently protected from selection bias to provide adequate substi
tutes for a randomized experiment?
This chapter presents our attempt to answer that question for the
various applicant-based impact estimates presented in chapter 3, using
evidence from the associated experiment. If we can find a technique
that eliminates selection bias, or reduces it to a tolerable level, we can
reasonably propose that approach as a possible alternative to experi
ments in future evaluations carried out in similar contexts. If we can
not, the applicant-based strategy will have failed its first test. Either
way, further tests of the methodology using other experimental data
sets should be undertaken; given the limitations of available test proce
dures and the fact that any result we obtain is conditioned on a specific
demonstration project and data set, a single test should not be viewed
as conclusive in either direction.
We begin by reviewing how others have attempted to validate nonexperimental impact estimates by comparing them to experimental
results. We then propose a more comprehensive and rigorous approach
for gauging the risk of selection bias in any nonexperimental measure,
an approach that allows careful comparisons among measures and pro
vides a formal basis for judging each measure against the unbiased
experimental norm. The concluding sections of the chapter apply this
approach to our applicant-based estimates to determine which might be
adequate substitutes for an experiment.
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Previous Validation Methods
Just as nonexperimental estimation techniques have evolved over
the years (see chapter 1), so too have methods for assessing the reli
ability of those techniques using experimental data. Two sets of previ
ous studies have attempted to validate nonexperimental estimators
against experimental estimates:
Analyses of data from the National Supported Work Demonstra
tion, which employed relatively informal validation methods; and
Analyses of AFDC work incentive (WIN) employment program
demonstrations, which went a good deal further in formalizing
and systematizing validation methods.

Supported Work Analyses.
All of the Supported Work studies follow one of two approaches to
assessing alternative nonexperimental impact measures against the
experimental norm: (1) they compare the magnitude of the experimen
tal and nonexperimental estimates (LaLonde, 1986; Fraker and Maynard 1987), applying judgmental standards to decide which
nonexperimental estimates came "close enough" to the experimental
benchmark and which did not; or (2) they compare the statistical infer
ences produced by the two types of estimates (Heckman and Hotz
1989; Couch 1992), contrasting statistically significant estimates with
insignificant estimates (or with significant estimates of the opposite
sign).
In the first approach, nonexperimental impact estimates that differ
substantially from one another (e.g., by more than several hundred dol
lars of earnings per year) are typically considered to be inconsistent,
and those that differ from the experimental benchmark by similar mag
nitudes are considered to be biased. Implicitly, estimates that fall
within these bounds are judged consistent or unbiased. The magnitudes
used for this purpose tend to be phrased in terms of "large relative to
the experimental estimate" or simply "large," although the deriva
tion or even the explicit statement of a cutoff between large and
small magnitudes is not given. Thus, while clearly focused on a crite
rion one might apply to determine the acceptable degree of bias the
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relative magnitudes of nonexperimental and experimental estimates
the standards used by LaLonde and by Fraker and Maynard are incom
plete and subject to dispute.
Comparisons based on statistical inferences are less subjective but
also incomplete and, as we argue below, even less discriminating than
the comparison of magnitudes. Under this approach, a nonexperimen
tal estimate is considered to be an acceptable substitute for the experi
mental result if it leads to the same policy conclusion among three
possibilities:
The program increased participant earnings;
The program decreased participant earnings; or
The evidence is inconclusive as to whether the program increased,
decreased, or failed to change participant earnings.
Distinctions among these three situations are based on the results of
tests of the statistical significance of the impact estimates. If a test
rejects the null hypothesis of no impact because the estimate is positive
and too large to reflect chance variations in the data (random sampling
and measurement errors) for a program that truly had no impact, one
concludes that the impact was positive. The corresponding situation for
a negative impact estimate implies that the impact was negative. When
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected by either a positive or negative
estimate because the estimate lies within the range of chance variation,
the evidence is judged inconclusive.
Ultimately, the success of an employment and training program
hinges not on whether it produces a significant earnings gain, but on
whether the earnings gain is large and sustained enough to offset the
program's cost. For practical reasons, this question has not been
addressed comprehensively by formal hypothesis tests. 1 Yet it remains
the "bottom line" consideration for employment and training evalua
tions.2
If one cares most about the net of program benefits over program
costs (a measure called "net social benefits" in the literature), it is help
ful but not sufficient to correctly categorize the main benefit measure
impact on participants' earnings in relation to zero. This is particu
larly true when the usual hypothesis test shows a program to have a
significantly positive effect. A numerical example illustrates why. Sup
pose that for some employment and training program, the experimental
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estimate and the nonexperimental alternative both show statistically
significant earnings gains say, $500 per participant for the experi
ment and, because of upward selection bias, $700 per participant for
the nonexperimental alternative. In this example, the nonexperimental
estimate passes the test for "same statistical inference as the experi
ment." It might not give the same benefit-cost conclusion for the pro
gram, however. If program costs equal $600 per participant, for
example, the nonexperimental approach would show the program to be
a good social investment (with a net social benefit of $100 per partici
pant) while the unbiased experimental estimate provides the opposite
conclusion (a net social loss of $100 per participant).
The basic problem here is that using similarities or differences in
policy conclusions as the litmus test for nonexperimental estimators
may give different answers depending on the policy question posed. An
estimate that is close enough to the experimental benchmark to agree
with it on one policy question may not do so on another. Moreover, in
considering the reliability of a nonexperimental method in future appli
cations, one cannot stipulate what policy question will be of greatest
interest. It might be whether the program increases earnings, as in the
case considered by Heckman and Hotz and by Couch. It might be
whether the program produces net social benefits, as a number of other
analysts have proposed. Or it might be another question altogether,
such as whether the program produces net budgetary savings or raises
earnings more than an alternative policy (e.g., wage supplements).
Clearly, what is needed here is an assessment tool that considers the
correspondence of policy conclusions between the experiment and pos
sible nonexperimental estimators over a range of policy questions.
The AFDC WIN Demonstration Analyses
One recent paper begins to move the literature on model validation
in this direction. In their exploration of alternative comparison-site
methods for measuring the effects of mandatory work-welfare pro
grams, Friedlander and Robins (1992) for the first time exposit specific
criteria for comparing experimental and nonexperimental estimates.
Three criteria are stated, including one that is new:
The magnitude of the numerical difference between the two esti
mates;
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Agreement between the two estimators on the statistical inference
regarding the null hypothesis of no effect; and
The statistical significance of the difference between the esti
mates.
We have already reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the first
two of these validation criteria. Friedlander and Robins apply these cri
teria much more comprehensively and uniformly than earlier authors.
They also for the first time establish explicit standards for judging the
magnitude of numerical differences under the first approach, although
the standards they use are necessarily judgmental and subject to debate
(as they themselves acknowledge). The authors also explore the limita
tions of the second criterion the test of agreement of statistical infer
ences but focus on a different point than those raised above. As they
point out, the test is artificially more accepting of nonexperimental
estimates derived from small samples than of nonexperimental esti
mates derived from large samples. 3
Perhaps the most important of Friedlander and Robins' many contri
butions is their decision to test for statistically significant differences
between experimental and nonexperimental estimates. This is a logical
extension of the first validation criterion, the simple comparison of
magnitudes. Except for a passing mention by LaLonde, none of the
earlier papers that focus on magnitude comparisons even mentions the
possibility of testing the experimental/nonexperimental differences on
which it focuses.4 Of course, measured differences do not give the
exact bias in the nonexperimental estimator, since the observed data
only approximate the degree of selection bias due to chance sampling,
outcome, and measurement error. Friedlander and Robins make these
uncertainties explicit and central to their analysis, insisting that
observed differences in magnitudes between the two types of estima
tors exceed the bounds of chance variation before concluding that a
particular nonexperimental approach suffers from selection bias.
For reasons that we explore more fully in the next section, this
important advance does not yet produce a fully satisfactory means of
identifying reliable versus unreliable nonexperimental estimators. One
major problem is recognized by the authors themselves but not reme
died: like any test for statistically significant differences between two
measures, the technique is more likely to accept the nonexperimental
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estimates as equivalent to the experimental estimates when samples are
small than when they are large. As Friedlander and Robins emphasize,
the ability of the bias test to detect any given degree of bias depends on
the size of the data samples employed. All other things equal, larger
samples lead to greater statistical certainty and, therefore, more dis
cerning tests for selection bias.5
A more fundamental issue which all of Friedlander and Robins'
validation criteria share with those used by earlier analysts concerns
the assumption that no bias is present until the data prove otherwise,
rather than the reverse. We consider this assumption to be unwarranted
in an exercise arising out of concern for the near-universal presence of
substantial selection bias among nonexperimental estimators. To
address this concern, we propose a reformulation of the validation
question to strike a better balance between proving what does not work
and demonstrating what does.

Refraining the Validation Question
Ultimately, the search for a nonexperimental means of reliably mea
suring the effects of employment and training programs has to address
two questions with regard to any particular candidate measure:
1. Is there compelling evidence that the candidate measure suffers
from an unacceptable amount of selection bias? If so, the mea
sure should be rejected out of hand as an inadequate substitute for
an experiment.
2. If not, is there compelling evidence that selection bias, assuming
it exists at all, is necessarily confined to an acceptable level? That
is, having failed to prove the existence of substantial selection
bias, can we prove the absence of bias of any appreciable magni
tude?
The answers to these questions will tell us which, if any, of the appli
cant-based impact estimates presented in chapter 3 can be viewed as
adequate substitutes for the experiment.
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In prior validation efforts, attention has focused on question 1
proving the existence of bias. The most direct such proof testing for a
statistically significant difference between the experimental and nonexperimental estimates, as in Friedlander and Robins begins by postu
lating that no selection bias exists and then looks for proof that it does.
Where proof of bias is found and the magnitude of the measured bias
is of substantive importance this sort of test is quite helpful, answer
ing question 1 in the affirmative and making question 2 moot. When
simple to carry out, such tests can serve well as the first and possibly
only step in the analysis.
However, tests of question 1 are not simple to carry out when deal
ing with voluntary employment and training programs. In that circum
stance, the calculation of the appropriate test statistic becomes
substantially more complex than in the case of mandatory programs
like those studied by Friedlander and Robins. The reasons are
explained in appendix C, which explores the implications of the volun
tary/mandatory distinction for the current study and in relation to past
validation analyses.
Given the complexities involved in addressing question 1 for volun
tary programs, we concentrate instead on question 2 proving lack of
bias. In many instances, this question will become paramount even
when question 1 is considered: an impact estimate that is not proven to
be biased in a test of question 1 may still be biased to an unacceptable
degree, if the data are too weak to provide conclusive evidence.
To protect against this possibility, we would turn the test objective
around, passing over question 1 to address question 2 as the first step.
This reflects our belief that the reliability of any nonexperimental
method must be proven before that method can be recommended for
use. The real objective is not to prove some estimation methods biased
and let the others "pass," but to prove that the bias associated with one
or more nonexperimental methods is nonexistent or, at worst, falls
within an acceptable margin. Only then can we consider a method an
acceptable alternative to an experiment in terms of selection bias.
The next several sections of the chapter are devoted to developing a
statistical framework for answering question 2 proving the absence
of substantial selection bias. This development could take many forms,
several of which we explore. All of the alternate frameworks examined
involve complex statistical concepts that some readers may wish to
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skip, since ultimately we choose a framework that can be understood
intuitively without benefit of the statistical arguments.

The Classical Approach to Proving Absence of Bias
Our goal, then, is to use the standard tools of classical statistical
analysis to formulate a test of question 2. We begin by considering the
simplest possible approach: basing a proof of "no selection bias" on a
simple comparison of magnitudes between the nonexperimental and
experimental estimates. As noted earlier in connection with question 1,
this strategy overlooks the fact that the difference between the nonex
perimental and experimental estimates is only an approximation of the
underlying bias in the nonexperimental estimate, which is defined as
the average difference in the two measures in repeated applications of
the technique.6 To take appropriate account of the approximation (or
estimation) error, we must use statistical tests, not simple comparisons
of magnitude.
There are two routes one could take to conducting a statistical test of
question 2:
Maintain the null hypothesis of no selection bias, but alter the test
procedure so that the null is rejected rather than accepted when
the data are inconclusive; or
Switch the null hypothesis to one that says substantial selection
bias is present, so that inconclusive results that allow the null to
stand will again lead to a finding of bias.
We develop each of these strategies in detail below. When both prove
less than fully satisfying, we turn to an alternative strategy that relies
on Bayesian tools of inference in place of classical hypothesis-testing
methods.
Changing Emphasis in the Original Test Procedure
The most obvious way to address question 2 is to repeat the test pro
cedure others have used for question 1, but shift priorities between the
two hypotheses. As noted earlier, the original test procedure insists on
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strong contrary evidence before rejecting the null hypothesis of "no
selection bias" in favor of the alternative hypothesis of "substantial
selection bias." To address question 2, we should turn this emphasis
around, requiring strong evidence that the null hypothesis is right
before accepting it, and overturning the null in all other cases. We can
accomplish this result by changing the significance level of the test.
Normally, one chooses a rule for accepting or rejecting the null
hypothesis that gives a correct null hypothesis little chance of rejec
tion. Statisticians refer to the probability of rejecting a correct null as
the "significance level" of the test. Low significance levels, on the
order of .05 or .10, are appropriate when one needs compelling evi
dence that the null is wrong before rejecting it. Rejecting the null at the
.05 or .10 significance level provides a strong assurance that the null is
wrong, since the probability of rejection when the null is right is only
.10 or below.
The desire to be quite sure before rejecting the null hypothesis,
while common in statistical practice, is not always appropriate. One
could instead choose to be quite sure before allowing the null to stand,
as we wish to be with a null that states that a nonexperimental estima
tor has no appreciable selection bias. We need to make the null harder
to accept when false, not harder to reject when true. In so doing, how
ever, we also make it harder to accept the null when true. Thus, we can
only ensure probable rejection of false nulls by raising the significance
level of the test above .10.
How far should we raise the significance level of the test to tip the
balance in favor of the alternative hypothesis by an appropriate
amount? Presumably, until the probability of rejecting the alternative
hypothesis when it is false drops to .10 or below, according it the status
usually reserved for the null. This will protect against accepting the
null too quickly, and do so to the same degree that one normally pro
tects against rejecting the null too quickly.
This result can be expressed in terms of statistical power. The
"power" of a statistical test is the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false. We are looking here for a
test with high power a test very likely to reject the null hypothesis of
"no selection bias" when selection bias is present. The test just
described one which rarely accepts a false null hypothesis neces
sarily rejects a false null in almost all cases. Thus, our goal can be
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restated as raising the significance level of the test far enough that the
power of the test the odds of rejecting the null hypothesis when
false reaches .90.
A complication arises at this point, however one very familiar to
statisticians: the power of a test depends on the true level of the param
eter in question here, the amount of selection bias. Thus, the odds of
rejecting a false null hypothesis depend on which specific alternative to
the null actually holds. With true selection bias of, say, $100, a test pro
cedure will be less likely to reject the null hypothesis of no selection
bias than when the true selection bias is $1,000, since the latter situa
tion is much more likely to generate measured differences in estimates
of a magnitude that will lead to rejection.
One can address this problem in two ways. First, one can establish a
degree of selection bias that one is willing to tolerate and then choose a
test procedure with high power to detect bias of at least that magnitude.
Alternatively, one could conduct a series of tests, each yielding 90 per
cent power at a specific level of true bias, and then somehow convert
the range of test results into an overall conclusion regarding the
method. Both of these strategies setting a bias tolerance limit and
synthesizing a range of test results present problems that we discuss
below in connection with the strategy of reversing the null hypothesis.

Reversing the Null Hypothesis
A second classical approach to question 2 is to reverse the null and
alternative hypotheses used in the original test of question 1, leaving
the significance level and power of the test unchanged. Here, instead of
assuming that selection bias equals $0 (the null hypothesis under ques
tion 1), assume that selection bias is not $0 (the null hypothesis under
question 2).
Unfortunately, this new null hypothesis is too broad to serve as the
basis for constructing an informative test. In general, statistical tests
are formulated by assuming that the null hypothesis is true. Based on
this assumption, one can tell what sorts of estimates to expect from the
data. If those expectations are not met (e.g., when the experimental and
nonexperimental estimates differ markedly in a test of question 1), one
rejects the null hypothesis. In this instance, we have a broad null
hypothesis that says that selection bias is some positive or negative
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number, a situation that leaves open too many options to have clear
implications for the data. (For example, the null could be true because
bias is only slightly different from $0, making small or zero differences
between the nonexperimental and experimental estimates fairly likely.
Or it could be true because bias is quite large or very negative, making
extreme differences reasonably likely). Testing a null hypothesis this
broad assures acceptance, and amounts to simply assuming that the
null is true.7
To remove this problem, we must change the null hypothesis to one
that can be meaningfully tested a narrower null that states that selec
tion bias is confined to a smaller range than all points other than $0. A
null that puts bias at or above some threshold level, say plus or minus
$200, seems the most sensible. If the data reject this null hypothesis,
we have found a nonexperimental method whose selection bias almost
certainly does not exceed $200 in absolute value and can declare it an
acceptable alternative to an experiment if we are willing to tolerate bias
up to that limit. The essence of this approach is to define an acceptable
level of selection bias and then test whether actual bias exceeds that
level.8
A Confidence-Interval-Based Test Procedure
We now have a null hypothesis for which it is possible to construct a
meaningful test: that selection bias exceeds $X. There may be more
than one way to test this hypothesis; we describe one such approach
below, based on the concept of a "confidence interval."9
In classical statistics, a confidence interval represents the range in
which an unknown parameter is thought to lie. One determines that
range by moving far enough beyond the point estimate of the parame
ter on either side to encompass the true value of the parameter with
great certainty. The standard error of the estimate determines how far
out one must go to reach that objective.
Consider the confidence interval for true selection bias implied by
the difference between a nonexperimental and experimental impact
estimate. Like all confidence intervals, such an interval is defined so
that we can be quite confident that the true selection bias falls some
where between its endpoints. Following the usual standard, let us sup-
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pose that the interval is broad enough to have a 90 percent chance of
containing the true level of selection bias.
To take a specific numeric example, suppose that the 90 percent con
fidence interval for selection bias for one of the nonexperimental
impact estimates in chapter 3 centers on $50 and ranges from $-75 to
$175. 10 In this instance, we would be fairly certain that the true bias is
confined to this interval and, therefore, that it does not exceed $200 in
either direction. If $200 is our tolerance limit, we would be willing to
reject the null hypothesis of substantial bias and accept the approach as
a reasonable alternative to the experiment. In other instances say, any
time the 90 percent confidence interval for true bias extended more
than $200 above or below $0, we would not reject the null hypothesis,
concluding instead that the nonexperimental method entails an unac
ceptable risk of selection bias.
This sort of calculation, while statistically complete, raises a major
practical issue introduced earlier in thinking about other statistical
approaches: How does one determine how much selection bias to toler
ate? The $200 figure in the preceding example was chosen arbitrarily
and is but one of many possibilities. Presumably, the choice of a "toler
ance level" of this sort will hinge on how much selection bias one is
willing to risk in relying on a nonexperimental impact estimator in
place of an experiment. This question has different answers under dif
ferent circumstances.
Choosing a Tolerance Limit
In general, the degree of accuracy required in measuring program
impacts will depend on the context. Three factors stand out in defining
the context:
The type of decisions to be made by policy makers when using the
impact estimate;
The proximity of true impact to the level of impact on which those
policy decisions will hinge; and
The degree of risk the policy maker is willing to accept that the
wrong decision will be made because of selection bias.
An extension of our earlier example illustrates the importance of these
three factors when deciding on an "acceptable" level of selection bias.
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Suppose that policy makers want to expand or contract a specific
training program depending on whether the earnings gains it produces
exceed or fall short of the program's costs. In particular, suppose the
program costs $500 per trainee, so that a true impact above $500 would
justify its expansion while impacts below that level would not. Sup
pose also that the program's true impact on earnings is $400, so that a
positive bias of $100 or more would make the program appear to have
met the $500 standard when, in fact, it did not.
Here, policy makers should be unwilling to rely on the nonexperimental impact estimator from our earlier example, which was proven
to be free of selection bias in excess of $200 but not necessarily free of
smaller biases. Such an estimate could be biased upward by as much as
$100 or $200, in which case it would produce an impact estimate
above $500 and make the program appear to provide gains in excess of
costs when it does not. If instead policy makers were prepared to sup
port the program if it produced any noticeable earnings gain say one
of $100 or more a method that comes within $200 dollars of the true
impact of $400 would be fully reliable for policy purposes.
The same method would also be acceptable when earnings gains
above $400 are required but the true impact of the program is far dif
ferent from $400, say $0 or $1,000. Here, an error of $200 or less
either way could not lead to the wrong policy decision.
Finally, under the original scenario true gains of $400, required
gains of $500, and a margin of error of plus or minus $200 a policy
maker might still be willing to risk an erroneous policy decision if all
that is at stake is a modest program expansion, not an overall decision
on continuing or discontinuing the program.
Accommodating a Range of Tolerance Levels
It is clear from these examples that changing any of the factors that
influence policy makers' tolerance for errors could alter the degree of
selection bias one should test against. Since the exact level of each fac
tor the type of policy decision to be made, the size of the true impact
in relation to the degree of selection bias, the policy maker's willing
ness to run risks cannot be anticipated in advance, a whole range of
tests are needed to appropriately gauge the performance of any nonexperimental method. In addition, a means of summarizing the conclu-
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sions of various tests (an infinite number, in principle) will be needed,
if we are to arrive at a conclusion regarding the overall acceptability of
a nonexperimental approach.
We will not attempt such an ambitious generalization of the classical
statistical approach in this monograph. Rather, we will start over in the
next section, not with any specific statistical procedure in mind, but
with the sense that, to be useful, tests for an acceptable level of selec
tion bias must reveal the likelihood of incorrect policy decisions over a
range of policy situations.

A Bayesian Approach to Model Validation
We begin the development of an alternative approach for validating
nonexperimental estimators by rephrasing our objective in terms of
policy reliability: If a nonexperimental method can be shown to pro
vide reliable policy conclusions over a range of policy questions, the
initial presumption that the nonexperimental measure is not an ade
quate substitute for the experiment can be overturned. If not, the pre
sumption remains.
At its barest fundamentals, this is the framework we will use to vali
date or refute nonexperimental impact estimates throughout the rest of
the monograph.
It is worth noting that elements of this same framework have
appeared previously in other studies. Heckman and Hotz (1989),
Couch (1991), and Friedlander and Robins (1992) all examine the reli
ability of the policy conclusions provided by nonexperimental methods
in relation to an experiment for a single policy question: Do impacts
exceed zero? Under the more general approach proposed here, an
acceptable nonexperimental approach must provide reliable policy
conclusions across a range of potentially relevant policy questions, not
simply with regard to the question of whether impacts exceed zero.
To examine each nonexperimental estimation approach in relation to
a range of policy questions, we must first formulate a model of how
policy decisions are made.
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A Policy Decision Rule
We begin by assuming that policy decisions about employment and
training programs are made on the basis of policy makers' beliefs
about the size of true program impacts. Specifically, we assume that
these decisions hinge on whether the true impact is above or below
some critical value. Letting 7 represent a program's true impact (on,
say, participant earnings), we might imagine that policy actions such as
future funding decisions and changes in program design depend on
whether policy makers believe:
7>C,
where C is the minimum level of achievement required to justify the
action under consideration. 11
For example, in some cases C = 0, as when policy makers believe
that a program that increases participant earnings by any amount (/ >
0) is worth supporting. Alternatively, the level of impact needed for
policy support may equal the per-participant cost of running the pro
gram; this would be the case if the crucial consideration is whether the
program produces earnings gains sufficient to justify its cost to taxpay
ers. Or C may represent the level of earnings gain that could be accom
plished for the same individuals by some other policy change, such as a
wage supplement; here, policy makers will continue to support the
training program only if they think it can raise participant earnings by
more than the next best policy tool available to them.
In the ideal world, one would pick an impact estimation technique
according to how well it distinguishes between earnings gains above
the cutoff level, C, and earnings gains below C. Alternatively, policy
makers might put top priority on accurate distinctions in a particular
direction (e.g., favor techniques that never show impacts above C when
true impact is below C, but which can make the reverse mistake) or on
avoiding "large" incorrect distinctions (placing impact on the wrong
side of C when true effects are far from C). Whatever the priority, it is
always the relationship of true impact to a cutoff value, C, that will
drive the policy decision.
Unfortunately, one cannot normally anticipate this "make or break"
impact level when choosing evaluation methods. Absent knowledge of
C which, as we have seen, may vary for different policy makers and/
or policy decisions evaluators have no alternative but to choose an
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estimation approach based on its performance across some range of
relevant C values. We can do this by considering the likelihood that the
average result of an impact estimation technique will give the "right"
answer from a policy maker's perspective for various C values, where
the right answer is "Yes, support the policy" when the true impact of
the program exceeds C and "No, don't support the policy" when the
true impact is less than C.

Using Current Data to Guide Future Policy Decisions
Our overarching objective, then, is to find a nonexperimental
method that in light of the homemaker demonstration data looks
like "as good a bet" as an experiment when making a variety of policy
decisions. Absent empirical data, we were unwilling to "bet" on any
nonexperimental method in this sense, since we believe that all nonex
perimental estimators have the potential for serious selection bias until
proven otherwise. But what should we believe about alternative options
once we have examined the data, if we want that data to guide our
choice of estimation methods in the future?
Statisticians have developed a formal framework for answering this
question i.e., for combining prior beliefs with current information to
obtain a new set of beliefs on which to base decisions. Known as "deci
sion theory" or "Bayesian statistics," this approach posits a distribution
of the expected average result of a particular estimation method which
recognizes that the true average result is unknown. A subjective proba
bility is then attached to each of the values in the distribution, creating
a probability distribution of beliefs across all possible average results.
Different subjective probabilities apply beliefs change once new
information is taken into account. The homemaker demonstrations pro
vide that information in this case, information regarding the likely out
come of using applicant-based impact estimation methods to guide
policy. A fundamental theorem of Bayesian statistics states that, when
one begins with an agnostic view of what the average result of an esti
mation approach might look like (a situation referred to as having a
"diffuse prior"), 12 the probability distribution one should construct for
the average result of that procedure based on a single application is
centered on the value produced by that application. 13 Furthermore,
when the observed estimate is drawn from a normal distribution (and,
as before, one starts with a diffuse prior) the probability distribution of
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possible average values constructed from a single application should
also follow a normal distribution, with standard deviation equal, to the
standard error of the available estimate.
Exhibit 4.1 provides one such set of beliefs regarding the average
result from using the experimental method to measure the impact of
the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide Demonstrations six years
after program entry (i.e., in 1990). The distribution in exhibit 4.1 is
centered on the 1990 experimental earnings impact estimate from
chapter 3 ($469), with standard deviation equal to the standard error of
that estimate ($264).
Exhibit 4.1 Subjective Distribution of the Possible Average Outcomes
from Using Experimental Methods to Measure the SixthYear Impact of the Homemaker Demonstrations
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To summarize, then, by starting with an agnostic view of the possi
bilities (i.e., with a "diffuse prior") and observing the value and stan
dard error of a single experimental impact estimate, we can formulate a
"posterior distribution" of possible average values from that method,
such as that shown in exhibit 4.1. The same is true of any nonexperimental impact estimation technique: its possible average result in
repeated applications can be represented as a normal distribution cen
tered on the one application achieved. Together, these two distributions
provide a basis for assessing the policy reliability of alternative nonexperimental methods.
Before we can turn beliefs about the average outcomes of different
estimation techniques into an assessment of the policy reliability of
nonexperimental techniques, however, we must first adopt two simpli
fying assumptions. First, we must assume that experiments and nonex
perimental approaches will exhibit an equal degree of sampling
variability in future applications to abstract from this confounding fac
tor in our analysis. 14 And we must assume that the future context of
interest sufficiently resembles the current context to allow us to trans
late our results to other settings. 15
Diagramming the Policy Decision
Bayesian posterior distributions for experimental and nonexperi
mental impact estimates speak directly to the policy question posed
earlier: Does true impact, /, exceed or fall short of the critical policy
cutoff, C? On average across repeated applications, experiments give
the true impact, /. Thus, beliefs held about the average results of an
experiment are also beliefs about true impact.
We can combine this information with beliefs about the average
result of a nonexperimental technique, also expressed in the form of a
Bayesian posterior distribution. The comparison of the two posterior
distributions for truth and the expected result of a nonexperimental
method give a measure of the risk of relying on the nonexperimental
method in making future policy decisions. Exhibit 4.2 shows in graphic
form how this measure is derived.
The top panel of exhibit 4.2 combines two specific posterior distri
butions of interest: one generated by the homemaker experiment in
1990, the other produced using the withdrawal-based nonexperimental
method in the same year. The experimental distribution, labeled "True
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impact" and centered at $469, shows the appropriate subjective assess
ment of what the true demonstration impact might have been in that
year, given the available evidence. The nonexperimental distribution,
labeled "Average nonexperimental result" and centered at $2,074,
gives the appropriate subjective assessment of the size of measured
impact the withdrawal-based approach is likely to produce on average.
This panel has been set up to help us determine, for different critical
policy cutoff values, the probability of obtaining "good" or "bad" pol
icy results from the withdrawal-based approach, were there no sam
pling variability in the data. To see how this is done, consider a
particular policy cutoff value, C*, along the horizontal axis. When the
true program impact exceeds C*, a policy maker who cares about that
critical value should be advised to favor the program. Conversely,
when the true program impact falls below C*, that policy maker should
oppose the program. What are the odds that the withdrawal-based
approach will yield the correct policy prescription in this circumstance,
given our subjective assessment of the possible values of true impact
and the possible average result of the withdrawal-based approach?
These odds can be derived directly from the exhibit for one special
subcase and put within certain limits for all cases. We show how in the
next two subsections.
The Probability of "Right" and "Wrong" Policy Decisions
To determine the probability of correct versus incorrect policy deci
sions using the withdrawal-based estimator, we begin in the top panel
of exhibit 4.2. Here, the "True Impact" curve gives our subjective pos
terior assessment of the probability that true impact lies on either side
of a given policy cutoff value, C*. When the true impact is below C*,
opposing the program is the "right" policy decision; when true impact
is above C*, supporting the program is "right" from the policy maker's
perspective. The probabilities of these two events, in our subjective
posterior distribution, are determined by the areas under the "True
impact" curve on either side of C*, which can be represented in proba
bility terms as:
Pr (I < C*) = probability that opposing the program is the "right"
decision; and
Pr (I > C*) = probability that supporting the program is the "right"
decision.
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Exhibit 4.2 Subjective Distribution and the "Maximum Risk Function"
of Experimental and Withdrawal-Based Impact Estimation
Techniques in 1990
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The other curve in the upper panel, labeled "Average nonexperimental Result," tells us the odds that the nonexperimental estimator under
consideration (the withdrawal-based estimator for 1990) takes on any
particular value on average across repeated applications. Absent exper
imental evidence, the expected value of this procedure (plus some ran
dom departure due to statistical variation in the data) would be the only
basis for making policy reflective of program impacts. The crucial
question, then, is whether policy so formulated is likely to be "right" or
"wrong" from the policy maker's point of view.
To make that determination, we must first consider the probability
that policy makers relying on the nonexperimental approach would
oppose or support the program in relation to a particular cutoff value,
C*. These probabilities, independent of sampling variation, are deter
mined by the area under the "Average nonexperimental result" curve to
the left and right of C*. Using N to represent the nonexperimental esti
mate, the two areas are:
Pr(N > C*) = probability that the nonexperimental approach will
lead to support of the program, on average; and
Pr(N < C*) = probability that the nonexperimental approach will
lead to opposition to the program, on average.
The risk, R, that the nonexperimental estimator will lead to the
wrong decision is:
R(C*) = Pr(N< C* and / > C*) + Pr (N > C* and / < C*).
We call this formula, traced out over a range of C* values, the "risk
function." 16
In the special case of zero correlation between N and 7, 17 this for
mula reduces to:
R(C*) = Pr(N< C*) Pr (/> C*) + Pr(N> C*) Pr (/< C*).
All of the terms in this equation can be calculated from the impact esti
mates presented in chapter 3 and their standard errors. The bottom
panel of exhibit 4.2 shows the result of these calculations the risk run
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in relying on a nonexperimental impact estimate when making policy
decisions, relative to an experiment with the same sampling error
across a range of policy cutoff values, C.
Dealing with Correlation in Posterior Beliefs
The risk function shown in exhibit 4.2 was derived under the
assumption that our beliefs about the true impact of the program and
about the average result of the nonexperimental estimator are uncorrelated. In the most general case, our assessment of the odds of a "cor
rect" policy decision should depend on our beliefs about the joint
behavior of the experimental and nonexperimental impact estimates.
That is, what matters is not what we believe about each of the two esti
mates individually, but what we believe about the likely relationship
between them their joint posterior distribution. The upper panel in
exhibit 4.2 does not show this added aspect of our beliefs, only each set
of beliefs in isolation (what statisticians call marginal distributions,
derived from the joint distribution). If the two sets of beliefs are in fact
unrelated, or uncorrelated, the two marginal distributions summarize
everything there is to know about our posterior beliefs, individually
and in tandem.
More likely, the two sets of beliefs are not unrelated. Rather, a more
reasonable set of posterior beliefs would associate relatively large val
ues of the experimental estimator (i.e., large true impacts) with rela
tively large values of the nonexperimental estimator. We believed at the
outset that the experimental estimate gives the true impact on average
(see chapter 1) and that the nonexperimental estimate might get us
close to that ideal (see chapter 2). Thus, we necessarily believed that
the two estimators are positively correlated, and we likely will continue
to believe that in forming our joint posterior distribution once we have
looked at the data.
While our posterior beliefs are likely to incorporate positive correla
tion between true impacts and the average nonexperimental result, the
zero-correlation special case shown in exhibit 4.2 still proves to be a
useful one. It can be shown (see appendix D) that this special case pro
vides an upper bound on the probability of making the "wrong" policy
decision when relying on the nonexperimental estimator. 18 Were our
beliefs uncorrelated, working through the special case would give the
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correct probability of policy error; given positive correlation, the cor
rect probability is necessarily below that produced by assuming no cor
relation.
In fact, an upper bound is all that we can hope for in the general
case. To do better to calculate the exact probability of policy error in
the face of correlated beliefs (independent of sampling error) would
require that we posit a specific numerical value for the correlation
between true impact and the nonexperimental estimator in our poste
rior distribution. Each researcher and policy maker seems likely to hold
his or her own distinctive beliefs on the subject, making it impossible
to formulate a convincing general case. 19 Fortunately, having an upper
bound on the probability of incorrect policy decisions can provide the
sort of validation findings we need: evidence that a particular nonex
perimental estimator holds the consequences of selection bias to a tol
erable level. If the upper bound itself seems tolerable, the true
probability of policy error must also be tolerable (or better).
Properties of the Maximum Risk Function

The "maximum risk function" traced by R(C) in exhibit 4.2 follows a
characteristic shape. As can be seen from the above formula, the maxi
mum risk level associated with any value of C is determined by multi
plying two probabilities that sum to 1.0, Pr (N < C) and Pr (N > C),
times two other probabilities that sum to 1.0, Pr(I>C) and Pr (I < C).
A sum of products of this sort is always largest when the two larger
pieces are multiplied together, i.e., when both Pr(N<C) and Pr(I>C)
are greater than .5, or when both Pr (N > C) and Pr (I < C) are greater
than .5. This can only happen when the distributions of N and I in the
upper panel of exhibit 4.2 lie some ways apart, placing one curve sub
stantially to the left of C* and the other substantially to the right. For the
distributions shown, this situation arises for values of C between $500
and $2,000, where most of the distribution of 7 lies to the left of C and
most of the distribution of N to the right. As a result, the maximum risk
index, R(C), shown in the bottom panel of the exhibit is quite large in
this range, but nowhere else.
Intuitively, this result makes sense in two respects:
Experimental and nonexperimental distributions far from one
another are produced by impact estimates far from one another,
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implying a large potential risk of making a misguided policy deci
sion if one relies on the nonexperimental estimate; and
Even when a nonexperimental approach produces a very different
impact estimate and, therefore, a probability distribution far
from that of the experiment it carries a high potential risk of
incorrect policy decisions (a risk above, say, .2) only for decisions
that hinge on deciding whether true impacts are below or above a
"threshold value" in the interval between the two estimates.
The first of these intuitions is not new. In relates to the original rea
son authors like LaLonde, and Maynard and Fraker, began to worry
about using nonexperimental estimators for policy purposes: the obser
vation that experimental and nonexperimental impact estimates often
lay far from one another in numerical terms. Indeed, it is the separation
of these two estimates that moves the N and / distributions in the top
panel of exhibit 4.2 so far apart, resulting in the sharp, sustained
increase in the maximum risk of misguided policy decisions for critical
values of C between the two estimates.
The second intuition has less precedent. It focuses attention on a
point that some earlier studies overlooked: that the reliability of an esti
mation technique for policy purposes depends critically on the distinc
tions policy makers need to make. For many purposes (e.g.,
distinguishing no impact from a positive impact, C=0), a nonexperi
mental measure far from the experimental benchmark can do little
harm. On the other hand, such an estimate may be very detrimental to
policy decisions that hinge on the presence or absence of large positive
impacts, in the $1,000-$2,000 range (e.g., conclusions from a benefitcost analysis). Exhibit 4.2 vividly illustrates the dangers of focusing
attention on any one such question. When other evaluators adopted
such a narrow focus in comparing all impact estimates to $0, they
essentially ignored all of the evidence in the exhibit regarding model
reliability to the right of $0! As noted earlier and illustrated dramati
cally here such a narrow perspective can lead to highly misleading
characterizations of the reliability of a nonexperimental estimation
technique in relation to other relevant questions.
A further case not shown in the exhibit also deserves mention: the
behavior of the maximum risk function when the experiment and the
nonexperimental approach produce the same impact estimate. Here,
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the risk involved in relying on the nonexperimental approach still
exceeds zero over a range of C values near that common estimate. This
is due to the uncertainty attached to the impact estimates, which forces
us to consider that either one could be wrong and, therefore, spreads
our probability assessments beyond the matching point estimates. In
this sense, a nonexperimental technique that produces a result identical
to that of the experiment is not a perfect substitute for an experiment,
since we know the experimental estimate is free of selection bias but
can only speculate on the chances that the same is true of the nonexper
imental estimate. The greater our uncertainty (i.e., the larger the stan
dard errors of the experimental and/or nonexperimental estimates), the
broader the band where nontrivial risks of inaccurate policy decisions
can arise even in this "best case" scenario. Indeed, when policy makers
need to know whether impacts exceed or fall short of a C just equal to a
common estimated level of impact, the maximum risk function reaches
a peak value of .5.20
Internal versus External Validity
Before preceding to apply the risk-function approach to model vali
dation, we need to add one final but vital point. Even when a nonexper
imental method is shown to carry little "risk" in the sense discussed
here, we will have established that method as an acceptable alternative
to an experiment only in the particular context where the test was run. 21
Thus, even if one or more of the applicant-based estimators exam
ined here passes the validation tests we employ, we cannot claim to
have found an applicant-based technique that will be as reliable as an
experiment in all contexts. Rather, we will have hard evidence of the
internal validity of the method: what worked in this particular instance
and, therefore, what might work in evaluating future programs under
similar circumstances. Just how similar those circumstances would
have to be cannot be determined until the same technique is tested
against the experimental norm in other contexts.22 We do not know, for
example, whether the same estimator would work when evaluating
programs involving other types of clients who might exhibit different
self-selection behavior, or under different administrative structures
where program selection rules might differ. 23 Only when these ques
tions are answered can we begin to gauge the method's external valid-
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ity or its likelihood of success under a wide range of external
circumstances.
Conversely, we should not abandon an approach just because it does
not meet our required standards of evidence in the context of the AFDC
Homemaker-Home Health Aide Demonstrations. Rather, we should
view our results here as the first of a series of possible tests of the
applicant-based approach across a variety of different situations. 24 In
the meantime, the validation results obtained could still have consider
able value to those designing future evaluations. When deciding
between alternative research designs, future evaluators can consider
how strongly their situation resembles the homemaker demonstrations
and how compelling the combined theoretic rationales and empirical
findings presented here are with regard to specific nonexperimental
methods, and then make an informed judgment about the most appro
priate approach. These judgments should be much better founded by
virtue of our initial series of tests, just as later judgments and design
decisions can be made more reliable by still further testing.

Findings on Model Reliability
To test the policy reliability of the nonexperimental estimators from
chapter 3, we use the framework just developed to calculate two sets of
maximum risk functions for each of our applicant-based nonexperi
mental estimation techniques:
Maximum risk functions for measured effects in the mostly inprogram years of 1985 and 1986, using impact estimates for aver
age annual earnings over those years; and
Maximum risk functions for measured effects in the post-program
years of 1987 through 1990, again using impact estimates for
average annual earnings.
Impact estimates and standard errors for each year of the follow-up
period and for these two multi-year periods appear in exhibit 4.3, with
results for the different nonexperimental methods and the experiment
shown in separate columns. To hold the number of risk functions
examined to a manageable level, we base our model validation tests on
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the multi-year estimates in the bottom panel. The top panel of year-byyear estimates is repeated here for reference, and includes the same
point estimates as exhibits 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 in chapter 3.
In multiyear format, annual earnings impacts are estimated at
$1,600-$2,700 for the in-program period and $500-$ 1,200 for the
postprogram period, depending on the estimation method used. These
estimates do not always exactly equal the average of those for the indi
vidual years due to the use of covariates in the impact regressions. 25
Relative Risks
The maximum risk functions associated with each of the multiperiod nonexperimental impact estimates in exhibit 4.3 appear in
exhibit 4.4 (for the in-program period) and exhibit 4.5 (for the postprogram period). The equivalent risk function for the experiment in
each instance is just the horizontal axis, since on average experimental
impact estimates cannot produce incorrect policy decisions due to
selection bias, regardless of the policy question asked (the value of C
considered).26
As can be seen in exhibit 4.4, all of the nonexperimental estimation
methods examined those using withdrawals, screen-outs, and noshows as their comparison samples pose substantial risks of poor
policy decisions during the in-program period over some range of
threshold values that policy makers might care about. Strikingly, how
ever, none poses any risk of misguided policy due to selection bias over
other wide bands of policy concerns. For example, if policy makers
need to know whether the homemaker demonstrations produced inprogram earnings gains above a threshold level of, say, $1,000 per
year, all three nonexperimental techniques carry almost no risk of mis
guiding policy due to selection bias alone.27 This conclusion holds for
any threshold level below around $1,200 per year. 28 The same is true of
policy decisions that hinge on whether or not in-program impacts
exceeded or fell below a threshold of $3,300 or more per year. But over
varying intervals between $1,200 and $3,300 per year, all three nonex
perimental approaches carry real risks of misguiding policy due to
selection bias. Of the three, the no-show-based approach entails by far
the narrowest band over which such risks could be substantial.

Exhibit 4.3 Earnings Impact Estimates, by Method, for Individual Years and for the Average of the In-Program and
Postprogram Years (standard errors in parentheses)
Year
1984: Mostly preprogram year
1985: In-program year
1986: Mostly postprogram year
1987: Postprogram year
1988: Postprogram year
1989: Postprogram year
1990: Postprogram year

Nonexperimental comparison group
Withdrawals
Screen-outs
No-shows
$ 121
(144) $ 26
(145)
(259) $ 183
3,422
(341)
3,401
(218)
(257)
2,100
2,003
(454)
1,802
(295)
1,145
(288)
635
(539)
1,030
916
(331)
(313)
800
1,014
706
(378)
(599)
(359)
1,316
(404)
(734)
696
(429)
814
2,074
(425)
(731)
768
(463)
867

Experimental
impact estimate
$ 116
(86)
2,610
(139)
1,194
(158)
643
(183)
583
(223)
394
(244)
469
(264)

Period
In-program: 1986-86
Postprogram: 1987-90

Nonexperimental comparison group
Withdrawals
Screen-outs
No-shows
(222)
$2,713
(355) $2,601
(245) $1,623
1,214
(571)
890
(334)
(325)
809

Experimental
impact estimate
$1,902
(132)
517
(202)

o
o
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Exhibit 4.4 Maximum Risk Functions of Alternative Nonexperimental
Approaches: Annual Earnings in the In-Program Period

Probability of
the "wrong"
policy decision

0.8--

0.6-Withdrawal-based
approach
0.4--

0.2--

$0

$500 $1,000
$1,500 $2,000
$2,500 $3,000 $3,500 C
"Threshold" annual earnings impact level on which policy decision hinges
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Exhibit 4.5 Maximum Risk Functions of Alternative Nonexperimental
Approaches: Annual Earnings in the Postprogram Period
Probability of
the "wrong"
policy decision

Withdrawal-based approach

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

"Threshold" annual earnings impact level on which policy decision hinges

$3,500^
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The situation in the postprogram years is much the same, as seen in
exhibit 4.5. Several differences are apparent, however. First the interval
of nontrivial maximum risk now begins at around $200 of impact per
year rather than $1,200, and ends at around $2,200 per year rather than
$3,300. Second, it is possible to rank the nonexperimental techniques
from best to worst in terms of maximum selection bias risks across all
policy questions. For all values of C, the screen-out-based and noshow-based estimates carry a lower maximum risk of misguided policy
due to selection bias than the withdrawal-based estimates. The band of
substantial potential risk is much narrower in each instance, particu
larly for the no-show-based estimates. This result follows from the fact
that the no-show-and screen-out-based impact estimates shown in
exhibit 4.3 are much closer to the experimental estimate in the postpro
gram period than is the withdrawal-based estimate. Exhibit 4.3 also
indicates a substantially larger standard error for the withdrawal-based
estimate over that period, which translates into greater uncertainty in
our posterior distribution regarding the expected results of this tech
nique. All other things equal, an impact estimation technique whose
average outcome is less certain a priori carries with it a greater risk of
misguided policy choices if adopted in future studies.
The ranking of methodologies during the in-program years is not so
clear-cut. Here, the no-show approach appears to be the riskiest of all
approaches for making policy decisions that hinge on threshold levels
of $1,000-$ 1,900 per year. But for thresholds above $1,900, up to
almost $3,500, the no-show approach carries less risk of selection bias
than either of the other two nonexperimental options. Which approach
would have been the better choice absent the experiment depends,
then, on what level of impacts policy makers need to be able to discern
during the in-program years. As before, the screen-out-based approach
carries a lower maximum risk of selection bias error than the with
drawal-based approach across all possible policy questions except for a
narrow range between $2,000 and $2,300.
Absolute Risks
While generally decisive with regard to what is knowable about the
relative reliability of the three nonexperimental approaches tested, the
maximum risk functions in exhibits 4.4 and 4.5 are primarily intended
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as guides to the absolute risks involved in using each of the nonexperimental methodologies. Returning to our most fundamental validation
question, then, we again ask:
Do any of the nonexperimental approaches tested produce policy
conclusions of comparable reliability to those of the experiment
over a broad range of policy questions?
In one sense, the answer must be "no," since any nonexperimental
approach whose average result is uncertain (i.e., which has nonzero
variance in the sample from which posterior distributions are formed)
will create a serious risk of selection bias for at least some policy ques
tions. Perhaps it is more meaningful to ask whether a particular nonex
perimental approach confines this "unavoidable" level of risk to a
sufficiently narrow and, from a policy perspective, remote band of
C values.
While necessarily a judgmental decision, we are inclined to view the
no-show-based strategy developed here and, for the postprogram
period, the screen-out-based strategy as approaching, if not quite
meeting, this standard, based on the maximum risk functions plotted in
exhibits 4.4 and 4.5. Except for policy questions regarding differentia
tion of impacts in a limited (and possibly critical) band of values
$1,200-$2,200 per year during the in-program period; $200-$ 1,500
per year in the postprogram period the no-show-based strategy car
ries almost no risk of misguiding policy decisions through selection
bias. The same is true for the screen-out-based approach in the latter
period. But the stated ranges where errors might arise are not trivial.
And should sharp discrimination within these bands become essential
to policy (e.g., in a benefit-cost analysis where the break-even point for
earnings gains lies somewhere in these ranges), none of the nonexperi
mental methods tested here would have provided an acceptably reliable
guide to policy. The experimental estimate, which carries zero risk of
policy error due to selection bias across the entire range of possible
impacts, would have done so.
We return to the question of the overall reliability of the nonexperi
mental methods when summarizing our results in chapter 5.
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Interpreting Variations in Reliability Across Methods and Over Time
Taken as a whole, three features of our validation results are particu
larly striking and worthy of further discussion:
The relatively poor performance of the withdrawal-based
approach;
The relatively strong performance of the no-show-based
approach, particularly in relation to the more conceptually appeal
ing screen-out-based approach during the two in-program years;
and
The improvement over time in the screen-out-based approach,
moving it from little better than the withdrawal-based approach
during the in-program period to little worse than the no-showbased approach during the postprogram period.
Our interpretation of these three key findings draws on the characteris
tics of the various applicant comparison groups discussed in chapter 2
and the derivation of the nonexperimental impact estimates in chapter
3.
From the outset, we have considered withdrawals as the group of
nonparticipating applicants most likely to differ from participants and,
therefore, as the group least likely to provide a reliable comparison
group. This follows from the fact that withdrawals quickly withdrew
their applications to the demonstrations (i.e., prior to a decision to
admit or exclude them), and in that respect more closely resembled the
AFDC recipients who never applied to the demonstrations than did
other applicants. In contrast, both screen-outs and no-shows main
tained their involvement in the program at least up to the point of selec
tion by intake staff.
Also, in comparison to screen-outs, we expected the factors that dis
tinguish withdrawals from participants self-selection on motivation
or availability of immediate employment to be less likely to be con
trolled for by the selection variables included in our impact models
objective baseline characteristics and intake workers' ratings of suit
ability for training. The net result, poor relative performance in relation
to the experimental benchmark, is apparent in exhibits 4.4 and 4.5.
In terms of the direction of bias, the top panel of exhibit 4.3 shows
that in five of the six years after application, use of withdrawals as a
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comparison group produced impact estimates larger than the experi
mental estimates. This implies that withdrawals earned less than partic
ipants would have in the absence of the demonstration program,
suggesting that the decision to drop out of the demonstration intake
process had more to do with lack of interest than with alternative
employment opportunities. Whatever the explanation, the earnings pat
terns seen here suggest that there are good reasons to avoid with
drawal-based comparison groups in future evaluations of employment
and training programs similar to the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health
Aide Demonstrations.
Like withdrawals, no-shows decided to withdraw from the program
intake process before services began, though in this case only after
they had been approved for services. Hence, we would expect their
earnings to more closely approximate the no-program counterfactual
earnings of participants. Moreover, the subjective ratings variable is
available for virtually all no-shows, but for only a minority of the with
drawals.
We have no direct information on why the no-shows did not enter
the program, however. Without this information, we cannot determine
how similar or dissimilar their earnings capacities are to those of the
controls and participants. On a priori grounds, the no-shows may have
failed to participate because they had better employment opportunities
than participants, or, conversely, they may have simply been less moti
vated or more pessimistic about their employment potential. These a
priori reasons apply to the withdrawals as well, but, for reasons noted
above, we expect the no-shows to be more similar to the participants
than the withdrawals.
Throughout the follow-up period, the earnings of the no-shows are
more similar than those of the withdrawals to the counterfactual earn
ings of participants, as evidenced both by the impact estimates shown
in exhibit 4.3 and by the maximum risk functions in exhibits 4.4 and
4.5. No-shows earned more than participants would have during the
first year after application (1985), since the no-show-based impact esti
mate in that year is smaller than the experimental estimate. This initial
earnings advantage declined over the next two years, however, and in
the last four years of the follow-up period no-shows earned less than
participants would have in the absence of the program, resulting in noshow-based impact estimates that were consistently larger than experi-
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mental estimates. This pattern suggests that no-shows failed to partici
pate in the program because of superior short-run employment
opportunities, but that in the longer run they were likely to earn some
what less than the participants would have without demonstration
assistance.
A key question is why the screen-out approach did not provide a
better substitute for the experimental control group during the in-program period, especially in comparison to the no-shows, once we
adjusted for the objective and subjective factors that led to exclusion
from the program. Returning first to the unadjusted difference-inmeans estimates in exhibit 3.4 of chapter 3, we see that throughout the
follow-up period screen-outs earned substantially less than controls,
leading to a substantial overestimation of demonstration impacts when
selected as a comparison group. This shortfall in the unadjusted data is
not surprising, since demonstration intake staff consciously excluded
applicants who looked less promising as homemaker-home health
aides, a factor likely to imply less promise in the labor market gener
ally. Surprisingly, however, the addition of baseline characteristics and
intake workers ratings to the model (later columns of exhibit 3.4) did
little to improve the model's performance during the in-program period
(1985-86).
The particular regression specification used may account for why
none of the nonexperimental estimates for 1985 accorded well with the
experimental benchmark, as shown in exhibit 4.1. The estimates were
derived by regressing earnings on an indicator of treatment status (par
ticipant versus comparison group) and a set of covariate measures of
baseline characteristics; this is the standard specification for such esti
mates. If relative earnings within the participant group were deter
mined by a different process during training and subsidized
employment from the unsubsidized labor market, the coefficients on
the baseline variables for 1985 which were determined largely by the
much larger participant sample may not work well for any of the
comparison groups. If this be the case, "equalizing" the two samples
by adjusting them to the common set of coefficients may seriously dis
tort the comparison group level and, hence, the nonexperimental
impact estimates. It seems likely that the in-program earnings of partic
ipants were determined by a different process from the earnings of
nonparticipants during the same time period, since participants' earn-
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ings were heavily subsidized by the demonstrations. The same hypoth
esis may also explain the relatively poor performance of the
withdrawal and screen-out impact estimates for 1986 (a year that fell
partially within the in-program period for some participants), but
should not be a factor in 1987 and beyond.
As can also be seen from exhibit 3.4, controlling for standard base
line characteristics and, subsequently, for ratings of suitability as
homemaker-home health aides substantially increased the reliability of
the screen-out comparison group in the postprogram period, as pre
dicted in chapter 2. Here, it cut the degree of overestimation in half.
Even so, the fully adjusted screen-out-based impact estimates
remained substantially above the experimental benchmark throughout
the postprogram period, producing a postprogram maximum risk func
tion that rises substantially above zero over a fairly wide range of pol
icy issues. (See exhibit 4.5.)
The failure of the intake workers' ratings to fully capture the effects
of the program selection process may be due to two factors:
The ratings of suitability may not have been applied consistently
enough to adequately account for the effects of selective intake on
future earnings; or
Intake staff may have selected among applicants on the basis of
factors other than those they used to assign suitability ratings, but
factors also related to future earnings.
Both of these possibilities are supported by the pattern of suitability
ratings observed among participants and screen-outs. All four ratings
levels excellent, good, fair, and poor are found in each group,
although higher ratings are much more common in the participant sam
ple and lower ratings in the screen-out sample. Even so, for a nontrivial
number of cases (the "poors" admitted to the demonstration and the
"goods" and "excellents" excluded), intake staff either misapplied the
rating scale or consciously based their screen-out decisions on some
thing other than their assessment of future potential as homemakerhome health aides.
While we cannot distinguish between these two hypotheses on the
basis of the available data, they both carry similar implications:
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The full potential of screen-outs as a comparison group has not
yet been realized in the homemaker data, in terms of the reliability
and sophistication of the suitability ratings used; and
If better measures of suitability or potential can be developed
e.g., a many-valued scale with explicit guidelines for how it
should be applied and related to intake decisions the screen-out
approach might provide a more reliable substitute for experiments
than in this application.29
On the basis of the evidence presented here, none of the applicant
groups yielded estimates close enough to the experimental benchmark
to justify the claim that it provides an adequate substitute for an exper
imental control group. For example, even the best applicant-based esti
mates differed from the experimental norm by more than 50 percent in
the critical postprogram period. Nevertheless, there are several reasons
for believing that the screen-out and no-show groups could potentially
provide a nonexperimental method for evaluating training programs
that yields reliable and unbiased impact estimates.
First, both of these applicant groups gave estimates of the program's
effect on earnings that were relatively close in absolute terms to those
provided by the control group in the postprogram period. Second, the
theoretical basis for using screen-outs that this group allows an unbi
ased estimate if the selection process is modeled and controlled for
was supported by the finding that methods for measuring selection are
feasible and promising. In particular, demonstrations showed that the
difficult problem of capturing the subjective determinants of program
selection can be addressed, and that controlling for this part of the
selection process sharply reduces the selection bias of the screen-outs
compared to estimates based on the experimental control group.
Finally, with either the screen-outs or no-shows, serious risk of errone
ous policy decisions based on the postprogram estimates (risk above,
say, 40 percent) was confined to a relatively narrow range of policy
thresholds (a band of about $500 in width).
We conclude that further tests of the methodology should be under
taken, using other experimental data sets. Given the relatively strong
performance of screen-outs and no-shows in this analysis, we recom
mend that attention be paid to measuring both the factors underlying
selection by program staff and those that lead some applicants who are
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accepted into the program not to participate. Our results cannot, of
course, be considered conclusive, given the limitations of the available
data and test procedures and the fact that our results reflect the specific
circumstances of a single demonstration project.
NOTES
1. To our knowledge, no evaluator has developed a test methodology that can incorporate the
uncertainties involved in measuring program costs (and in projecting future earnings gains beyond
the observation period) with the more readily incorporated uncertainties of measuring earnings
gains during the observation period to test the statistical significance of "net program benefits"
(which equal observed and projected program benefits less program costs).
2. See, for example, Orr et al. (1994), Gueron and Pauly (1991), Orr (1987), Long, Thornton,
and Whitebread (1983), and Kemper, Long, and Thornton (1981).
3. See footnote 16 of the Friedlander and Robins paper. As explained there, all types of impact
estimates including the experimental estimate are less likely to differ significantly from zero
in small samples, due to the larger standard error that attaches to small sample estimates. Thus, as
sample sizes decrease, experimental and nonexperimental estimates become more and more likely
to agree in terms of statistical inference (with both indicating no significant effect), irrespective of
the true extent of selection bias.
4. Near the beginning of his analysis, LaLonde states the principle that: "If the econometric
model is specified correctly, the nonexperimental estimates should be the same (within sampling
error) as the training effects generated from the experimental data, but if there is a significant dif
ference between the experimental and nonexperimental estimates, the econometric model is misspecified" (LaLonde 1986, pp. 610-11). He then applies this criterion to just a few of his
numerical estimates: in a series of comparisons between experimental and nonexperimental esti
mates, the distance between estimates is discussed in relation to their standard errors the stan
dard measure of sampling error only twice (pp. 614 and 616), and then only loosely. Fraker and
Maynard also refer to "tests of the comparability of the earnings models of the comparison and
control samples" (pp. 205 and 212), which could have a similar purpose but are not explained.
5. A second, related problem is the potential for very large samples to reject a nonexperimen
tal estimate because it differs from the experimental finding in statistical terms but not enough in
substantive terms to really matter. Friedlander and Robins' first validation criterion the magni
tude of observed differences presumably provides some protection against this risk by identify
ing the statistically significant differences that are of no substantive consequence.
6. In the homemaker demonstration data as in almost any employment and training program
evaluation limited samples imply a substantial potential for approximation error in both nonex
perimental and experimental impact estimates. This potential is reflected in the standard errors of
the estimates, which are shown for the experiment in parentheses alongside the experimental
impact measures in chapter 3. (Standard errors for the nonexperimental impact measures appear
later in this chapter.) The homemaker demonstration data used here provide substantial but not
unusually large samples: 1,600 participants and 300 to 900 comparison group members, depend
ing on the comparison group chosen. These samples are somewhat smaller than those available to
Friedlander and Robins and roughly equal in size to those used in the earlier validations studies of
the National Supported Work Demonstration (except for two comparison groups of 11,000 and
16,000 members, respectively, used by LaLonde 1986). Several more recent employment and
training experiments provide substantially larger participant samples, as well as the potential to be
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matched to even larger external comparison groups. However, we are aware of only one instance
outside of the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide Demonstrations where an internal compari
son group of nonparticipating applicants of any size is available: the Corpus Christi site in the
National JTPA Study, where data have been collected for 600 participants and 2,600 nonpartici
pating applicants.
7. Indeed, a null hypothesis this broad almost certainly is true. As DeGroot (1975, p.406) and
others have pointed out, the hypothesis that bias (or any other quantity) equals precisely $0 (or
any other specific value) is almost certainly false, and hence our particular null hypothesis almost
certainly true independent of the data.
8. Note that changing the null hypothesis in this fashion essentially for statistical reasons
also addresses an important substantive concern in hypothesis testing: the need to ensure that any
bias detected by statistical means is also of a magnitude that gives it practical importance. Nor
mally, the criterion of practical significance is applied after the statistical test, by asking whether a
statistically significant bias is also large enough to be of concern. Here, we combine both consid
erations into a single step by looking for conclusive statistical proof of bias at or above some
threshold level.
9. DeGroot (1975, pp. 406-407) provides the basis for another approach, in a test of the null
hypothesis that a quantity falls within a certain range, against the alternative hypothesis that it is
outside that range. A similar test could be constructed with the two hypotheses reversed.
10. This assumes a hypothetical difference between the nonexperimental and experimental
estimates of $50 and a hypothetical standard error for that difference of $76.
11. Whether policy decisions do, in fact, emerge from such an exercise is not clear. This for
mulation of the issue remains appropriate in any case since, if evaluation results are to affect pol
icy, they presumably will do so in this fashion.
12. A diffuse prior attaches equal probability to all points on the real number line.
13. For this result and others cited below, see page 191 of DeGroot (1970) or any of a number
of standard textbooks on Bayesian statistics and/or statistical decision theory.
14. In fact, we cannot reasonably anticipate the sample sizes that will be available in future
impact studies, nor the tradeoffs in sample sizes to be faced when choosing between experimental
and nonexperimental methods. Thus, the only way to incorporate statistical variability in our anal
ysis is to assume that it is neutral across the two methods.
15. See below for a discussion of this "external validity" issue.
16. In general, risk functions in statistical decision theory depend not only on the probability
of certain types of mistakes but on the negative consequences, or "loss," associated with each par
ticular mistake. Here, we adopt a simplified framework in which the loss incurred in making pol
icy errors is the same for all possible errors. A more realistic approach, beyond the scope of this
monograph, would attach larger loses to larger mistakes, so that favorable (unfavorable) policy
decisions for true impacts way below (above) C* would add more to the risk function than for true
impacts only slightly below (above) C*. It would also be possible to attach greater losses to mis
takenly favorable policy decisions than mistakenly unfavorable policy decisions, or vice versa, if
one type of policy decision is believed to be more consequential than the other.
17. Zero correlation implies independence in a joint normal distribution. We have assumed
normality in the data from the outset, which with a diffuse prior implies normality in the pos
terior distribution, which is where independence is required.
18. Unfortunately, as also shown in appendix D, it is not the case that the special case of per
fect (positive) correlation provides a lower bound on the probability of an incorrect policy deci
sion. The only known lower bound is 0.
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19. A uniform prior for the correlation coefficient over the [0,1] interval might be considered
in this role but would still embody a specific set of beliefs about the reliability of the nonexperimental estimator in relation to truth that could be subject to dispute.
20. When C equals the midpoint of both the / and N distributions, Pr(I<C) = Pr(I>C) = Pr
(N<Q = Pr(N>C) = .5, and R(Q = (.5) (.5) + (.5) (.5) = .5.
21. None of the papers reviewed earlier emphasize this point. However, Fraker and Maynard
(1987) do consider whether the Supported Work setting is likely to be characteristic of other largescale employment and training programs that might be evaluated using nonexperimental methods
similar to those they test and reject.
22. LaLonde (1986) also pointed to the importance of validation work in other settings. With
the exception of the Friedlander and Robins (1992) paper and the current monograph, that empha
sis has thus far produced only additional analyses of the same program setting considered by
LaLonde (the National Supported Work Demonstration). A further extension of the validation lit
erature into new experimental data sets is now possible, based on the many such employment and
training data sets produced in recent years. See Greenberg and Shroder (1991) for examples.
23. While not always evident in their conclusions, the same is true of all of the earlier model
validation exercises.
24. The approach could, for example, be tested in one of the 16 sites evaluated experimentally
as part of the National JTPA Study noted earlier the one site (Corpus Christi) where baseline
and follow-up earnings data are available for a large number of nonparticipating applicants.
Unfortunately, none of the other sites in that study provided data on a sufficient number of nonpar
ticipating applicants during the experimental intake period to conduct such a test. Nor are intake
workers' ratings of suitability available even in Corpus Christi.
25. Separate regressions were run on average earnings over the multiyear periods, to obtain
appropriate standard errors for the multiyear results.
26. Experimental impact estimates can produce incorrect policy decisions due to sampling
error, of course, but we are abstracting from that factor (for both the experimental and nonexperi
mental estimators) in this exercise.
27. Like experimental estimators, they carry some risk of misguiding policy due to sampling
and measurement error in the data, which we symmetrically ignore here.
28. In deriving this and other cutoff values noted below, we consider risks of .05 or above to
be serious enough to merit mention.
29. Fraker and Maynard (1987) also recommend the collection of better screening data at the
conclusion of their article.

5
Summary
and
Recommendations
In reviewing the literature on nonexperimental estimation of training
program impacts in chapter 1, we concluded that there is no generally
accepted nonexperimental method available to deal with the problem
of selection bias, despite nearly thirty years of efforts to find one. We
then returned to an approach tried briefly and abandoned early in the
process: the use of nonparticipating applicants as comparison group
members.
As demonstrated in chapter 2, there are important a priori reasons
why applicant-based comparison groups might provide more reliable
measures of the impacts of employment and training programs than
comparison groups drawn from sources external to the program. In
chapters 3 and 4, we tested estimates based on several such "internal"
comparison groups against those derived from a true experiment, using
a unique data set from the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide
Demonstrations. In this chapter, we summarize the a priori rationale
for the applicant-based approach and the results of our empirical tests.
We then close by noting the implications of our work for future
research and evaluation practice.

The Rationale for Applicant-Based Comparison Groups
The fundamental challenge in evaluating employment and training
programs is to obtain an unbiased estimate of what program partici
pants would have earned absent the program. Past attempts to do so
with nonexperimental comparison groups have foundered on the prob
lem of selection bias: the very processes that lead some individuals to
participate in an employment and training program also lead to higher
or lower earnings even without the program's services.
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Past Responses to Selection Bias and the "Preprogram Dip"
The source of this problem was first recognized in connection with
early efforts to measure program impacts through pre/post earnings
comparisons for participants alone: the "preprogram dip." This dip
results from participants entering employment and training programs
at a time when earnings are transitorily low. In contrast to these partic
ipants, individuals drawn from the general population are, on average,
likely to be in steady state in the labor market. Therefore, matching
external comparison group members to participants on earnings in the
immediate preprogram period is likely to overstate program effects, as
participants rebound from their transitorily low earnings levels and
comparison group earnings remain relatively stable.'
Attempts to control statistically for preexisting differences between
participants and comparison group members have generally relied on
relatively fixed individual characteristics like age, race, sex, and educa
tional attainment. Because these characteristics are invariant over time,
they cannot account for transitory differences between participants and
comparison group members.
Panel data became more generally available in the 1970s; this gave
analysts a better method of matching the earnings histories of partici
pants and comparison group members based on long-term permanent
earnings up to the time of program entry. The problem with this
approach is that it assumes participants would regain their previous
earnings levels in the absence of the program. There is no guarantee
that this is the case. It is quite possible that the earnings loss that trig
gered program entry represented a permanent break in earnings trends
for many individuals. In that case, one cannot project future earnings
on the basis of preprogram earnings. In his review of the many studies
of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act employing this
technique, Barnow (1987) found that impact estimates were quite sen
sitive to the specific treatment of the preprogram dip. Later attempts to
resolve the problem using preprogram specification tests have also met
with mixed success.
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Applicant Comparison Groups as a Possible Solution
In chapter 2, we proposed using nonparticipating applicants as com
parison groups in order to minimize preexisting differences between
participants and comparison group members. Because they apply for
services at the same time as participants, nonparticipating applicants
can be expected to undergo the same type though not necessarily the
same degree of dip and recovery (or lack of recovery) in earnings as
do participants. Hence, even if the preprogram dip signifies a perma
nent break in the earnings trend of participants, some version of that
break may be evident in the earnings paths of nonparticipating appli
cants. Alternatively, if the break is transitory for some of the partici
pants, it should also be transitory for some of the nonparticipating
applicants. Moreover, by applying to the program, nonparticipating
applicants reveal themselves to have some of the same, sometimes difficult-to-measure personal characteristics (e.g., motivation, problemsolving ability) that lead participants to seek help in response to their
current economic situation, which often reflected an earnings loss.
The use of applicant-based comparison groups can thus be expected
to control for many of the individual characteristics and circumstances
(including transitory ones) that lead individuals to apply to training
programs. The differences that remain will depend on the reasons com
parison group members do not enter the program while other appli
cants do. For example, some applicants voluntarily drop out of the
intake flow before reaching the point of program entry. These groups,
which we call withdrawals and no-shows, systematically self-select out
of the program. As a result, they seem likely to differ from participants
in observable and unobservable attributes (e.g., motivation or alterna
tive employment opportunities) that could affect their future earnings.
Of the two groups, no-shows more closely resemble participants in
at least two respects: they remain interested in the program further into
the intake process, and they pass the screens for acceptance into the
program. While this does not guarantee that they will more closely
approximate what the later experience of participants would have been
absent the program, it does at least make it more likely to the extent
that these same self-selection factors affect future earnings.
In contrast, applicants screened out by intake staff differ from par
ticipants primarily in those attributes that determine program selection
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rather than self-selection. As with any systematically selected group,
screen-outs will provide a biased representation of the without-program earnings of participants unless we control for these differences.
Fortunately, the factors leading to program selection even those
not generally measured in evaluation data sets are more amenable to
statistical control than those leading to self-selection. In particular, the
factors that cause some program applicants to be rejected while others
are accepted, if not totally random, are by definition externally observ
able at least in the perceptions of the program intake staff who make
admission decisions. If these factors can be measured through intake
workers' ratings of applicant potential and more conventional demo
graphic and background variables they can be controlled for in the
analysis to remove the selection bias brought about by the program's
intake procedures. By contrast, the use of external comparison groups
allows for very little control for program selection and, as noted, virtu
ally no control for self-selection. There is, of course, no guarantee that
the use of internal comparison groups and attention to the selection
process will eliminate selection bias, but the chances of attaining this
ideal should be increased with this approach.
In general, then, comparison groups composed of nonparticipating
applicants may be superior to those drawn from the general population,
even when the latter are matched to the participants on individual char
acteristics and prior earnings. Within the population of nonparticipat
ing applicants, there are a priori reasons to expect that no-shows will
provide better estimates than withdrawals, and that screen-outs will
provide the best comparison if we are able to control for the objective
and subjective factors intake staff use to select program participants.

Empirical Estimates Using Alternative Applicant-Based
Comparison Groups
We tested these theoretical propositions in chapters 3 and 4 by esti
mating program impacts using applicant-based comparison groups and
comparing the results with estimates derived from a controlled experi
ment. The data for this analysis come from the AFDC HomemakerHome Health Aide Demonstrations, a voluntary program that provided
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four to six weeks of training and up to a year of subsidized employ
ment for AFDC recipients in seven states.
The homemaker-home health aide demonstrations provide data that
are unusually well-suited to this testing exercise in several respects.
First, the sample includes not only participants and a randomly
assigned control group, but also a group of applicants who did not par
ticipate in the program. Second, as part of the intake process, program
staff rated applicants on their potential as homemaker-home health
aides, allowing us to extend conventional comparison group adjust
ments to subjective factors that affect program selection. Third, earn
ings data are available for both the experimental sample and the
nonparticipating applicants for an unusually long follow-up period
up to five years after exit from the program.
Using these data, we estimated three different impact models for
each of three applicant-based comparison groups withdrawals,
screen-outs, and no-shows in each of seven years. The first set of
estimates were simply unadjusted differences in mean earnings
between participants and the comparison group. The second set of esti
mates were regression-adjusted to control for differences in observable
baseline characteristics, such as demographics and prior earnings. The
third set of estimates controlled for both these observable variables and
the unobservable screening criteria captured by intake workers' subjec
tive ratings of applicants. Thus, the first model made no attempt to con
trol for selection effects, beyond the use of nonparticipating applicants
as a comparison group, while the second used a set of standard nonexperimental controls for self-selection. The third model attempted to
control both for self-selection and, through the inclusion of the subjec
tive ratings, for program selection. Each set of estimates was compared
against the experimental benchmark.
In general, we found that unadjusted mean differences between par
ticipants and comparison group members greatly overstated program
effects, especially in the postprogram years, revealing that participant
earnings would have exceeded the earnings of other applicants even
absent the intervention. The addition of conventional baseline covariates to the model narrowed the gap between the nonexperimental esti
mates and the experimental estimates for screen-outs and no-shows,
although this adjustment actually moved the withdrawal-based esti
mates further off the mark. Adding the intake workers' subjective rat-

118

Summary and Recommendations

ings narrowed the gap between the nonexperimental and experimental
estimates in the post-program years by $150 to $260 for withdrawals
and $20 to $160 for screen-outs; it had little effect on the estimates for
no-shows.
The fully adjusted nonexperimental estimates for the withdrawalbased sample overestimated program impacts in all years but one, and
by a rapidly growing margin (up to $1,600) toward the end of the fol
low-up period. However, those based on screen-outs and no-shows
tended to overstate program effects in the postprogram period by a
much smaller and more stable margin, ranging from $120 to $430. On
the basis of the impact estimates alone, then, withdrawals do not
appear to provide an acceptable comparison group, especially for longrun impacts; screen-outs and no-shows yield much more promising,
though still suspect, estimates.

Specifying Validation Tests
Previous comparisons of nonexperimental impact estimates with
experimental estimates for the same program have often stopped at this
point. Others have focused on whether experimental and nonexperi
mental estimates yield the same policy implications (i.e., are signifi
cantly different from zero in the same direction). These criteria while
emphasizing the right factors provide an inadequate basis for assess
ing the performance of nonexperimental estimators, for several rea
sons.
Problems with Previous Methods
The dividing line between differences that are acceptably small and
those that are not, in terms of magnitude alone, is inherently judgmen
tal and arbitrary. Moreover, the comparison of experimental and nonexperimental point estimates does not take account of the fact that each
of the estimates is only a single draw from the distribution of estimates
that would be yielded by the two approaches in repeated applications.
Once the random character of that draw is taken into account, the dif-
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ference between two estimates only approximates the selection bias in
the nonexperimental approach.
This problem can be at least partially addressed by testing whether
the difference between the two estimates is statistically significant. The
stringency of this test depends, however, on the sample size involved:
in small samples, even differences that would be generally regarded as
large might not be statistically significant; in very large samples, even
inconsequential differences may be statistically significant. And as
explained in appendix C, in evaluating voluntary training programs the
existence of no-shows makes the test infeasible except through a com
plex adjustment for the correlation between the two estimates.
Similarly, while focused on an important criterion, past studies that
compared nonexperimental and experimental estimates in terms of
their policy implications have defined the issue too narrowly. Simply
asking whether the estimated impact on earnings was significantly dif
ferent from zero in the same direction under the two approaches does
not address alternative policy questions such as whether program bene
fits exceeded program costs. Since policy makers are likely to ask a
wide range of policy questions in future evaluations, a more robust val
idation criterion would be highly desirable.
Finally, those previous validation exercises that were based on tests
of statistical significance have implicitly presumed each nonexperi
mental technique to be unbiased unless the data prove otherwise. Given
that concerns over selection bias have dominated all past efforts to
measure the effects of employment and training programs nonexperimentally, the burden of proof clearly belongs on the other side of the
question: nonexperimental methods should be presumed to suffer from
selection bias to an unacceptable degree until data prove otherwise.

A More Complete Validation Standard
In chapter 4, we respond to these concerns by proposing a more bal
anced, comprehensive, and rigorous method for assessing the potential
selection bias in any given nonexperimental estimate. We derive a tech
nique that both allows for more meaningful comparisons among such
estimates and provides a rigorous basis for judging each measure
against the experimental norm. This technique is also more sensitive
than past approaches, in that it provides a quantitative measure of how
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well each nonexperimental estimator performs across a range of policy
questions, rather than a global accept/reject decision for only a single
policy question.
Our approach begins by recognizing that nonexperimental estima
tors must be presumed biased until proven otherwise. Unfortunately,
proving a nonexperimental approach to be unbiased on the basis of a
single estimate drawn from a finite sample is virtually impossible, due
to sampling error. As an alternative, we consider whether the approach
would yield unbiased policy conclusions, on average (i.e., abstracting
from sampling variability), over a range of policy questions. We do this
by applying a Bayesian decision theory framework to the results of the
experiment to formulate a probability distribution for true program
impact and a similar distribution for the average result of a given nonexperimental method. These two distributions are then combined to
calculate an upper bound on the odds that the nonexperimental
approach will produce a misguided policy conclusion due to system
atic selection bias, when the critical policy issue is whether true impact
exceeds some threshold level, C.
We are then able to map the limits of the probability of a misguided
policy decision over all possible policy questions (i.e., all possible C
values) to arrive at a "maximum risk function" for that particular nonexperimental approach. Abstracting from sampling variation, an exper
iment produces the correct policy inference regardless of the policy
question; therefore, its "maximum risk function" is 0 for all values of
C. Individual nonexperimental approaches can then be judged accept
able or unacceptable as alternatives to the experiment based on how
much, and over which range of policy decisions, their maximum risk
exceeds 0. Assessment of the relative performance of alternative nonexperimental estimators can also be made to determine which is the
most trustworthy as a guide to policy.

Assessment of Model Performance
The maximum risk function criterion is then applied to the nonex
perimental impact estimates derived from comparison samples of with
drawals, screen-outs, and no-shows in chapter 3. Two separate analyses
of the homemaker data are conducted, one for the mostly in-program
years of 1985-86 and the other for the postprogram period of 1987-90.
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The in-program analysis shows an unacceptably high potential risk of
incorrect policy conclusions due to selection bias for both the with
drawal-based and screen-out-based impact estimates, over an impor
tant range of policy decisions (those that hinge on whether annual
impacts exceed or fall short of cutoffs in the $1,700-$3,300 range). By
matching much more closely the experimental findings in this interval,
the no-show-based approach shows much less risk of misguided policy,
and carries a substantial risk only for decisions that hinge on impacts
exceeding or falling short of policy thresholds in the range of $1,200$2,200 per year.
During the postprogram period, both the no-show- and the screenout-based estimates are judged to be minimally acceptable alternatives
to the experiment in this application. Here, if key policy decisions
hinge on impacts below $200 per year or over $1,500 a year (and if
sampling error is minimized through large sample sizes), both
approaches would be expected to provide a highly reliable guide to
policy concerning the homemaker intervention. The lower of these two
ranges includes questions of whether the homemaker demonstrations
had any earnings impact at all in the postprogram period (C = $0), and
the higher begins just above where impacts become large enough and
sustained enough to offset initial program costs (C around $1,200 per
year).2 Only if policy makers need to distinguish between annual
impacts in the $200-$ 1,500 range would the risk of incorrect policy
conclusions through selection bias preclude the use of comparison
groups of no-shows and/or screen-outs. Withdrawal-based estimates
were also found to guide policy reliably regarding impacts below $200
per year, but not regarding impacts in the $200-$2,200 range.

Conclusions and Recommendations
While the results in chapters 3 and 4 fall short of identifying a fully
acceptable substitute for the experimental approach, we believe that the
evidence presented here is generally encouraging with regard to the use
of applicant-based impact methods when experiments cannot be imple
mented. As shown in chapter 4, two of the three families of applicantbased findings from the homemaker demonstrations proved to be reli-
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able guides to policy across a fairly wide range of policy questions in
the postprogram period, at least as concerns the core problem of selec
tion bias that experiments are designed to remove. One of these two
families the approach using training no-shows as a comparison
group also proved generally reliable during the in-program period
over a range of policy questions. The theoretically preferred screenout-based approach proved much less reliable than the no-show-based
model during the in-program period, but yielded similar results in the
postprogram period.
Longer-Term Follow-Up
The improved reliability of the screen-out-based estimates during
the postprogram period has a plausible explanation related to the need
for longer-term follow-up of the sample. Presumably, program staff
based their screening decisions on the most readily detectable signals
of future success. In general, indicators of short-run success should
have been more visible to staff than precursors of long-run success. If
screened on this basis, we would expect any initial differences between
screen-outs and participants (after controlling for measured differences
between the two groups) to diminish over time. If we were able to fol
low the sample for a period as long as, say, ten to fifteen years, screenouts might be virtually equivalent to a randomly selected control
group. We would not predict this result for applicants kept out of the
program through self-selection (withdrawals and no-shows), since selfselection could be based as much on permanent and unmeasurable
individual differences as on short-run differences in observable charac
teristics. Further follow-up of the homemaker sample would provide a
test of these alternative hypotheses.
Over the first six years after random assignment, no-shows per
formed best among the three comparison groups tested, particularly in
the first three or four years following program entry. In the postpro
gram years, however, which are crucial for measuring how the training
program affected the earnings capacities of the trainees in an unsubsidized market and over the long run, there was little difference in the
performance of the screen-out and no-show comparison groups. As
between these two groups, the theoretical rationale for using screenouts is more credible. Moreover, the process that generates screen-outs
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is more amenable to better measurement and modeling than was
achieved here (see below). Thus, screen-outs may well provide the
comparison group for future nonexperimental evaluations.

Strengthening the Ratings Variable
One of the innovations tested in our analysis is the use of intake
workers' subjective ratings to control for the factors influencing pro
gram selection among applicants. The addition of these ratings consis
tently moved the withdrawal- and screen-out-based estimates (though
not the no-show-based estimates) closer to the experimental norm. This
is particularly encouraging given the relatively crude nature of the rat
ing variable available (a simple four-point scale), the high rate of miss
ing data for this measure in the nonparticipant samples, and the
indications in the data that intake workers either applied the ratings
inconsistently or made their screening decisions on criteria other than
the ratings. We believe that these results justify further research to
more fully develop the rating approach to modeling program selection.
In any future application of this approach, we would recommend
that the rating scale be improved in several ways. First, more fine
grained ratings e.g., a ten-point scale should be used, to break the
confounding of scale values with program status that tends to occur
when a scale with a small number of discrete values is used. 3 Intake
workers might be motivated to use a wider range of values of the scale
by instructions that emphasize that the cutoff value for determining
selection is not fixed in advance and may vary over time depending on
the supply of applicants. Second, care should be taken to see that
intake workers provide ratings for as many applicants as possible, to
minimize missing data. This can be done by emphasizing the impor
tance of these data when training workers on data collection proce
dures, and by recording the ratings early in the intake process before
large numbers of applicants have dropped out. In training intake work
ers, it should also be emphasized that the ratings are intended to reflect
the criteria used to decide which applicants to accept, however subjec
tive those criteria may be. Finally, attention should be given to maxi
mizing the consistency with which the ratings are applied. This might
be done by having all the ratings assigned by the same worker or by a
committee of intake workers. At a minimum, it is important to record
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the identity of the worker who assigned each rating, so that ex post
adjustments can be made for systematic differences in ratings among
workers.

Extensions to Other Data Sets
However one views the results of the present study, it is important to
bear in mind that our empirical analysis constitutes only one example
of the use of nonparticipating applicants as a comparison group. A sin
gle test, conditioned on the specific circumstances of a single set of
demonstrations, cannot be viewed as conclusive evidence either for or
against any particular method. Many more replications of this
approach, using different samples drawn from different programs and
environments, will be required to arrive at any definitive conclusions.
We hope that this study will encourage others to conduct further tests
along these lines, and to revisit the results of earlier validation studies
to judge their reliability in light of the new validation methodology
presented here.
Regardless of the empirical evidence available at the moment, we
hope that the a priori arguments we offer for screen-out-based impact
analysis will be taken seriously by the evaluation community. As
argued in chapter 2, the use of screen-outs as comparison group mem
bers is highly feasible in a variety of evaluation contexts and, though
not entirely successful in its first application, appears on theoretical
grounds to offer the best hope available (outside of an experiment) for
resolving the selection bias problem. No-show-based comparison sam
ples also hold promise, on the basis of our empirical results. If other
studies show similar results, closer examination of the reasons for nonparticipation among this group should be undertaken in an attempt to
model their selection behavior.
Our strongest recommendations are, first, that researchers conduct
ing experimental evaluations of employment and training programs
begin to routinely collect subjective ratings from intake workers at
baseline, in order to document the selection process. Second, long-term
follow-up data should be collected for applicants who do not partici
pate in the program. This information can then serve as the basis for
further tests of the applicant-based approach analyzed in this mono
graph, when experimental data are available. And when experiments
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are not possible, the same set of inputs can provide a conceptually
appealing and empirically promising alternative to conventional nonexperimental methods for measuring the effects of government training
programs.
NOTES
1. Throughout this discussion, the term "matching" is intended to encompass both sample
selection designed to match comparison group members to participants and the use of statistical
methods to control for differences between the two groups.
2. Bell and Orr (1994) project positive net benefits for all five of the homemaker demonstra
tions with monthly earnings impacts of $100 or more ($1,200 annually) during the second postprogram year.
3. In the extreme, a two-point scale would be useless, because its values would simply corre
spond to the (observable) decision to accept or reject the applicant. If intake workers use a fourpoint scale, but rate nearly all applicants in the middle two categories of the scale, the resulting
ratings are only slightly more informative than those based on a two-point scale.

Appendix A
Construction of Grouped Data
This appendix describes the construction of the grouped data used in the
analysis. The majority of variables are taken from the Basic Information Sheet
filled out by all applicants to the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide Dem
onstrations. These individual data are combined with grouped annual earnings
data from the Internal Revenue Service to produce the analysis file used in the
monograph.
The Original Evaluation Data
Between 1982 and 1987, Abt Associates collected experimental data from
the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide Demonstrations, seven state-run
programs that provided training and subsidized employment experience as
homemakers and home health aides to selected AFDC recipients. During dem
onstration intake, prospective applicants filled out Basic Information Sheets
providing demographic and educational background, employment experience,
caregiving experience, and public program participation. We include only in
dividuals who went through intake between July 1984 and May 1985, as this is
the single group for which complete data are available on all demonstration ap
plicants. We have individual-level data on 5,521 program applicants including
participants, withdrawals, screen-outs, no-shows, and control group members.
IRS Earnings Data
Abt's original evaluation produced two years of follow-up data on the orig
inal experimental sample participants, no-shows, and controls for the years
1984 and 1985. In order to include withdrawals and screen-outs in the sample
and extend the follow-up period, demonstration data were matched to Internal
Revenue Service earnings data (wages plus tips) for 1984 through 1990. To en
sure anonymity, the IRS provides means and standard deviations of earnings
for groups of 10 to 19 individuals. The nature of the earnings data therefore re
quires that all subsequent analysis be conducted at the group level.
Formation of Groups
To maximize the efficiency of estimates obtained from the grouped data, we
formed groups that were as small and as homogeneous as possible with regard
to crucial baseline variables. This procedure minimized within-group variance
and preserved as much cross-group variation as possible in grouped analysis.
Individual observations were stratified and grouped according to eight base
line characteristics, including program status, state of residence, race, educa
tion, age, number of children, intake workers' ratings of applicants' potential

127

128

for succeeding in the program, and wage rate on the last job held before intake.
Exhibit A. 1 shows the variables used to form groups of observations for the ex
perimental and nonexperimental components of the sample, in descending or
der of priority. 1 The bottom panel summarizes the degree of homogeneity in
each set of groups.
Stratification produced 499 groups with an average group size of 11.1 indi
viduals. (See exhibit 3.1 for the average group size of each population.) All ex
perimental groups are completely homogeneous with regard to program status
(participant, no-show, control) and state of residence. Due to their smaller
number, the nonexperimental groups are homogenous only with regard to pro
gram status (withdrawal, screen-out). On average, groups reached the third lev
el of the stratification before experiencing any within-group heterogeneity.
Covariate Means and Missing Data
Exhibit A.2 shows group-level means for all covariates used in the analysis.
Most of these measures indicate the average percent of a group in a given cat
egory, including a category for missing data. As can be seen, missing data are
relatively infrequent. The overall average missing data rate is 1 percent for age,
4 percent for race and number of children, and 12 percent for previous wage.
Group averages for continuous variables such as age exclude individuals
with missing or invalid data, except for previous wage and 1984 annual earn
ings, where those with unknown values are assumed to have earned the average
reported value for their applicant group, rating of potential, and race. Categor
ical variables include missing observations as a distinct category with the ex
ception of race, where missing observations are included in the "other race"
category.
NOTE
1. As shown in exhibit A.I, the grouping of the experimental sample was structured in part to
parallel sample divisions used in the original evaluation, resulting in a somewhat different priority
order from that of the nonexperimental sample.
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Exhibit A.I Grouping Variables, in Priority Order, and Resulting Degree
of Within-Group Homogeneity
_____Experimental Sample_______Nonexperimental Sample
1. Program status (participant, no-show, 1. Program status (withdrawal,
control)
screen-out)
2. State of residence (states with high
impacts in original evaluation, states
with low impacts) 1
2. Rating of potential
3. Rating of potential (4 categories, plus
"missing")
3. Race
4. Race (White, Black, Hispanic, other,
"missing")
4. Wage rate on last job2
5. Wage rate on last job2
5. Education
6. Education (H.S. grad, dropout,
"missing")
6. Age
7. Age (15-24, 25-34, 35+, "missing") 7. State of residence (7 categories)
8. Number of children (1,2, 3+,
"missing")________________8. Number of children_______
_____________Within-group homogeneity____________
All groups homogeneous to Level 2
All groups homogenous to Level 1
Average group homogenous to
Average group homogenous to Level 3 Level 3
Maximum degree of homogeneity =
Maximum degree of homogeneity
Level 8___________________= Level 7______________
1. High-impact states include Arkansas, Kentucky, New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas. Low-impact
states are New York and South Carolina.
2. A two-stage stratification was performed on wage rate. First, the sample was divided between
those who had worked previously and those who had not. The latter group was stratified on the
remaining variables on the list (education, age, etc.). Those who had worked were ordered by
wage rate (with missing wage rates set to the mean for their strata) and divided into groups of 10
consecutive observations to maximize within-group homogeneity on this factor. No further strat
ification of these cases was possible without disturbing this ordering.
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Exhibit A.2 Mean Values of Covariates, by Applicant Group

Sample Size
Covariate
Average ageb
% White
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other racec
% Educ. < 12 yrs.
% Educ. = 12 yrs.
% Educ. > 12 yrs.
% Never married
% Married, spouse
present
% Separated, divorced,
widowed
% Marital status
missing
Average number of
dependent childrend
% Ever worked for pay
% Never worked for
pay
Average maximum
previous hourly wage6
% Maximum wage <
$25
% Maximum wage >
$25
% Educ. missing
Average 1984 annual
earningsf
% Arkansas
% Kentucky
% New Jersey
% New York
%Ohio

Withdrawals3
82

Screen- Nocuts shows Participants Controls
24
144
166
83

30
30
53
11
5
52
32
14
34

31
38
51
7
4
50
30
20
32

29
17
58
17
8
50
29
15
29

30
28
57
8
7
44
35
17
33

29
28
55
10
7
46
33
15
33

11

10

4

7

7

39

44

34

42

42

16

14

32

18

18

2.0
82

2.0
85

1.9
86

1.9
87

1.9
86

18

15

14

13

14

$3.00

$3.17

$3.37

$3.33

$3.33

93

97

100

100

100

7
1

3
0

0
6

0
5

0
5

$823
4
17
31
15
26

$592
11
31
15
14
20

$710
15
3
14
26
4

$840
15
13
17
13
14

$749
15
11
17
13
13
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Exhibit A.2 (continued)

% South Carolina
% Texas
% State missing
% Rated potential
"excellent"
% Rated "good"
% Rated "fair"
% Rated "poor"
% Intake rating missing

Withdrawals3
4
3
0
1
17
12
4
65

Screen- Noouts shows Participants Controls
4
8
9
9
4
17
15
23
4
5
6
0
4
24
27
9
36

13
56
12
1
18

12
64
12
0
12

12
63
12
0
12

a. Of the 82 withdrawal groups, 19 consist of individuals for whom reason for nonparticipation is
missing. These individuals are assumed to have withdrawn from the intake process voluntarily
without providing a reason to the demonstration staff.
b. Observations with missing or invalid values are excluded from the calculation: 2 percent of the
withdrawals, 4 percent of the screen-outs, and 0 percent of the remaining groups,
c. "Other race" includes observations with missing data, from a low of 2 percent of the with
drawals to a high of 7 percent for no-shows. The overall average missing data rate is 4 percent,
d. Observations with missing or invalid values are excluded from the calculations, from a low of
1 percent of the screen-outs to a high of 6 percent of the no-shows. The average overall missing
data rate is 4 percent.
e. Includes only individuals whose highest wage rate on previous job was less than or equal to
$25 per hour. Those who had never worked for pay are coded zero and included in the average.
Those who worked for an unknown wage rate are assumed to have earned the average reported
wage rate for their subpopulation (withdrawals, etc.), intake rating, and race,
f. Includes $0 values for those with no earnings reported in the IRS data.

Appendix B
Regression Procedures
In the analysis described in chapters 3 and 4 we use data from the Internal
Revenue Service, which provides seven years of earnings information for the
AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide Demonstration population (1984-90).
As described in appendix A, earnings data from the IRS are in the form of
means for groups of 10 to 19 individuals. All explanatory variables in the anal
ysis are therefore expressed as group means or as percentages of group totals.
This appendix explains the difficulties associated with using grouped data
in regression analyses and describes our use of generalized least-squares (GLS)
to surmount these difficulties. It also contains regression results for the final,
fully developed equation discussed in chapter 3, for each of three comparison
groups and from the experiment itself.
Two problems arise in using ordinary least-squares (OLS) on grouped data
to measure program impacts. Both stem from the fact that group-level observa
tions have different variances even when the underlying individual-level data
are homoskedastic. Because of this heteroskedasticity, OLS coefficient esti
mates (though unbiased) are no longer efficient i.e., the OLS coefficients do
not have the minimum variance among all linear unbiased estimators. 1 Also,
the usual standard errors for the OLS coefficients will be biased because of het
eroskedasticity, invalidating the standard tests of statistical significance.
For our purposes, biased standard errors represent the more important prob
lem.2 We surmount it by using the usual GLS procedure for dealing with heteroskedastic error terms, weighted least-squares (WLS). More formally, we
assume that an OLS regression of earnings on a set of explanatory variables at
the individual level would satisfy the classical requirements; namely, that the
regression disturbances are not correlated with one another, and that the distur
bances all come from the same normal distribution with mean zero and con
stant variance (i.e., the disturbances are homoskedastic). Letting Ng be the
number of individuals in group g (in our case, lQ<Ng < 19), each equation es
timated in chapter 3 takes the form:
v = XB + e,

£[e] = 0,
O?v[e] = £[e e' ] = ft = o2xP
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where:

y = (yi,y2>->yGy
xn x lk

x=
e =
and

X

~
Si=l

The variance of each residual is then:
_

g
N

"g

Thus, the residuals are heteroskedastic, since the variances depend on the num
ber of observations in each group. Observations that correspond to large groups
will have smaller variances than observations for small groups.
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The GLS procedure weights each observation by the square root of its group
size. Since the group sizes Ng are known, we can form the diagonal weighting
matrix:
Nl

0

0

N,

The GLS parameter estimates are then just:

B = (x'ci^x) ~ Va~V
( ,,, 1 -i ^V1 ^/1 -i
= Lr
v x) xr—\f y
\

G

J

G

When the vector of coefficients is estimated in this way, the estimated standard
errors are unbiased.3
This method is used to form all of the estimates in chapters 3 and 4, includ
ing the experimental impact estimates. Exhibits B.I through B.7 present indi
vidual GLS regression results for each nonexperimental method, together with
the experimental benchmark regressions, by year, from the fully specified
equation that includes ratings of applicant potential among the explanatory
variables. Exhibits B.8 and B.9 do the same for regressions representing the inprogram and postprogram periods, where the dependent variable is the sum of
the group means for 1985-86 and 1987-90, respectively. In each case, the co
efficient on the participant dummy variable provides the impact estimate
shown in the text.

NOTES
1. Intuitively, estimation based on data for which the dependent variable is grouped will be
less efficient than estimation using individual data because information is lost about the variation
of earnings within groups.
2. Correcting for the lack of efficiency in the coefficient estimates would require more com
plex adjustments that take account of the within-group variance of earnings. While the data are
available for this purpose, we did not judge the gain in statistical precision (which we expected to
be minimal) worth the added complexity.
3. For a complete discussion of the use of GLS in the context of grouped data, see Kmenta
(1986).
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Exhibit B.I 1984 Full-Model Weighted Least-Squares Regression
Estimates, by Comparison Group (standard errors in
parentheses)
Dependent variable
mean
Mean earnings, 1984
Coefficients of
independent variables
Intercept
Participant dummy
Average age
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other race (or
unknown)
% Education < 12 years
% Education =12 years
% Education missing
% Never married
% Married, spouse
present
% Marital status missing
Avg. # dependent
children
% Ever worked for pay

Comparison group
ScreenNoExperimental
Withdrawals outs
shows
controls
$741
$826
$819
$779

259
(944)
121
(259)
30
(21)
-325
(231)
-186
(321)
-674
(443)
-1,139
(446)
-811
(484)
2,072
(2,360)
-792
(624)
247
(418)
-4,683
(2,720)
84
(148)
-629
(269)

-723
(715)
157
(124)
41
(18)
-274
(201)
-540
(293)
-99
(335)
-843
(353)
-195
(404)
3,850
(3,589)
89
(529)
781
(340)
-4,941
(3,600)
18
(120)
-517
(204)

-731
(886)
26
(145)
44
(23)
-217
(246)
-416
(350)
36
(636)
-1,114
(460)
-252
(500)
4,287
(3,700)
379
(725)
582
(427)
-6,190
(3,668)
146
(145)
-538
(270)

541
(627)
99
(74)
6
(16)
19
(187)
-261
(254)
301
(442)
-397
(347)
-72
(376)
4,129
(2,678)
303
(552)
181
(316)
-6,431
(3,093)
-141
(112)
-490
(200)
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Exhibit B.I (continued)
Dependent variable
mean
Avg. previous wage
% Previous wage > $25
% Kentucky
% New Jersey
% New York
% Ohio
% South Carolina
% Texas
% State missing
% Rated "excellent"
% Rated "fair"
% Rated "poor"
% Rating missing

Adjusted R2
Sample size

Comparison group
ScreenNoExperimental
Withdrawals outs
shows
controls
164
146
125
165
(51)
(44)
(56)
(42)
1,840
-2,125
N/A
N/A
(3,233)
(2,318)
-39
471
306
74
(463)
(501)
(375)
(358)
972
703
591
425
(385)
(327)
(389)
(289)
5,077
5,623
6,670
6,704
(2,720)
(3,575) (3,637)
(3,078)
462
601
328
138
(414)
(448)
(368)
(318)
189
471
510
524
(447)
(432)
(375)
(304)
328
756
907
550
(411)
(342)
(380)
(290)
2,841
3,608
2,131
2,103
(2,222)
(2,480) (2,563)
(2,540)
189
183
150
252
(195)
(162)
(185)
(137)
-41
-53
25
32
(168)
(146)
(173)
(130)
251
493 -1,993
-1,418
(476)
(294) (1,418)
(1,159)
-69
-259
-49
-129
(148)
(170)
(130)
(129)
.18
226

.22
251

.24
168

.13
334
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Exhibit B.2 1985 Full-Model Weighted Least-Squares Regression
Estimates, by Comparison Group (standard errors in
parentheses)
Comparison group
NoExperimental
Dependent variable
Screenmean
Withdrawals cuts
shows
controls
Mean earnings, 1985
$3,205
$2,919 $3,804
$2,643
Coefficients of
independent variables
Intercept
-1,224
-3,177
-1,352
75
(1,243)
(1,269) (1,339)
(997)
3,422
2,914
Participant dummy
2,100
2,237
(341)
(221)
(218)
(119)
28
62
43
Average age
21
(28)
(31)
(26)
(35)
-69
-334
-80
% Black
68
(305)
(357)
(371)
(297)
754
% Hispanic
1,101
525
407
(423)
(524)
(530)
(404)
-479
-673
-1,021
% Other race (or
-3,075
unknown)
(587)
(593)
(958)
(703)
-385
-276
-222
-707
% Education < 12 years
(597)
(634)
(708)
(552)
-534
-57
-333
% Education =12 years
666
(641)
(716)
(754)
(598)
-2,200
-13,183
-5,510
% Education missing
-6,785
(3,112)
(6,378) (5,606)
(4,271)
-655
-882
% Never married
-1,272
-1,074
(825)
(938) (1,094)
(878)
604
1,017
452
% Married, spouse
1,163
present
(551)
(610)
(648)
(502)
218
% Marital status missing
11,097
5,264
6,633
(3,606)
(6,408) (5,587)
(4,948)
-13
-79
Avg. # dependent
225
227
(212)
(219)
children
(195)
(178)
-231
210
% Ever worked for pay
318
97
(412)
(359)
(367)
(321)
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Exhibit B.2 (continued)
Comparison group
Experiment;
NoScreencontrols
shows
Withdrawals cuts
-59
-186
-100
-143
(79)
(68)
(86)
(69)
N/A
N/A
2,240
4,480
% Previous wage > $25
(4,117)
(4,258)
.89
.76
.85
Avg. total earnings 1984
.87
(.09)
(.13)
(.12)
(.09)
2,526
1,659
2,625
% Kentucky
1,910
(757)
(569)
(668)
(609)
639
1,386
1,036
1,341
% New Jersey
(584)
(460)
(593)
(515)
-117
-6,672
-4,470
-10,836
% New York
(4,928)
(6,371) (5,550)
(3,611)
2,345
3,748
% Ohio
3,848
2,370
(505)
(677)
(656)
(547)
950
1,313
% South Carolina
987
767
(655)
(666)
(486)
(589)
-145
211
328
42
% Texas
(464)
(542)
(581)
(615)
1,700
3,413
5,974
% State missing
4,778
(4,040)
(4,403) (3,881)
(2,944)
313
658
% Rated "excellent"
562
676
(287)
(218)
(280)
(257)
-515
-169
-364
-452
% Rated "fair"
(207)
(258)
(221)
(260)
1,801
-1,289
258
3,753
% Rated "poor"
(1,845)
(524) (2,154)
(627)
-190
-8
-55
32
% Rating missing
(204)
(195)
(259)
(230)

Dependent variable
mean
Avg. previous wage

Adjusted R2
Sample size

.75
226

.67
251

.66
168

.63
334
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Exhibit B.3 1986 Full-Model Weighted Least-Squares Regression
Estimates, by Comparison Group (standard errors in
parentheses)
Dependent variable
mean
Mean earnings, 1986
Coefficients of
independent variables
Intercept
Participant dummy
Average age
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other race (or
unknown)
% Education < 12 years
% Education =12 years
% Education missing
% Never married
% Married, spouse
present
% Marital status missing
Avg. # dependent
children
% Ever worked for pay

Comparison group
NoExperimental
Screenshows
Withdrawals outs
controls
$3,179
$3,026 $3,572
$3,006
-111
(1,652)
2,003
(454)
42
(37)
-245
(406)
521
(562)
-189
(780)
-111
(794)
-325
(853)
1,959
(4,137)
205
(1,096)
265
(733)
-3,260
(4,794)
-51
(259)
-244
(477)

-1,775
(1,453)
1,545
(253)
58
(36)
-17
(409)
954
(600)
-98
(679)
-129
(726)
520
(820)
-470
(7,300)
-560
(1,074)
822
(698)
-3,552
(7,335)
-110
(243)
-564
(420)

-2,014
(1,765)
1,145
(288)
89
(46)
-476
(490)
647
(699)
-2,058
(1,264)
27
(933)
532
(995)
4,863
(7,391)
423
(1,442)
881
(855)
621
(7,366)
6
(289)
-295
(544)

177
(1,133)
1,023
(135)
42
(30)
-82
(338)
696
(459)
-539
(798)
-640
(627)
138
(679)
2,798
(4,850)
130
(997)
256
(570)
-132
(5,619)
-161
(202)
-3
(365)
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Exhibit B.3 (continued)
Comparison group
NoExperimental
ScreenWithdrawals outs
shows
controls
127
179
137
101
(91)
(114)
(77)
(90)
% Previous wage > $25
N/A
3,237
-7,630
N/A
(4,712)
(5,660)
Avg. total earnings 1984
.77
.75
.91
.78
(.12)
(.17)
(.14)
(.10)
% Kentucky
1,122
821
799
1,666
(809)
(764)
(997)
(646)
% New Jersey
1,108
458
217
472
(685)
(781)
(522)
(669)
% New York
-2,076
5,063
839
633
(4,800)
(7,293) (7,317)
(5,596)
% Ohio
2,043
3,448
3,216
1,728
(727)
(751)
(892)
(574)
-185
-62
% South Carolina
279
225
(783)
(763)
(863)
(552)
% Texas
479
182
358
98
(720)
(704)
(765)
(527)
% State missing
2,225
-1,632
-1,927
-2,039
(3,913)
(5,040) (5,118)
(4,588)
% Rated "excellent"
466
551
355
68
(341)
(329)
(369)
(248)
-121
-112
-149
% Rated "fair"
96
(293)
(296)
(343)
(235)
-592
% Rated "poor"
751
8,092
4,719
(834)
(599) (2,940)
(2,095)
-403
-101
-506
-274
% Rating missing
(259)
(341)
(263)
(232)
Dependent variable
mean
Avg. previous wage

Adjusted R2
Sample size

.48
226

.44
251

.40
168

.39
334
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Exhibit B.4 1987 Full-Model Weighted Least-Squares Regression
Estimates, by Comparison Group (standard errors in
parentheses)
Dependent variable
mean
Withdrawals
Mean earnings, 1987
$3,620
Coefficients of
independent variables
Intercept
569
(1,970)
Participant dummy
635
(539)
Average age
22
(44)
% Black
8
(482)
% Hispanic
550
(668)
-822
% Other race (or
unknown)
(927)
% Education < 12 years
-2,577
(943)
% Education =12 years
-1,125
(1,016)
% Education missing
2,357
(4,912)
% Never married
-1,093
(1,302)
% Married, spouse
968
present
(874)
% Marital status missing
1,580
(5,693)
624
Avg. # dependent
children
(307)
-244
% Ever worked for pay
(567)

Comparison group
ScreenNoExperimental
outs
shows
controls
$3,418 $3,809
$3,460

-358
(1,544)
883
(268)
31
(38)
-316
(434)
1,225
(635)
-858
(719)
-996
(771)
-408
(869)
-3,493
(7,726)
-867
(1,147)
926
(745)
7,347
(7,761)
268
(258)
-316
(445)

-809
(2,025)
916
(331)
63
(53)
-728
(561)
698
(801)
-2,427
(1,446)
-1,344
(1,068)
-740
(1,144)
-703
(8,453)
-2,085
(1,650)
1,202
(982)
5,538
(8,426)
553
(331)
-53
(622)

722
(1,325)
551
(157)
35
(35)
-837
(395)
158
(535)
-907
(931)
-1,850
(732)
-887
(794)
-3,475
(5,660)
-760
(1,164)
1,316
(667)
8,403
(6,560)
382
(236)
113
(426)
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Exhibit B.4 (continued)
Comparison group
NoScreenExperimental
Withdrawals cuts
shows
controls
92
168
97
112
(109)
(96)
(130)
(90)
-794
% Previous wage > $25
N/A
1,069
N/A
(6,723)
(5,023)
Avg. total earnings 1984
1.11
.90
1.19
1.03
(.15)
(.14)
(-19)
(.12)
% Kentucky
1,729
40
988
361
(812) (1,141)
(961)
(754)
% New Jersey
1,954
1,584
2,056
1,467
(813)
(709)
(894)
(610)
% New York
1,920
-5,289
-3,333
-6,509
(5,703)
(7,717) (8,371)
(6,534)
% Ohio
1,749
1,276
991
903
(863)
(800) (1,021)
(669)
-144
-154
% South Carolina
677
425
(931)
(808)
(989)
(644)
-381
-373
-37
% Texas
661
(747)
(856)
(876)
(615)
% State missing
-1,085
-1,552
-1,202
-3,901
(4,648)
(5,335) (5,857)
(5,357)
% Rated "excellent"
449
316
623
104
(406)
(423)
(349)
(289)
-436
-292
-581
-450
% Rated "fair"
(348)
(315)
(274)
(393)
% Rated "poor"
-1,032
745
3,174
1,270
(990)
(636) (3,248)
(2,445)
-776
-135
-334
-208
% Rating missing
(308)
(283)
(271)
(391)
Dependent variable
mean
Avg. previous wage

Adjusted R2
Sample size

.40
225

.44
248

.41
167

.33
333

Exhibit B.5 1988 Full-Model Weighted Least-Squares Regression
Estimates, by Comparison Group (standard errors in
parentheses)
Dependent variable
mean
Mean earnings, 1988
Coefficients of
independent variables
Intercept
Participant dummy
Average age
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other race (or
unknown)
% Education < 12 years
% Education =12 years
% Education missing
% Never married
% Married, spouse
present
% Marital status missing
Avg. # dependent
children
% Ever worked for pay

Comparison group
Experimental
NoScreencontrols
shows
Withdrawals outs
$4,179
$4,112 $4,489
$4,315

797
(2,180)
800
(599)
26
(49)
-405
(535)
190
(741)
-604
(1,029)
-1,338
(1,047)
-538
(1,125)
6,236
(5,458)
-936
(1,446)
1,556
(967)
-8,610
(6,325)
472
(341)
-634
(630)

491
(1,772)
869
(308)
-5
(44)
-99
(498)
1,107
(731)
-743
(828)
87
(886)
483
(1,000)
6,462
(8,902)
-578
(1,310)
1,409
(851)
-3,119
(8,945)
276
(297)
-652
(513)

-382
(2,315)
706
(378)
47
(60)
-492
(642)
581
(917)
-2,040
(1,657)
57
(1,224)
363
(1,304)
8,326
(9,693)
-1,907
(1,892)
1,927
(1,121)
-4,010
(9,661)
416
(379)
-360
(713)

2,277
(1,605)
500
(191)
11
(42)
-692
(479)
-34
(650)
-966
(1,131)
-1,468
(889)
-735
(962)
-4,942
(6,872)
-73
(1,413)
1,496
(808)
6,144
(7,962)
235
(286)
-399
(517)
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Exhibit B.5 (continued)
Comparison group
Experimental
NoScreenDependent variable
controls
shows
Withdrawals outs
mean
200
274
230
334
Avg. previous wage
(109)
(149)
(110)
(121)
N/A
N/A
2,029
4,652
% Previous wage > $25
(7,469)
(5,746)
1.09
1.31
1.14
.99
Avg. total earnings 1984
(.15)
(.22)
(.16)
(.17)
-21
716
1,411
862
% Kentucky
(916)
(1,068)
(932) (1,308)
334
1,038
1,445
863
% New Jersey
(740)
(816) (1,025)
(904)
-4,497
5,057
4,250
10,715
% New York
(7,930)
(6,334)
(8,893) (9,596)
1,238
1,357
1,816
728
% Ohio
(813)
(916) (1,170)
(959)
-163
-9
528
671
% South Carolina
(782)
(1,132)
(1,034)
(930)
-515
-748
-1,928
-1,567
% Texas
(746)
(858) (1,004)
(950)
-332
-509
-381
4,681
% State missing
(6,146) (6,712)
(6,501)
(5,163)
423
1,102
1,236
% Rated "excellent"
1,373
(351)
(451)
(484)
(401)
-654
-800
-814
-952
% Rated "fair"
(450)
(332)
(387)
(361)
2,377
-1,989
5,088
% Rated "poor"
335
(2,969)
(1,100)
(731) (3,724)
-37
-691
-96
171
% Rating missing
(448)
(329)
(342)
(320)
Adjusted R2
Sample size

.39
226

.40
251

.38
168

.26
334

146

Exhibit B.6 1989 Full-Model Weighted Least-Squares Regression
Estimates, by Comparison Group (standard errors in
parentheses)
Dependent variable
mean
Mean earnings, 1989
Coefficients of
independent variables
Intercept
Participant dummy
Average age
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other race (or
unknown)
% Education < 12 years
% Education =12 years
% Education missing
% Never married
% Married, spouse
present
% Marital status missing
Avg. # dependent
children
% Ever worked for pay

Comparison group
Experimental
NoScreencontrols
shows
Withdrawals outs
$4,775
$4,694 $5,018
$4,874

3,732
(2,673)
1,316
(734)
1
(60)
-797
(656)
-63
(909)
-1,429
(1,262)
-3,154
(1,284)
-1,912
(1,380)
5,704
(6,693)
-414
(1,774)
1,199
(1,186)
-11,580
(7,755)
105
(419)
-1,007
(772)

1,724
1,988
(2,118) (2,477)
814
597
(404)
(368)
-13
35
(64)
(52)
-537
-176
(687)
(596)
752
1,355
(874)
(981)
-160
-1,284
(990) (1,773)
-577
-147
(1,059) (1,310)
-570
-328
(1,195) (1,396)
4,278
4,140
(10,640) (10,371)
-1,962
-1,243
(1,566) (2,024)
1,481
780
(1,017) (1,200)
-780
-1,975
(10,691) (10,336)
-10
6
(354)
(406)
-220
-251
(763)
(613)

3,749
(1,755)
338
(209)
33
(46)
-701
(523)
215
(711)
-1,605
(1,236)
-2,101
(972)
-1,666
(1,052)
-5,265
(7,513)
-944
(1,544)
1,169
(883)
6,380
(8,704)
74
(313)
-113
(565)
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Exhibit B.6 (continued)

Comparison group
NoExperimental
Dependent variable
Screenshows
controls
mean
Withdrawals outs
112
Avg. previous wage
266
225
83
(119)
(148)
(132)
(160)
5,174
N/A
N/A
% Previous wage > $25
11,991
(9,157)
(6,869)
1.23
1.40
1.12
Avg. total earnings 1984
.87
(.20)
(.20)
(-23)
(.16)
1,152
1,671
% Kentucky
1,872
833
(1,114) (1,400)
(1,001)
(1,309)
1,011
% New Jersey
2,973
1,630
1,159
(1,108)
(975) (1,096)
(809)
4,164
-4,716
% New York
15,498
2,757
(7,766)
(10,630) (10,267)
(8,669)
718
1,141
1,251
% Ohio
2,603
(1,176)
(1,095) (1,252)
(888)
133
% South Carolina
1,068
1,539
789
(1,267)
(1,112) (1,211)
(855)
-270
% Texas
-1,538
-1,680
-1,187
(1,165)
(1,026) (1,074)
(816)
-630
% State missing
7,646
-1,398
5
(7,346) (7,181)
(7,107)
(6,331)
% Rated "excellent"
1,396
1,174
1,109
371
(479)
(552)
(518)
(384)
-660
-711
-886
-856
% Rated "fair"
(474)
(432)
(481)
(363)
% Rated "poor"
511
-2,813
3,028
2,093
(1,348)
(3,246)
(873) (3,985)
-187
-972
-546
% Rating missing
-1,076
(419)
(383)
(479)
(360)
Adjusted R2
Sample size

.34
226

.33
251

.40
168

.25
334
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Exhibit B.7 1990 Full-Model Weighted Least-Squares Regression
Estimates, by Comparison Group (standard errors in
parentheses)
Dependent variable
mean
Mean earnings, 1990
Coefficients of
independent variables
Intercept
Participant dummy
Average age
% Black
% Hispanic
% Other race (or
unknown)
% Education < 12 years
% Education =12 years
% Education missing
% Never married
% Married, spouse
present
% Marital status missing
Avg. # dependent
children
% Ever worked for pay

Comparison group
Experimental
NoScreencontrols
shows
Withdrawals outs
$5,190
$5,176 $5,469
$5,332

4,509
(2,661)
2,074
(731)
-1
(60)
-708
(653)
222
(905)
-2,604
(1,256)
-3,348
(1,278)
-2,576
(1,373)
8,805
(6,663)
477
(1,766)
943
(1,180)
-12,680
(7,721)
-152
(417)
-1,604
(769)

2,066
2,370
(2,282) (2,602)
867
658
(425)
(397)
-2
32
(68)
(56)
-308
-55
(722)
(642)
1,273
1,827
(942) (1,031)
-83
-1,919
(1,066) (1,863)
-1,162
-1,176
(1,140) (1,376)
-670
-152
(1,287) (1,466)
9,467
9,449
(11,463) (10,895)
-675
461
(1,687) (2,126)
1,535
608
(1,096) (1,260)
-789
-516
(11,519) (10,859)
74
216
(426)
(382)
-542
-594
(801)
(660)

4,045
(1,899)
402
(226)
25
(50)
-517
(566)
503
(769)
-840
(1,338)
-1,805
(1,051)
-487
(1,138)
3,898
(8,129)
-641
(1,671)
660
(955)
4,484
(9,419)
143
(339)
-286
(611)
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Exhibit B.7 (continued)
Comparison group
ScreenNoExperimental
Withdrawals cuts
shows
controls
314
132
268
100
(147)
(142)
(129)
(168)
23,043
% Previous wage > $25
N/A
N/A
8,868
(9,116)
(7,400)
Avg. total earnings 1984
.93
1.12
1.32
1.07
(.20)
(.21)
(.25)
(.17)
1,854
% Kentucky
1,901
334
1,630
(1,304)
(1,200) (1,470)
(1,083)
% New Jersey
3,239
2,052
1,676
754
(1,103)
(1,051) (1,152)
(876)
% New York
16,975
3,076
4,005
-3,391
(7,732)
(11,452) (10,786)
(9,380)
776
762
% Ohio
1,059
1,989
(1,171)
(1,180) (1,315)
(961)
% South Carolina
931
373
103
1,057
(1,262)
(1,198) (1,273)
(925)
-128
-1,683
% Texas
-1,633
-1,716
(1,160)
(1,105) (1,128)
(883)
% State missing
-5,287
-8,466
5,760
-6,857
(6,303)
(7,914) (7,544)
(7,691)
% Rated "excellent"
1,490
1,260
1,215
808
(544)
(550)
(415)
(516)
-880
-752
% Rated "fair"
-1,121
-1,013
(472)
(465)
(506)
(393)
% Rated "poor"
1,376
-2,170
4,453
802
(1,342)
(941) (4,186)
(3,512)
-285
-549
% Rating missing
-1,143
-1,224
(417)
(413)
(503)
(389)
Dependent variable
mean
Avg. previous wage

Adjusted R2
Sample size

.41
226

.32
251

.42
168

.24
334
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Exhibit B.8 1985-86 Full-Model Weighted Least-Squares Regression
Estimates, by Comparison Group (standard errors in
parentheses)
Comparison group
NoScreenDependent variable
Experimental
mean
Withdrawals outs
controls
shows
Mean annual earnings,
$2,971 $3,688
$3,192
$2,825
1985-86
Coefficients of
independent variables
-976
Intercept
-2,476
-1,683
126
(1,208) (1,360)
(1,292)
(945)
Participant dummy
2,713
2,229
1,623
1,630
(210)
(355)
(222)
(112)
Average age
60
32
35
66
(29)
(30)
(25)
(35)
-157
-81
-405
% Black
30
(317)
(340)
(281)
(377)
% Hispanic
1,027
637
586
551
(498)
(439)
(539)
(383)
-385
-334
-780
% Other race (or
-2,567
unknown)
(609)
(564)
(666)
(974)
-581
-202
-98
-674
% Education < 12 years
(620)
(719)
(604)
(523)
-430
-97
% Education =12 years
593
236
(681)
(666)
(766)
(566)
-120
-323
% Education missing
-6,827
-1,994
(3,233)
(6,067) (5,695)
(4,047)
-225
-916
-375
-326
% Never married
(857)
(893) (1,111)
(832)
% Married, spouse
919
434
1,021
354
present
(573)
(580)
(476)
(659)
% Marital status missing
-1,521
2,942
7,325
3,251
(3,747)
(6,096) (5,676)
(4,688)
-32
-120
Avg. # dependent
117
58
children
(202)
(202)
(223)
(169)
-7
-397
% Ever worked for pay
12
47
(373)
(419)
(349)
(304)
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Exhibit B.8 (continued)
Comparison group
ScreenNoExperimental
Withdrawals outs
shows
controls
-8
-24
40
21
(71)
(75)
(64)
(88)
% Previous wage > $25
N/A
3,858
-2,695
N/A
(4,424)
(3,916)
% Kentucky
1,723
1,516
2,096
1,229
(633)
(769)
(635)
(539)
% New Jersey
1,224
747
801
555
(535)
(602)
(436)
(556)
% New York
-1,815
2,473
-6,456
-3,019
(3,752)
(6,061) (5,638)
(4,669)
% Ohio
3,482
2,206
3,648
2,036
(568)
(624)
(688)
(479)
% South Carolina
625
291
633
587
(612)
(665)
(634)
(460)
260
% Texas
19
343
187
(563)
(585)
(590)
(439)
-170
% State missing
2,819
1,573
2,023
(3,058)
(4,188) (3,944)
(3,828)
% Rated "excellent"
571
556
507
190
(284)
(267)
(273)
(207)
-286
-134
-314
-159
% Rated "fair"
(229)
(246)
(264)
(196)
-940
% Rated "poor"
504
5,922
3,260
(651)
(498) (2,188)
(1,748)
-347
-229
-54
-121
% Rating missing
(202)
(218)
(263)
(194)

Dependent variable
mean
Avg. previous wage

Adjusted R2
Sample size

.67
226

.61
251

.58
168

.56
334
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Exhibit B.9 1987-90 Full-Model Weighted Least-Squares Regression
Estimates, by Comparison Group (standard errors in
parentheses)
Comparison group
ScreenNoDependent variable
Experimental
mean
Withdrawals outs
shows
controls
Mean annual earnings,
$4,532
$4,340 $4,691
$4,399
1987-90
Coefficients of
independent variables
Intercept
2,289
1,077
560
2,657
(1,455)
(2,078)
(1,647) (1,994)
443
Participant dummy
1,214
763
809
(571)
(286)
(325)
(173)
Average age
14
46
27
3
(47)
(41)
(52)
(38)
-491
-191
-535
-698
% Black
(434)
(510)
(463)
(553)
% Hispanic
241
845
214
1,395
(706)
(680)
(790)
(589)
-355
% Other race (or
-1,347
-1,885
-1,075
(1,025)
unknown)
(981)
(780) (1,428)
-522
-747
-1,800
% Education < 12 years
-2,585
(823)
(1,055)
(806)
(998)
-339
-915
-1.482
94
% Education =12 years
(1,072)
(872)
(929) (1,124)
% Education missing
5,781
4,327
5,380
-2,444
(6,231)
(5,202)
(8,275) (8,351)
-860
-613
-489
% Never married
-1,403
(1,378)
(1,217) (1,630)
(1,281)
1,584
1,183
% Married, spouse
1,219
1,009
present
(922)
(732)
(791)
(966)
-227
% Marital status missing
-7,749
652
6,443
(7,219)
(6,028)
(8,315) (8,323)
Avg. # dependent
269
183
267
212
children
(327)
(325)
(276)
(260)
-883
-471
-309
-178
% Ever worked for pay
(614)
(476)
(469)
(600)
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Exhibit B.9 (continued)
Comparison group
ScreenNoExperimental
Withdrawals cuts
shows
controls
237
255
145
124
(115)
(102)
(128)
(99)
% Previous wage > $25
9,175
4,666
0
0
(5,342)
(7,117)
(0)
(0)
% Kentucky
1,715
1,145
906
555
(1,017)
(866) (1,127)
(830)
% New Jersey
1,618
1,176
2,389
1,060
(758)
(861)
(671)
(883)
% New York
11,158
1,216
2,354
-4,883
(8,267) (8,267)
(6,036)
(7,190)
% Ohio
1,081
868
1,115
1,999
(914)
(852) (1,008)
(737)
% South Carolina
1,023
479
241
305
(865)
(985)
(709)
(976)
-142
-871
% Texas
-1,339
-1,426
(798)
(865)
(906)
(676)
% State missing
-2,697
-1,873
4,185
-3,417
(5,713) (5,782)
(4,920)
(5,895)
% Rated "excellent"
1,100
1,193
433
949
(429)
(373)
(417)
(318)
-709
-872
-688
-673
% Rated "fair"
(336)
(369)
(301)
(388)
% Rated "poor"
737
-1,966
1,640
3,900
(1,048)
(2,692)
(679) (3,209)
-86
-626
-929
-329
% Rating missing
(326)
(298)
(386)
(298)

Dependent variable
mean
Avg. previous wage

Adjusted R2
Sample size

.44
226

.44
251

.49
168

.32
334

Appendix C
Tests for Proven Bias in Nonexperimental
Impact Estimates: Voluntary versus Mandatory Programs
In testing for selection bias in nonexperimental measures of the effects of
employment and training programs, procedures differ between voluntary and
mandatory programs. We explain why in this appendix. As noted in chapter 4,
for voluntary programs these tests require more effort than is warranted in the
current study. Tests for proven bias may prove worthwhile in other studies, in
which case the analysis of alternative test methods provided here takes on
heightened significance.
We begin with a general discussion of bias test procedures that readers with
statistical backgrounds may wish to skip. We then deescribe our approaches to
proving bias for mandatory and voluntary programs and critique an alternative
voluntary approach from the literature.
The General Structure of Tests for Proven Bias
To prove that a nonexperimental impact estimate suffers from selection bi
as, one must first assume that an impact estimate from a randomized experi
ment does not. Under this assumption, and ignoring other possible sources of
bias (e.g., a nonrepresentative sample), the experiment estimates true program
impact without bias. To be unbiased, a nonexperimental estimator must esti
mate the same quantity. This proposition that the experimental and nonex
perimental estimators estimate the same quantity serves as the null
hypothesis in testing for proven bias. As in any statistical test, we look for con
clusive evidence that the null hypothesis is wrong. Should we find such evi
dence, we will have proven that selection bias exists.
A standard method for determining whether two estimates estimate the
same quantity is a test of the statistical significance of their difference wheth
er that difference differs significantly from zero. A test of this sort shows
whether the difference between the two estimates could have arisen by chance
alone while estimating a common quantity. If so, the null hypothesis of no dif
ference is allowed to stand. If not, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude
that the two estimates estimate two different quantities and, hence, that selec
tion bias is present in the nonexperimental estimate.
Bias Tests Involving Overlapping Samples: The Case
of Mandatory Programs
Tests for selection bias based on comparisons of experimental and nonex
perimental impact estimates are complicated by the fact that the two estimates
come from overlapping samples. In evaluating employment and training pro-
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grams, data on program participants are necessarily included in both the exper
imental and nonexperimental estimates, creating an automatic correlation
between the two measures which must be taken into account in conducting the
test.
Fortunately, for mandatory training programs there is a way to eliminate the
correlation. In this instance, the desired experimental estimate of impacts on
participants is just the difference between the average treatment group outcome
and the average control group outcome, since all treatment group members par
ticipate in the program to some extent (if only through the threat of sanctions
for nonparticipation). 1 Each nonexperimental estimate is the difference be
tween the average outcome for the treatment (i.e., participant) group and a
"without-program" representation of that group derived from the comparison
sample. Thus, the two estimates differ only in the use of a control group mean
or a comparison group mean, measures drawn from nonoverlapping samples.
The comparison of average outcomes for these two groups which are uncorrelated can become the focus of the test, implicitly "cancelling out" the par
ticipants who play a parallel role in both of the original impact estimates.
Though not indicated in their text, Friedlander and Robins (1992) presum
ably followed a procedure of this sort when testing for bias among nonexperi
mental estimates of the effects of mandatory AFDC employment and training
programs.
Bias Tests Involving Overlapping Samples: The Case
of Voluntary Programs
The cancellation strategy just described does not work when evaluating vol
untary training programs such as the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide
Demonstrations or the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) program. Here, the
desired experimental impact estimate is not simply the difference in average
outcomes between participants and control group members. Rather, it is the
broader treatment-control group difference adjusted for no-shows individu
als assigned to receive treatment who fail to participate in the program. As ex
plained in chapter 3, an experiment estimates the average effect on participants
by dividing the average effect on the treatment group by the treatment group
participation rate.2
Because of the no-show adjustment, participants in voluntary programs are
not compared to members of the control group in a way that allows for their
"cancellation" when contrasting experimental and nonexperimental impact es
timates. Nor can the entire treatment group be "cancelled" in a such a fashion,
since the nonexperimental estimate does not use this group.3 An alternative is
to abandon the cancellation approach, calculate the covariance between the two
impact estimates, and take it into account in testing for significant differences
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between the two. As explained in chapter 4, we view this added effort as unneeded in the current context, where we wish to prove the absence of bias rath
er than its presence. It may become essential in other applications, however.4

Removing Overlap by Cancelling Out the Entire Treatment Group
Another means of testing for selection bias in voluntary programs appears
in the literature. Hotz (1991) suggests comparing control and comparison
groups as a way of validating nonexperimental impact estimates from the Na
tional JTPA Study, a voluntary program with high no-show rates. Heckman
and Roselius (1994) apply this technique to JTPA data on female youths, where
the no-show rate among treatment group members is 33 percent. In identifying
a comparison group that matches the female youth control group, they have in
effect found a valid substitute for the experimental control group when estimat
ing effects on the entire treatment group. It must be noted, however, that this
is not the same as finding a valid counterfactual for participants alone when a
substantial number of no-shows appear in the experimental treatment group.5
To use such a comparison group, one has to compare it to a combined sam
ple of participants and no-shows. This raises several issues when thinking
about future applications of the technique:
To produce a reasonable estimate of a program's average impact on par
ticipants, the comparison of participants and no-shows to the comparison
group would need to be followed by the no-show adjustment, just as in
the experiment. As a result, future nonexperimental analyses would have
to adopt the assumption of no effects on no-shows when, in principle, the
no-shows need not enter into the analysis at all.
The full technique has little intuitive appeal, proposing first to derive a
nonexperimental estimate of program effects on the combined partici
pant-plus-no-show sample, and then to recover the desired effect on par
ticipants-only by making the no-show adjustment. This eventual
"removal" of no-shows from the analysis begs the question of why they
were included in the first place.
The need for a participant-plus-no-show sample and the subsequent
no-show adjustment might well be overlooked in future applications of
the method. Instead, studies might inappropriately adopt the comparison
group as an appropriate counterfactual to participants alone.
Correct use of the technique requires additional data collection for the
no-show sample, a group that most conventional nonexperimental analy
ses ignore. No-shows may be difficult to identify in the field (if program
operators are reluctant or unable to identify all of the applicants admitted
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to their programs) and will add to the sample for which baseline and fol
low-up data are needed.
In light of these difficulties, it would seem more useful to focus validation
research for voluntary programs on comparisons of alternative impact estima
tors, not on comparisons of comparison and control groups.6

NOTES
1. This is true of any program where treatment group members are subject to some type of
intervention regardless of their own decisions. In such circumstances, all treatment group mem
bers are participants.
2. As explained by Bloom (1984b), this procedure assumes no effect on nonparticipants, a
standard assumption in experimental evaluations of voluntary employment and training programs.
If r represents the share of treatment group members who participate in the program, the average
effect of the program on the treatment group as a whole (7) can be decomposed into a weighted
average of the average effect on participants (P) and a zero effect on no-shows: T= r+P + (l-r)»0.
Solving for P, we get P = Tlr as the no-show-adjusted impact estimate for participants.
3. The nonexperimental estimate uses participants but not no-shows. We explore below the
possibility of redefining nonexperimental estimates to include participants and no-shows.
4. The problem of correlation between experimental and nonexperimental estimators could
still be handled through a modification of the "cancellation" strategy, were it not for the inclusion
of baseline variables in the standard impact model. (A description of the modified cancellation
approach can be obtained from the first coauthor.) With the inclusion of baseline variables, the
strategy fails because experimental and nonexperimental estimators are typically designed to
relate baseline variables to participant outcomes in different ways. In deriving an experimental
estimate, the relationship between baseline characteristics and outcomes is generally assumed to
be the same for participants and no-shows, and usually for controls as well (the three groups
included in the experimental analysis). In contrast, the relationship between baseline characteris
tics and outcomes is generally assumed to be the same for participants and the comparison group
when deriving nonexperimental estimators. (The equations in chapter 3 illustrate these points.) It
thus becomes impossible to "net out" the participant group from both estimators, since it enters in
different ways in the two contexts.
5. This assumes that participants differ from the treatment group as a whole due to self-selec
tion following random assignment.
6. There is one instance in which a comparison/control group emphasis could still provide a
valid short-cut in testing for selection bias: if there are strong a priori reasons to expect a particu
lar comparison group to match up well with the combined participant-plus-no-show sample (but
not with the participant sample alone). This is true of one of the three applicant-based comparison
groups tested in this monograph, screen-outs. For this comparison group approach, it would be
possible to "cancel out" the participant-plus-no-show sample from the experimental and nonex
perimental estimators to focus on the remaining contrast between the control and comparison
groups. We do not take this approach here, however, since this option is not generally available in
nonexperimental analyses of voluntary programs and cannot be used for the other two comparison
groups covered in this monograph (withdrawals and no-shows).

Appendix D
Upper and Lower Bounds on the Risk Function
This appendix provides proofs that:
The special case of a posterior distribution with zero correlation
between the expected value of a nonexperimental impact estimator and
true program impact provides an upper bound on the risk function
defined in chapter 4; and
The special case of a posterior distribution with perfect positive correla
tion (correlation coefficient = 1.00) between the expected value of a
nonexperimental impact estimator and true program impact does not
provide a lower bound on the risk function defined in chapter 4.
Proof that the Zero-Correlation Special Case Provides an Upper Bound
on Risk
The general equation for risk from chapter 4 of the text states the probability
of making an erroneous policy decision when using a nonexperimental impact
estimator, N, to determine whether true impact, /, exceeds some cutoff value,
C*:
(1) #(C*) = Pr (N < C* and / > C*) +
Pr(N>C*andI<C*),
where the probabilities involved come from the joint posterior distribution of
N and /, which is assumed to be normal. Equation (1) can be restated in terms
of the conditional and marginal distributions of N and /, respectively, as:
(2) R(C*) = Pr (N < C* I / > C*) Pr (I > C*) +
Pr(N>C*\I< C*) Pr (I < C*) .
When N and / are positively correlated,
(3) Pr(N<C*\I>C*)<Pr(N<C*),
since knowing that true impact is larger than some threshold value (7 > C*) re
duces the probability that the nonexperimental estimator is smaller than that
value (N < C*). By similar reasoning, positive correlation also implies that
(4) Pr (N>C*\I<C*)< Pr (N>C*) .
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If we now substitute the larger right-hand expressions from equations (3)
and (4) in place of the smaller lefthand expressions where they appear in equa
tion 2, we get:
(5) R(C*) <Pr (N < C*) Pr (I > C*) +
Pr(N>C*)'Pr(I<C*).
The right-hand side of this equation is precisely the expression for R(C*) ob
tained in the text (from equation (1)) when N and / are assumed to be uncorrelated (and, hence, through normality, independent). It follows, then, that risk
derived under the assumption of zero correlation exceeds true risk whenever
correlation is believed to be positive. In other words, the risk derived under the
assumption of zero correlation provides an upper bound on true risk for any
non-negative true correlation.
Proof that the Perfect Positive Correlation Special Case Does Not Provide
a Lower Bound on Risk
Perfect positive correlation between N and / allows us to express TV as a lin
ear transformation of/. We do so in this section, in order to show that this spe
cial case does not automatically minimize the risk of policy error in comparison
to cases where the relationship between N and / is not so tightly constrained.
In general, one can stipulate an entire family of linear transformations of /
which each have the same marginal distribution as N:
(6)

F = E (N) -E(I) • J [Var (N) - Var (e) ] /Var (/) +
V [ Var (N) - Var (e) ] /Var (/) / + e,

where e is a normal random variable with mean 0 and variance Var(e) (<
Var(Af)) uncorrelated with N and /. Different values for Var(e) give different
members of the family.
In general, equation (6) transforms two independent normal random vari
ables, / and e, into a third normal random variable, F. The mean and variance
of this new variable are E(N) and Var(W), respectively; thus, N is a member of
the family. The covariance and correlation of these variables with / are given
by the formulas:
(7) Cov (F, /) = V[Var(tf) - Var (e) ] /Var (/) Var (/) , and

161

(8) Cor(F,7) = Cov (F*. 7) / VVar (F) Var (/)
= V [ Var (N) - Var (e) ] /Var (AT) .
What distinguishes N from other variables in the family is its perfect posi
tive correlation with 7. To achieve Cor(F,7) = 1, Var(e) must be 0. In this special
case, equation (6) defines the particular family member N:
(9)

N = E (N) -£(/) VVar (N) /Var (/) +
VVar (AT)/Var (/) /,

since e identically equals 0 whenever Var(e) = 0.
We can now rewrite equation (1) replacing N with the linear transformation
of / given in the right-hand expression of equation (9). This produces a risk
function for the perfect positive correlation subcase:
(10) R(C*) = Pr{E(N) -£(/) VVar (N) /Var (/) +
VVar (N) /Var (/) / < C*, and / > C* } +
Pr {E (N) -£ (/) VVar (N) /Var (/) +
VVar (AT) /Var (/) /> C*, and / < C* } .
Solving each probability term for/, this equation reduces to:

(11)

R(C*) = Pr{C*<I< [C*-E(N)] -JVar(I)/Var(N)
+Pr{ [C*-E(N) ]

JVar(I)/Var(N) +

E(I) <!<€*}.
One of the two terms in this expression is always 0 for a given C*, since C*
cannot simultaneously be both below and above
[C*-E(N)] • VVar (/) /Var (N) + E (7) .
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Without loss of generality, assume C* exceeds this expression so that equation
(11) reduces to:
(12) R(C*) = Pr { [C* -E (N) ] • VVar (/) /Var (N) +
£(/) </<C*}.
Exhibit D.I shows this probability as the shaded area under the marginal
posterior distribution of/. We need to consider whether other risk functions
those implied by posteriors without perfect positive correlation between TV and
/ would encompass a smaller or larger probability of error (i.e., area). What
ever its other properties, we know that in general N has meanE(N) and variance
Var(7V) and so must be a member of the family F. When N does not correlate
perfectly with /, Var(e) is not 0 and equation (6), rather than equation (9), be
comes the starting point for deriving a risk index. Here, equation (12) becomes:
(13) R(C*) = Pr{[C*-E(N) -e~\ •
VVar (/) /Var (N) -Var (e) + E (I) <I<C*}.
This change from equation (12) alters the left-hand boundary of the shaded
region in exhibit D.I in two ways:
By shifting it to the left or right, as the square-root factor declines in
magnitude right if C*-E(N) is positive, left if C*-E(N) is negative;
and
By adding variation to the boundary unrelated to the distribution of / or
N, through the addition of the stocastic "-e" term.
Once e enters the equation, the risk index at C* becomes an average of a range
of shaded regions generated by this variability in the (now shifted) left-hand
boundary of the region. Each resulting shaded region is weighted according to
the posterior probabilities of various possible values of e.
The critical question is whether these two changes necessarily increase the
value of the risk index at C*, for all possible C*s. If so, the perfect positive cor
relation case is a lower bound on risk; if not, it is not. In fact, each of the chang
es noted above can at times reduce the risk index.
Taking the changes one at a time, consider first a scenario where a general
shift in the boundary is the only change. When C* > E(N), as it necessarily will
be for some C*, this shift moves the boundary to the right, reducing the shaded
area under the curve, and hence the risk.
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Exhibit D.I Risk with Perfect Correlation Between N and I

Posterior
distribution
of I

t

C*

[C* - E (AO ] VVar (/) /Var (N) +£(/)
Now suppose the boundary does not shift, but that the addition of the "-e"
term causes it to vary across different possible values of e. Since e is normally
distributed with a mean of 0, we derive the expected risk by attaching the great
est weight to the shaded region actually shown, where e - 0. This was the only
region that received any weight in computing risks when N and / were perfectly
correlated. It will now count for less than 100 percent and other regions for
more than 0 percent. Each of these other regions can be smaller or larger than
the region shown, depending on the sign of e.
Since normal distributions are symmetric, variations d units to the left of
[C* - E (N) ] • VVar (/) /Var ( N) + E (7)are as likely as variations d units
to the right of [C* - E (N) ] • VVar (7)/Var (TV) + E (/) . These two
variations, and their associated shaded regions, will therefore get equal weights
in our weighted average risk formula. They will not, however, add and subtract
equal areas to the shaded region; whether the addition or subtraction is larger
or smaller will depend on the position of the distribution of / relative to
[C* - E (N) ] VVar(/)/Var(AO + E (/) .As pictured, each addition
will be smaller than the associated subtraction for a given d, reducing the risk
index.
When these two scenarios combine, the risk index unambiguously declines
as the assumption of perfect positive correlation is removed. It follows, then,
that the special case of perfect positive correlation does not provide a lower
bound on risk.
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